From balance of power to regional collectivism : China and Asia-Pacific economic cooperation by Li, Jingzhong
From Balance of Power to Regional Collectivism
China and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Jingzhong Li
)
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
The University of Leeds
Department of East Asian Studies
May 1998
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has
been given where reference has been made to the work of others.
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
LEEDS
Abstract
This thesis is an exercise to examine whether the People's Republic of China will
work together with the other Asia-Pacific countries in a multilateral framework. The
argument that this thesis has made is that, driven mainly by both internal and external
factors, there is a tendency for China to do so. The Chinese government and leaders'
desire to turn China into an economically developed country has been the most important
reasons for the Chinese government to devote more attention to the development of
regional economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
In order to make clear why the Chinese government, since the middle of the 1980s,
actively sought to join the process of constructing regional economic cooperation, I have
divided the whole thesis into two major parts. The first part is, (A), to define what kind of
a region the Asia-Pacific is, and to demonstrate why as geographically and culturally
diversified a region as the Asia-Pacific has become a region; (B) to show why the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation Ministerial Meeting (APEC), a forum, was chosen by the
Asia-Pacific countries to promote economic cooperation in this region. The second part is
focused on China itself. In this part, I shall, (A), find out what has happened in the
thinking of the Chinese leaders and academics to bring about China's participation in
APEC and why; (B), demonstrate that the economic consideration was the most important
reason for the Chinese government's decision to join APEC.
In conclusion, I shall demonstrate that important changes in the Chinese foreign policy
thinking, caused by the momentum of developing regional economic cooperation and the
Chinese government's desire for faster economic development, have led to China's
participation in the APEC process. I shall also show that China is strongly motivated to
adopt regional collectivism and point out that China's APEC membership will lead to
increased cooperation between China and the other Asia-Pacific countries.
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1Introduction
The question to be answered by this study is whether the People's Republic of
China (PRC) can work cooperatively with other countries, particularly its Asia-Pacific
neighbours in a multilateral framework. This study originates in a high-profile
symposium in Beijing for which I worked back in 1986. The symposium was jointly
sponsored by China's State Commission of Economy, and the Pacific Forum, a
California-based foundation devoted to studies of US relations with Asia-Pacific
countries. Its members were well known academics, retired generals of the US military
forces and retired senior intelligence officers. Though the symposium was on Sino-US
economic relations and China's open policies, cooperation between the two countries
under the concept of the Asia-Pacific region was also discussed by some participants.
Not long before this symposium, China became in July 1986 a member of the Pacific
Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), the most important forum at that time
discussing economic cooperation in this region. Five years later in 1991, China joined
the inter-governmental Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Ministerial Meeting (APEC).
Discussions at the symposium and China's involvement in the APEC process made me
realise that a new dimension was in formation in Chinese foreign policy, a dimension
that increasingly stresses multilateral cooperation in its foreign affairs.
What has made the PRC readjust its foreign policy? What causes under what
circumstances will make it do so? What kind of a player will these changes turn China
into? These are questions worth looking into against the background of changes in the
much wider international community. As far as China is concerned, to adjust its policies
so as to assume an international position suitable for it will be determined by a host of
factors. Obviously the priorities of Chinese foreign relations will determine the way that
China readjusts its foreign policy. For this reason, a study of how and why China has
become a member of a forum, dominated by countries which were regarded by it not
long ago as enemies, will help shed light on the way in which China will behave in the
international community.
2The rapid increase of China's economic power and the forecast of the Chinese
economy becoming the world's number one have extended the scope of the study of
Chinese foreign policy. This is to a large extent due to a rapidly rising China in both
economic and military terms. China's seemingly unbending attitudes towards such Asia-
Pacific regional issues as Taiwan and the South China Sea further enlarged in the minds
of scholars of Chinese studies the question of how the international community should
deal with a China that is seen by some as a growing threat and by others as an
opportunity with almost inexhaustible potentials. This issue is made much more •
complicated by the fact that China is not just seen as a threat or as an opportunity. Those
who think China is a threat also believe that China is an important opportunity while
those who see China as an opportunity are also concerned about China's capability to
cause disruption in the international community. Such paradoxical views' come from the
uncertainty whether China is ready to accept and abide by the existing norms of the
international community.'
But the majority of the scholars of Chinese foreign policy accept that China's rise is
inevitable. The emphasis of today's study of Chinese foreign policy is therefore highly
concerned with how to make China a full member of the international community. This
indicates that this branch of China study has entered a new phase. However, the new
studies seem to have their roots in the past. It is necessary to look back before to look at
the present. Traditionally, studies of Chinese foreign policy were very much dominated
by two approaches. One is to try and understand China and China's behaviour in the
international community by looking at the country itself. A typical example for this is the
research by Lillian Craig Harris on the determinants of Chinese foreign policy. In
China's Foreign Policy Toward the Third World Countries, Harris argues that China's
foreign policy comes from three sources: China's past, China's internal politics and
China's relations with the two super powers. 2 A more recent example is that of David
Shambaugh. In his Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972--1990,
3Shambaugh analyses the role played by the various foreign policy departments, research
bodies and researchers.3
The other approach is to study Chinese foreign policy in light of the existing
theories of general international studies. These theories include three main schools of
thought. They are Realism, which highlights the significance of the international
environment, particularly the pursuit and balance of power; Interdependency, which
emphasizes the importance of international political economy and the role of domestic
politics; and Social-psychology, which put the stress on the role of individual decision
makers.4Although scholars of Chinese foreign policy do not necessarily confine
themselves to just one school of thought, but they do seem to put more emphasis on one
school than the other.
Those who subscribe to the first school of thought, for example, have emphasized
the effect of the bipolar, super power dominated international system on the formation
of Chinese foreign policy, particularly the constraints of this system to Chinese foreign
policy choice. For these scholars, the internal political ups and downs are not so
important. For instance, while Jonathan Pollack was so dismissive as to say that
domestic determinants are not critical at all, Robert Ross argues that domestic
determinants only work within the limit set by tripolarity, i.e. the relations between
China, the United States and the Soviet Union. 5 There are also scholars who hold that
Chinese foreign policy has been continuously influenced by the realistic school of
thought.6 They further explain that the pursuit of power balance in an international
environment dominated by the two super powers determined that China must align itself
with one super power in order to deter the other. This was even so when the PRC
declared an independent foreign policy in the 1980s when its relations with the Soviet
Union became more stable. "The declaration of an 'independent foreign policy'...
should not be taken at face value. It did not mean that China had placed itself in the
middle ground between the super powers. China still tilted strongly towards the United
States on the important strategic questions."7
4As far as the study of Chinese foreign policy goes, those who adhere to the second
and third schools of thoughts all start from the domestic situation of China to look for
keys to Chinese foreign policy choice and behaviour. The difference lies in their
emphasis. The former take domestic developments as the overall determinants while the
latter contend that individual leaders had the ultimate say. Those who put the most
emphasis on the domestic developments tend to focus on the impact of the major
political campaigns since the inception of the PRC in 1949. Kenneth Lieberthal, for
example, argues that such events from the Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957 to the Great •
Leap Forward of 1958 to the Cultural Revolution started in 1966 directly influenced "its
posture toward the rest of the world". 8 Some even argue that domestic factors have
more importance than the international system dominated by the super powers. 9 On the
other hand, the school emphasising the importance of individual leaders tend to look at
individual leaders' perception, thinking, strategy and tactics and even personal style for
fundamental reasons for Chinese foreign policy changes. As China has been by and
large under strong personal influence of Mao and Deng, these two figures have been the
focus of attention for this group of scholars.1°
As the structure and pattern of global affairs have fundamentally changed since the
end of the Cold War, China's post-1949 pattern of domestic situation characterised by
the domination of one paramount leader and severe political upheavals has also drawn to
a close. But China's influence and importance are seen to be growing quickly. As
mentioned earlier, the question of how to involve China in the post-Cold War
international community has become a rather urgent one. The whole search for an
answer seems to centre on a dilemma whether China is willing to accept and abide by
the existing norms of the international community.
The research on this issue, which has just started growing, tends to adopt a rather
generalised approach. I divide them up roughly into those that adopt a "macro" view and
those that adopt a "micro" view. The "macro" group tend to consider Chinese
willingness to accept and observe the existing international norms by looking at the
5complete picture of Chinese foreign relations behaviour. They are best represented by
such scholars as Michael Yahuda and Gerald Sega1. 11 They examine this issue by
looking basically at determinants two and three, i.e. domestic restraints on China in this
respect. These restraints include political system, the role of the state, people's
perception of the outside world and nationalism. Their common position is that it is
possible for China to do as expected by the international community. But they
emphasize that there is a strong possibility that China will not always do so, particularly
over such issues as Taiwan and the South China Sea. They therefore maintain that a
high level of readiness should be kept to constrain China whenever it is necessary. Their
difference lies in the level of vigilance because some believe slightly more strongly that
China will be a norm-observing player. 12
On the other hand, the "micro" group, who seem to be in the minority, tend to
consider this issue from two angles. Both paints a positive picture. One explains why
China participates in APEC by looking at internal and external reasons. The other
focuses on the track records of China's involvement in those multilateral economic
organisations that China belongs to. China's APEC membership is considered to be just
a minor aspect. They draw on their own as well as the researches of such people as
Samuel S Kim and Harold Jacobsen and Michel Oksenberg. A good example is the
research by Stuart Harris. He argues that China's track records in these organisations
prove that China is more than willing to accept and observe international norms. China
already acts within the limits of norms of the international community, albeit China is
more likely to do so within those regimes that have less security colours. He contends
that the international community, particularly the United States, should encourage China
more in this direction. "If the Chinese assumption that trade is mutually beneficial is
found wanting, such as through undue US or other politicising of WTO membership, or
in other ways, China's cooperative behaviour in the international field could change." 13
One thing is made clear by the above brief survey. China's motive to participate in
APEC and its implication still remains an area that deserves more thorough study. This
6is by no means to say that the above mentioned researches are useless. They all make
highly convincing arguments on the basis of solid research. However, they are found to
be either too broad in scope, as the "macro" group is, to avoid having this issue
overshadowed, or too brief, as the "micro" group is, to deserve to be described as
thorough. 14 As a phenomenon which reflects significant readjustments in Chinese
foreign policy thinking, it is necessary to undertake more thorough study on China's
motive to participate in APEC and its implication.
In this study, I intend to adopt an approach which combines elements of both
approaches described at the beginning, but highlights domestic elements. I am inclined
to view positively China's ability to accept and observe norms of the international
community. I believe that China's participation in APEC indicates that there is a strong
tendency for China to work together with its neighbours under commonly accepted
norms of international behaviour. I argue that in the post-Cold War era, against the
background of a fundamentally changed world and China's desire for fast economic
development, China is moving away from the concept of balance of power to embrace
regional collectivism by entering into cooperation with its Asia-Pacific neighbours.
Regional collectivism is an idea developed on the basis of the reality of Asia-Pacific
economic cooperation. It is somewhat different from the exiting theories of multilateral
cooperation, such as regionalism or the so-called regime theory. Regional collectivism
does not insist on such conditions as a region in its geographical and cultural senses for
regional cooperation to be undertaken. But regionalism regards a region in its cultural
and geographical senses as a key condition for cooperation. 15 Regional collectivism
refers to a group of members of the global community forming inter-state association on
conditions other than those stressed by regionalism. Regional collectivism also tends to
emphasize more the collective process of developing and maintaining commonly
beneficial norms, rules and decision-making procedures than regimes made up of "sets
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around
which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations".16
7Regional collectivism therefore describes a situation in which a group of countries that
do not belong to the same geographical region work collectively to deal with issues that
concern them all.
As indicated above, different perspectives have been followed in ascertaining the
fundamental determinants of Chinese foreign policy. But as Michael Yahuda has pointed
out, the overriding determinant during the PRC's first forty years was to secure a safe
international environment to allow it to concentrate on domestic development. The tactic
that was deemed to be most essential was to align with one of the super powers to
balance off threats from the other. 17 However, the PRC's APEC membership indicates
that it has accepted that there is a strong necessity for it to revise its approach to its
relations with its Asia-Pacific neighbours in the post-Cold War era. As rapid economic
development has been put at the top of its political agenda, concepts of interdependency
and cooperation with its Asia-Pacific neighbours are accorded increasingly more
importance. This seems to highlight that the significance of balance of power is
declining while that of regional collectivism is increasing in the post-Cold War era.
The Structure of the Thesis
The following study will prove that there is indeed a strong tendency for the PRC to
embrace regional collectivism by examining both the process of building regional
economic cooperation and the process of China joining the APEC. It is necessary to do
so because a better understanding of both processes is important for people to see this
point. Therefore, this study consists of two parts. Part one will determine the nature of
both the region and the organisation. Part Two, which is the key part of this study, will
examine how the PRC joined the APEC and why.
Part one will include chapters one and two. Chapter one will establish how an Asia-
Pacific region came into being. The question it will answer is what made the APEC
member countries, who in fact belong to different geographical and cultural regions,
want to identify themselves as members of the same region. It will start by looking
8briefly at the geographical characteristics of the so-called Asia-Pacific region. Then it
will move on to illustrate what impact the historical evolution of the political and
economic relations between these countries has on the emergence of an Asia-Pacific
region. Chapter two will determine APEC's true identity and the reasons why it became
the chosen format for regional economic cooperation. The question to be answered in
this chapter is what form of economic cooperation the APEC countries want to
undertake. It will look at the influence of a host of factors on the emergence of APEC.
Chapters three and four will make up part two. Chapter three will show how the
PRC became an APEC member. The question to be answered in this chapter is how the
PRC came to accept that it was necessary for China to join the APEC forum. This
chapter will be focus on the domestic debate among the academics and support by
politicians. It will also touch on the international effort to bring China into APEC.
Chapter four will analyse those more fundamental reasons behind the PRC's decision to
join APEC. It will examine these reasons that made China to enter into cooperation with
a group of countries that were once its main enemies. It will focus on China's domestic
economic needs, the change in China's international environment and issue of Taiwan.
In conclusion, I shall argue in chapter five that the PRC's decision to join APEC
does signify that it intends to adopt a more cooperative approach to its relations with its
Asia-Pacific neighbours. It also signifies that the PRC has recognised the significance of
interdependency and cooperation and does consider it necessary to join the other Asia-
Pacific countries to deal with issues confronting them through collective measures.
Research Materials
The research for this study was carried out in Britain. Though Asia-Pacific
economic cooperation is a highly recent topic of discussion, the number of books
written in English on this subject is quite large. The materials used in this particular
research are a mixture of English and Chinese materials, and include books, journal
articles and newspaper reports and commentaries. But I have paid more attention to
9those works discussing the basic ideas, and those which make general and
comprehensive studies of this region. These works can fulfil two purposes. One is that
they make it possible for me to study the idea of economic cooperation in this region in
its original form. The other is that general and comprehensive discussions on the Asia-
Pacific region can help put the whole region into perspective. This helps me to gain a
better understanding of not only the idea itself, but also the Asia-Pacific area as a region.
As far as researches on the basic ideas are concerned, Kiyoshi Kojima's Japan and
Pacific Free Trade Area, Peter Drysdale's 18 US Congressional Research Report,
International Economic Pluralism: Economic Policy in East Asia and the Pacific are
treated as primary resources as they are the pioneering works on this subject. As for the
political relations in this region, I have come across a large amount of books and journal
articles on them. I find some of them, such as Michael Yahuda's The International
Politics of the Asia-Pacific, Gerald Segal's Rethinking the Pacific, and Richard H.
Brown and William T. Liu ed. Modernisation in East Asia, Political, Economic, and
Social Perspectives, extremely useful.
The research on China has been based mainly on Chinese materials, as the study
wishes to present the argument for the PRC to participate in the cooperation process
from a Chinese perspective. Such a selection of materials make it quite difficult to
broaden the scope of materials covered. This is particularly true for the study on China's
reactions to the early development of the idea of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. I
rely on Renmin Ribao (RMRB., People's Daily) as the main source of material for this
period. This is because no books written by Chinese authors (let alone books written by
foreign authors) on this topic have been found. Materials covering China's early
reactions are also extremely rare. Since the first formal discussion of economic co-
operation was in the second half of the 1960s, in China's case the heydays of the
Cultural Revolution, academic research was totally stopped. Renmin Ribao (RMRB.,
People's Daily) is therefore the only source of materials to turn to.
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As far as research materials are concerned, the situation became much better after
economic reform started as academic discussion became less restricted and widespread.
In addition to Retunin Ribao, other sources, especially academic journals, have become
available. The journals that I have relied on include Zhongguo Waijiao (Chinese
Diplomacy), Zhongguo Zhengzhi (Chinese Politics), Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (International
Studies), Shtfie Zhishi (World Knowledge), Guoji Maoyi (International Trade),
Guomin Jingji Jihuayu Guattli (Planning and Administration of the National Economy),
Shijie Jingji (World Economy). These journals, although either run or supported by the
government, have their contributors who are either officials, members of government
controlled research institutes, or senior members of government think tanks. The views
expressed often reflected official positions. Beside, various yearbooks published by
different Chinese institutions and books written by Chinese authors on general issues of
China's foreign relations and foreign economic relations were extensively referred to. I
have also used extensively government statements and official speeches on this issue.
The discussion on Taiwan's position in the process was based on articles carried in
Taiwan's Zhongyang Ribao (ZYRB., Central Daily), Hong Kong's Tai Kung Pao and
RMRB.
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Chapter One. The Asia-Pacific: A Region of Unusual Traits
As East Asia became another centre of rapid growth in the world economy towards
the end of the 20th century, people began to talk about a Pacific era, or Pacific century.
The intensification of the economic and trade relations between the countries ringing the
vast Pacific ocean and efforts to promote economic cooperation among these countries
made the idea of an Asia-Pacific region became ever more widely accepted by business
people, politicians, academics and journalists. Discussions on this topic therefore tend
to look for the origins of the Asia-Pacific region in the development of the political and,
especially the economic, relations among the concerned countries during the most recent
half century. 1
 In fact, the evolution of such relations over the past centuries played a
significant part in the emergence of the Asia-Pacific region. On the basis of such
evolution, the drastic changes taken place over the past two to three decades solidified
the concept of an Asia-Pacific region in world politics and economy.
The idea of an Asia-Pacific region is highly unusual in the fact that it does not carry
with the connotation as that attributed to Western Europe. It is founded by and large on
the reality of the intra-regional political and economic relations. In order to illustrate this
point, I will start this chapter by looking at the geographical characteristics of this
region. This will be followed by separate studies of the evolution of the intra-regional
political and economic relations. It will therefore include three sections. Firstly, the
region's geographic and human characteristics will be outlined. Secondly, the history of
the Asia-Pacific region will be reviewed, dwelling mainly on the intra-regional political
relations between 1965, the year when economic co-operation was formally discussed
for the first time,2 and 1993, the year when the first APEC informal summit was held.
It will highlight the impact of such major events as the normalisation of the Sino-US
relations and the end of the Cold War on the evolution of intra-regional relations.
Thirdly, it will look at the intra-regional economic relations in late 20th century.
1. 1. The Asia-Pacific Region--Some Basic Facts
13
"The politics, economics and strategy of any area are played out in a distinctive
environment... The politics of the Pacific basin can be understood only if the
geographic realities are appreciated." 3
 This is undoubtedly also true for the process of
constructing regional economic cooperation. But for those who are dismissive of Asia-
Pacific regional economic cooperation, one of their main arguments is that it lacks the
basic elements that make it a region of nations. "As a concept, 'Asia-Pacific' makes little
sense. Unlike East Asia or South Asia or Southeast Asia, it has no shared history or
common cultural traits. Asia-Pacific is not even an accepted geographical entity."4
The most suitable description of the Asia-Pacific is that it is a region which is vast
and abundant yet heterogeneous and rather fragmented. The most commonly accepted
definition is that, as a region, the Asia-Pacific include both the Pacific rim countries
(whose shores are washed by the Pacific Ocean) and those Southeast Asian nations who
are geographically and culturally closer to the Pacific rim East Asian countries than to
other regions.5 Taken together, the Asia-Pacific region is, therefore, made up of some
30 per cent of the world's land surface and hold some 40% of the world's population.6
The other most significant factor is the Pacific Ocean itself. According to the New
Encyclopaedia of Britannia, at 165 250 000 square kilometres, it is more than twice the
size of the second largest ocean, the Atlantic.7
Those who tend to dismiss the feasibility of conducting economic co-operation in
this region argue that the Asia-Pacific region is too large and fragmented for that.
Separated (though linked as seen by others) by the Pacific Ocean, communication is
made more difficult between countries ringing the Pacific Ocean than between some of
them and countries not considered as Asia-Pacific countries. For instance, they point to
the fact that a person travelling from Beijing to Sydney will need more time than to
travel to London. The distance between Hong Kong and Mexico City at 14,122 km is
over one and half times of the distance from Hong Kong to Paris, which is 9,601 km .8
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Another more persuasive theory arguing against conducting economic cooperation
in this region is the heterogeneous nature of the Asia-Pacific region. There are 34
countries and a large number of areas under trusteeship. They stress that these countries
have more differences than similarities with each other. Sharp difference is said to exist
in many aspects. For instance, more than a thousand languages are spoken among the
over 2.4 billion people. There are other more significant differences in the sizes of these
countries, their populations and their wealth. Here are in terms of area all of the world's
five largest countries, Russia, Canada, China, the United States and Australia. The rest -
of the countries, though much smaller than these countries, still have more differences
than similarities in terms of both size and population. In addition, some of the world's
richest nations exist side by side with some of the world's poorest ones. Huge historical
and cultural differences are also found in this region. Moreover, their stress is put on
the huge political and cultural differences among these countries. The countries are said'
to range from the most democratic to the most authoritarian. Religiously, all the world's
main religions are practised in this region. But they tend to figure more prominently in
different parts of this region.9
Big difference is also found in the possession of resources. The Asia-Pacific region
is blessed with a wide range and large quantities of natural and cultivated resources. The
vastness of the Asia-Pacific region bestows upon it enormous quantities of mineral
resources. The Asia-Pacific region has its fair share of energy resources on a per capita
basis as well. Even more importantly, this region is the largest producer of certain
resources. For instance, some 60 per cent of the world's nickel and tin are produced
here. The Asia-Pacific region contains some 70 per cent of the world's uranium
reserves. Asia-Pacific's production of other resources, such as coal, iron ore, natural
gas, oil and aluminium are also around 50% of the world's tota1.10
Though nature is generous in offering natural resources to the region as a whole, its
distribution is by no means fair and even. Here, size plays the crucial part. Except for
some smaller countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia which are rich in certain
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individual mineral or energy items, the distribution of both mineral and energy
resources favours the largest countries, United States, Russia, China, Canada, and
Australia. But apart from these countries, the rest of the 20 some Asia-Pacific countries
suffer from shortages of both mineral and energy resources. Certain countries even rely
on other countries for the supply of some of the key resources. The classical case is that
of Japan. Such a pattern of distribution naturally makes those resource-rich countries
main resource-producing countries too.11
But nature is much more even-handed in the distribution of another highly
significant resource: food. Despite the fact that nature is not very friendly with the Asia-
Pacific region as vast tracts of land are useless for food production, 12 food has never
been a problem for the Asia-Pacific region. 60 per cent of the world's rice is grown in
the Asia-Pacific states, with the United States, China, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan,
Vietnam, the Philippines, and Korea as the leading producers. Wheat is important in the
region and is also produced in large quantities. This is the case even with the American
and Canadian production excluded. It accounts for 20 per cent of the world's wheat
production, with China and Australia as the major wheat producers.13
In addition to cereals, fish is another staple food for this region. The Pacific Ocean,
the world's largest, is an endless supply of seafood for the peoples in this region. Six
of the top ten fishing nations are situated around the Pacific. Japan leads, followed by
the United States, China, Peru, South Korea, and Thailand. Chile, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Canada are also significant fishers in Pacific waters. Taken together,
they share some 50 per cent of the world's fish catch. Not surprisingly, the sea remains
a vital source of food for the Asia-Pacific peoples. Fish production in the Pacific region
can be substantially bigger than what is actually tapped. This can be proved by the
absence from the list of Australia, Malaysia, and the Pacific micro-islands, countries
with long coastlines.14
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The vastness of the Asia-Pacific region also means that it covers several climate
zones. The differences in climate seem to be a favourable factor. Apart from basic
foods, there is a variety of cash crops made possible by such diverse climates. The
Asia-Pacific countries are major producers of sugar, coffee, palm oil, cotton, rubber
and tobacco. Here the varied climate, especially the tropical climate, carries fundamental
importance. Climate has made possible huge production, yet less even distribution of
the production, which tends to be concentrated in a much smaller number of countries.
For instance, Malaysia accounts for 50 per cent of the world's total production of palm
oil. Different cash crops also tend to concentrate in countries whose climates are
suitable. For instance, coffee and sugar are the main cash crops for tropical countries in
Southeast Asia and Latin America. 80 per cent of rubber is produced in Southeast Asia.
China is the only main rubber producer outside this area, yet its production is
concentrated in the southern most regions. Tobacco comes mainly from China, Japan
and the Korean Peninsula.15
The above brief description of the Asia-Pacific region shows that the Asia-Pacific is
indeed not a region of nations in its usual sense. It is a vast and abundant region with
fundamental differences. Physically, it can hardly be regarded as a single and integrated
region. Natural as well as political and economic conditions tend to group the Asia-
Pacific countries into smaller groups. These smaller groups tend to be culturally closer
to each other too. Long distances also exist among these groups. The only physical link
is the world's largest ocean - the Pacific. This increases the level of difficulty in
communication. The abundant yet unevenly distributed natural and cultivated resources
seems to make it possible and necessary for the Asia-Pacific countries to undertake
cooperation. But that tends to intensify the economic and trade relations between these
1 ,2	 .
countries only. That is not enough to make the Asia-Pacific a region.
1. 2. Intra-Regional Political Relations: The Past
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The existence of the Asia-Pacific region, one can safely say, is very short. But the
Asia-Pacific region is, to a large extent, shaped by the centuries of evolution of the
relations between nations of this region, which started from that between the ancient
nations of the Far East. While the relations between these ancient nations left deep
influence on the future Asia-Pacific region, it was the attraction of this part of world as a
centre for world trade and a source of much coveted goods that had attracted, first, the
European colonists, and then, the imperialists to this region. The interactions between
the local nations and the western countries, especially the imperialist contention in East
Asia and over China particularly started the development of centre of international
relations among the countries ringing the Pacific.
1. 2. A. The Oriental World Centred on China
To certain extent, the roots of the Asia-Pacific region can be traced to East Asia.
For hundreds of years before European colonisation spread to FAst Asia, this region had
an international system of its own. This system was centred on one huge nation---
China, thanks to her far more advanced civilisation. Due to the fact that China had by
far a more advanced economy and a powerful central government keeping the country
unified for most of the time, China's position was unrivalled by its much smaller and
weaker neighbours. The country to country relations, as a result, was very much under
China's influence. As a result, there evolved a relationship between a metropolitan state
and tributaries. 16 But China also faced challenges, sometimes serious challenges, from
outside its boundaries, particularly from some of the nomadic peoples in the so called
Inner Asia. 17 But Chinese civilisation was solid enough to accommodate and assimilate
such challenges while enabling China to leave long-lasting influences.
Through many centuries, ancient China was ruled by different dynasties, some
lasting longer than others. The biggest concern for the successive Chinese emperors,
however, was to maintain and extend the harmonious environment for their rule. 18 As
far as international relations were concerned, the idea of harmony was to prevent any
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nation from threatening the emperors' rule. Various policies were followed at different
times to achieve this. The first was to extend the emperors' rule. For instance, during
the Han Dynasty (206 BC to 220 AD) and particularly during the reign of Emperor Han
Wu Di, territorial expansion was carried out wherever possible. 19 This was true for
China's most powerful dynasty, the Tang Dynasty, as well.
As outward expansion petered out, the second policy, that to maintain an
international order centred on China, was put in place. This policy was applied to those
areas which were too far and too difficult for the Chinese emperors to sustain effective
rule. Under such an order, the nations under Chinese influence were incorporated into
the so-called Tributary System. While these nations enjoyed support and various
privileges, such as the trading privilege, they were supposed to be equal to each other.
Whenever disputes broke out, they would have China as their arbiter, otherwise China
would throw her weight behind one against another. In order to exchange for China's
support and the various privileges, the rulers of these nations would have to assure the
Chinese emperors their allegiance by paying tributes to the Chinese emperors. The
tributary system was most successful in what is Southeast Asia today. 20 China also
used her power to create vassal states. This was most successful in Korea. By throwing
her weight behind one kingdom against another, Korea was kept a vassal state until
almost the modern age.21
The third policy for such an international order was to pacify those nations which
China could not subjugate through the above two policies. According to such writers of
Chinese history as Morris Rossabi and Wang Gungwu, China applied the tributary
system to these nations too. Yet the tributary system was different in the sense that these
nations enjoyed more benefits, and tributes were paid to China to exchange for more
returns and to maintain favourable trading relations with China.22 As for those nations
or tribes refusing to be incorporated into the China-centred international system and
constantly harassed China, expeditions were carried out to remove them as threats.23
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The effect of the above policies depended very much on the Chinese emperor who
executed them. Whenever China had a powerful emperor, such policies tended to be
more successful than otherwise. Nevertheless, ancient China managed to sustain an
international order centred on her by applying these policies. Although China failed to
incorporate all of the Inner Asian peoples into this order and establish itself as the power
arbiter in this region, she was quite successful in East and Southeast Asia. In East Asia,
Japan and Korea came under Chinese influence very early in ancient times. Japan
become integrated in the evolving pattern of Asian international relations after the eighth
century.24 Conscious of Chinese power for centuries, Japan agreed to what China
called a tributary relationship in 1404, which benefited Japan greatly. Korea was used
as a land bridge for Japan to reach China. As a result, Korea was put under pressure
from both China and Japan. But as mentioned above, Korea was not dominated by
Japan due to its close relations with China underlined by . the tributary system.25
Different writers of Chinese and Southeast Asian histories have advanced different
arguments about China's role and influence in Southeast Asia. Some argued that
China's influence in Southeast Asia was very marginal because China missed the
opportunity to leave permanent influence in this region between the third and sixth
centuries after the Han Dynasty was brought down. D J Hall is one of them. 26 Others
maintain that China was the arbiter in Southeast Asian international relations. C. P.
Fitzgerald is one. Wang Gungwu is another. For instance, Wang argues that China
succeeded not only in turning most of the nations in Southeast Asia into vassal states,
but also maintained such a status quo in this region by exhibiting its power. This Sino-
centric international order, however, started to wane before western influence spread to
this region.27 But the China-centred order solidified one of the key features of the intra-
regional relations, the unbalance between China and the rest of East Asia countries. This
feature still affects today's Asia-Pacific region, particularly Southeast Asia.28
1. 2. B. Colonial Dominance and Imperialist Rivalry
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A new international system started to emerge as European colonialism spread to this
region starting from 16th century. As European colonisation expanded, international
relations in this part of world began to move into a completely new phase. It was
characterised by the rivalry for spheres of influence between several imperialist powers
from outside this region. The rise of such Asia-Pacific powers as Japan, the United
States and Russia later made the imperialist rivalry further complicated and added a
Pacific dimension to global international relations. More importantly, such rivalry was
to draw the contour of the political map for the modern Asia-Pacific region.
Colonial Expansion
"The European impact on the Pacific was slow to develop. ..., it struck out
gradually from its initial penetration in South-east Asia in 1509". 29 The Europeans came
for trade, mostly with China. This was because China was regarded as the developed
country of that time. 30 When the first Europeans, the Portuguese, came to this region,
they did not come into direct contact with China. As mentioned above, China managed
to establish a Sinocentric international order in this region to serve her own interests.
Yet China's northern borders were vulnerable to threats from the nomadic tribes in
Inner Asia. In order to deal with these threats, successive Chinese emperors had to
focus on the North. In the Ming Dynasty, the Yong Le Emperor (1402--24) even had to
move his capital from Nanjing in the South to Beijing in the North. This heralded the
start of the wane of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. Though China did not
abandon Southeast Asia immediately, 31 yet by the time when the Europeans came, the
Sinocentric international order in Southeast Asia was by and large left on its own.
The European imperialists came in different groups. The momentum of the rivalry
shifted from the early colonising countries to the latter ones. This was very much the
result of the development in both the European politics and in science. 32 The early
European colonisation was meant to service home demand, and was subjected to the
sway of rivalry for supremacy back in Europe.33
 Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands,
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which took turns to become the dominant force, were involved in the early rivalry. They
mainly competed for the monopoly of trade. Their attention was therefore focused more
on those spots with great strategic importance for the spice trade. The Spaniards
focused on the Philippines while the Dutch concentrated on Java. 34 But the rivalry
gradually turned its attention to territorial domination, especially since France and
Britain began to be involved. However, territorial rivalry and expansion between these
countries in this stage were secondary to the satisfaction of domestic demands. 35 But it
was only those European colonisers, who intended to establish a permanent presence,
left lasting influence on the pattern of the future Asia-Pacific intra-regional international
relations.
As the rivalry between western European colonisers expanded in today's Southeast
Asia, a new dimension, which was set to usher in a new era in the affairs of this region,
was being added to the colonial expansion in East Asia. The new dimension was most
distinguishably characterised by the involvement of such colonial powers whose
interests, due to geographical reasons, were to make them permanent participants in this
region's affairs. They were Russia, the United States and Japan. Similar to the western
European colonial powers, the new powers also became active participants at different
times.
Among the new powers, Russia was the first to engage in expansion in this region.
For much of the 17th century, Russian expansion to the East was most noticeable. The
rapid expansion by the Russians through Siberia was given a significant spur by Peter
the Great's desire to turn Russia into a naval power. 36 But another reason for rapid
Russian eastward expansion, which perhaps carried even more short-term importance,
was an economic one. Trade with this region came to occupy a highly significant place
in the Russian economy. By the late 17th century, up to one-third of total Russian state
revenue came from the Far East fur trade. 37 In order to support the trade, a military
system was quickly set up.
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Due to such strongly motivated expansion by the Russians, clash between Russia
and China could only be a matter of time. The Chinese managed to keep the expanding
Russia out of much of its frontier area, and for over a hundred years did not have to
meet any serious Russian challenge.38 But for the first time China had a rival in the
Asia-Pacific region that was also large and land-based.
The most extensive colonisation in this region was that of the British. While
Russians were consolidating their position in this region, a different and longer-lasting
colonial system was practised by Britain in North America and South Pacific. In these
lands, where the local population was sparse, the huge influx of European immigrants
could spread out virtually unopposed. In North America, Britain overcame France to
push her empire westward. In Western Pacific, the British also pushed the Dutch aside
by taking over trade routes that would make trade with China possible. British
colonisation of North America and the South Pacific greatly broadened people's vision
of the Pacific, and the 'South Seas', 39 the title used by Chinese and Japanese for the
huge waters between the Americas and Asia, was given its true meaning.
The most significant legacy of British colonisation for the international relations of
the Asia-Pacific region was the emergence of the United States. Unlike the other three
main British colonies in the Pacific region, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the
crown subjects in what was to be the United States revolted in 1776 and pushed to the
Pacific coast with their own priorities. Before independence trade between the American
east-coast colonies and Asia was limited and largely under British control. Once the
United States came onto the scene, the move to the Pacific, like that of Russia, was both
on land and at sea. But it was the land base that was eventually to provide the firmer
footing for its expanding interest in the Pacific. The American movement was also fast.
Within 50 years, the United States came to have a Pacific dimension. In this process,
the 1848 gold-rush in California gave the sharpest pull to the American interests in the
Pacific, laying the foundation for a broadly based economy in the area.'0
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Thus after almost three and half centuries, western expansion and colonisation in
the Far East had put in a new international order dominated by western powers.
International politics of Europe and of the Pacific had come into direct contact.
Incidentally, the extent of the immense Pacific basin was defined. The busy trading
centres in the so-called South Sea had fallen into the hands of the European colonists.
The "imperialist expansionists were by and large in position to further plunder their
preys".41 In particular, Russia and America, two of the future most influential powers,
were ready to involve deeply in the affairs of this region. The result was not only the
increase in the number of actors and the increased complexity in this region's affairs,
but also the seed of a agenda of international relations of the Asia-Pacific region.
Imperialist Rivalry
Once colonialist occupation was replaced by imperialist competition, international
relations in this part of the world began to assume new features. The most important
feature was that competition became increasingly "localised". In other words, the map
change in this region would no longer follow the rise and fall of the colonial power.
Since the middle of the 19th century, the main feature of the international relations in
this part of the world was increasingly characterised by heated competition and rivalry
between the imperialist powers. However, the purpose of such competition changed
from the seizing of strategic trade bases to the expansion of spheres of influences in this
part of the world. Competition was for both land occupation and political domination.
The driving force behind this was the development of commercialism and capitalism in
Europe and America, which forced the powers to seek reliable, secured source of raw
materials and labour on the one hand, and stable markets for their products on the
other.42 The so-called "localisation" was further confirmed by the rise of Pacific
powers, particularly Japan and the United States. These developments were earlier
signs of international relations with Pacific characteristics.
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The focus of the competition was shifted to what is today's Northeast Asia. China
was the main target. Confronted by mighty challenges, Qing China was forced to
change, yet change was limited to introduction of western technologies and equipment.
Qing China refused to carry out thorough-going reform to its political and economic
systems, and paid heavily for it. 43 Certainly China was not the only target of the
expansionists' "gun boat policy". Japan was forced to open its market as we11. 44 Unlike
China, Japan chose to adapt to the new situation by applying western ideas to its
development. The result was a rapidly developing Japan. Not surprisingly as Japan
grew stronger, it also began to see the political as well as the economic usefulness of
expansionist colonisation. The obvious target for Japanese imperialism, as centuries
ago, was China. But Japan must take over Korea in order to have a land base to
challenge China. So through treaties forced upon China, Japan dominated Korea and,
after defeating Russia in the 1904-5 RUssia-Japan War, occupied Northeast China, and
became the most active imperialist power in this region.45
Japan's victory over Russia and its occupation of Northeast China consolidated its
position as a big power. Yet long before Japan came onto the scene, the United States,
after the Civil War, began to secure a position for itself in the affairs of this region. It
conducted the whole matter in a rather considered manner. 46 "It was not by chance that
the United States was the first to force open the Japanese door." 47 But in the last half of
the 19th century the United States seemed more concerned with linking its west coast
with Asia with a string of bases, a process which was by and large completed in 1889
when the United States took over Hawaii, the Philippines and Guam. The trans-Pacific
cable and the railway link to the Pacific further underlined the focus of the US interests
in the Asia-Pacific, setting the stage for new horizons and priorities for foreign
policy.48
By the turn of the century, the challenge of China ceased as the imperialist
expansionists had by and large consolidated their spheres of influence in China. Soon.
the European imperialists were plunged into World War One and their attention on
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China and the Far East was almost totally diverted to that war. The decline of the old
European powers' influence was sharply contrasted by the further rise of the "local"
powers, particularly Japan. The outbreak of World War One gave Japan the opportunity
to further expand and consolidate its sphere of influence in China. 49 "With the rise of
Japan and the United States, and the globalisation of international trade, the Pacific was
becoming a much more integrated area... new states, such as Australia and Canada,
were emerging as important actors alongside the stronger powers of Russia, the United
States, Britain, and Japan." 50 More importantly, the "local" colour of the ties between
these nations grew stronger.
The Inter-War Years
The period between the two world wars saw further development of Asia-Pacific
dimension in the world affairs. This was predominantly underlined by further Japanese
expansion in East Asia. The end of World War One signalled the start of the wane of the
old European imperialist powers. Though their grip on their colonies in East Asia
remained temporarily intact, these powers, particularly Britain, were no longer able to
prevent their positions from being challenged. The United States, the region's other
power with far more potential to influence its affairs, became increasingly focused on
affairs in its backyard. Russia, whose ambition met heavy defeat when it was just about
to penetrate deeper into the affairs of this region, spent most of the period engrossed in
domestic and European affairs. In sharp contrast to this, the militarist Japan managed to
secure a new status quo that granted it greater recognition, and to expand further its
sphere of influence. China and the colonies of the western powers in this part of the
world became ripe targets for Japanese imperialism.51
But Japan's expansive behaviour also began to cause disruption in the order of this
region. This was most challenging for Britain and the United States. In order to deal
with it, they recognised Japan's big power status and tried to contain it as well. The
1921 Washington Naval Conference attended by the United States, Britain and Japan
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led to the 1922 Naval Treaty. This was the first limited attempt at the idea of multilateral
arms control in this region. The treaty was certainly intended to restrict Japan's
seemingly unstoppable expansion, but it also enabled Japan to focus on internal
development to prepare it for future conflict with the United States. 52 Such
developments Such developments was reflected in the academic world as well. The
Institute of Pacific Relations was founded in July 1925 "devoted to consultation and
research directed at reducing some of the region's more pressing tensions" .53 Japan
was not prepared to accept the restrictions either. As its interests spread from China to
Southeast Asia, Japan began to set up in western Pacific some kind of regional order
under its domination in the 1930s. This was the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity
Sphere. That was once again by chance the first conscious initiative to give an identity
to this region. But it was an identity with Japanese deep imprints. 54 Such expansionist
activities would naturally make Japan a member of the Axis in World War Two since its
interests conflicted with those of the Allies.
As it has been indicated above, the industrial revolution and the development of
capitalism in Europe ushered into the Far East a new type of colonialism. It put more
emphasis on the expansion of spheres of control in order to satisfy the home demand
for cheap labour, raw materials, and stable markets. This made the colonised nations
figure more prominently in the metropolitan states' calculation, as their internal stability
and external safety were now more closely related to the interests of these states. This
made it necessary for imperialist powers to deal with issues of this region locally. The
rise of the United States, Russia and Japan, and the rivalry between them in particular,
further underlined this development. This led to the first regional collective attempt at
dealing with regional issues in the form of the Washington Naval Treaty. Japan tried to
organise the region's affairs by the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. Such
developments was set up in clearly indicated that the affairs between the countries
ringing the Pacific assumed more and more regional colours.
1. 3. Intra-Regional Relations: The Present
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As far as the evolution of a regional identity was concerned, the outbreak of World
War Two brought it to a sudden halt. After the war, there emerged a bipolar world
system, which sank the whole world into a Cold War between two ideological camps.
The Communist victory in China, and the subsequent Korean War, prompted the
United States to adopt the policy of containment. This policy was brought to a new level
after the outbreak of the Vietnam War to prevent the rest of East and Southeast Asia
falling to communism like domino.55 However, since the confrontation between the
United States and the Soviet Union was centred in Europe, their control over their
Pacific rim partners were not as tight as that in Europe. This made possible changes that
were to affect deeply the pattern of the relations between these countries. The most
significant effect of the changes was the reduction of tension and animosity in among
these countries. This added an important building block to the Asia-Pacific region.
1. 3. A. The Post-War Military Alliances
The Asia-Pacific region was engulfed by both hot and Cold Wars in the first two
and half decades after 1945. The ultimate purpose of these wars was to reach some of
kind of balance in power along the ideological divide. However, balance of power in
this region was different in character from that in Europe. This can be seen in the
military alliances set up in this region by the Soviet Union and the United States. They
were alliance of defensive nature. Cold War division was, therefore, first broken in this
region.
As far as the Sino-Soviet Alliance was concerned, it was meant more to confront
the perceived threat from the United States and Japan, than to co-ordinate actions to
expand the Communist sphere of influence. 56 The American-Japanese military alliance
and the outbreak of the Korean War made both the war-torn Soviet Union and the
newly born People's Republic of China find each other as the natural allies to fall back
on. Although concerted efforts were made during the Korean War, it was not done in
the form of a multi-lateral alliance. Such concerted efforts was practically non-existent
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during the Vietnam War. Besides, Mao's PRC was not prepared to accept Soviet
dominance either.57
The United States did try to bring in multi-lateral alliance systems. ANZUS, a
military alliance between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, and SEATO,
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation, were set up in the 1950s. However, neither of
these alliances played any major role in the conflict with the communist camp. Neither
of them lasted until the Cold War formally ended. 58 This was allowed to happen partly
because the alliances themselves were not entirely appropriate for this region, and partly
because the Americans focused their attention on bilateral alliances with such key
strategic partners as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Thailand, and
treated these alliances as extension of its policy of containment.59
Though efforts were made by the two super powers to dominate and organise
international relations in the Asia-Pacific region along ideological lines, such efforts
were merely for control, and had distinctively defensive characteristics. China and the
Soviet Union did not attempt to project revolution throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
The two multi-lateral alliances led by the United States were too loose to be spearheads
of attack on communism. What this meant was that balance of power existed in the
Asia-Pacific region, yet the region was not divided up into two tightly connected camps
despite of the existence of a clear-cut Cold War division.60
What is worth noting is that, though neither alliance systems attempted to deal with
international trade and economic issues as there were hardly any, the super powers did
provided their weaker partners both badly needed development assistance and markets.
This enabled the weaker partners to create the basis for future economic take-off. The
super powers also guaranteed to a large extent their weak partners' security through
maintaining the power balance in this region. This provided the crucial public good for
economic development to take place in the weaker countries.61
1. 3. B. International Relations Since 1965
29
As far as the process of building economic co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region
is concerned, the year 1965 went down into the history of this process as an important
milestone. It was in this year that the effort to give the region an identity was restarted.
The idea of undertaking such co-operation was for the first time formally discussed.
The discussion was initiated by a Japanese economist called Kiyoshi Kojima. But it
followed a different direction this time. The idea was to form a free trade area among the
Pacific developed countries, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United
States. But the Southeast Asian developing countries, which had been a traditional
market for Japanese export and source of raw material supply, would be included on the
basis of affiliation.62
It was no surprise for the idea to come from Japan. In the middle of the 1960's,
Japan's economy was again taking off, yet the initial success of the European Economic
Community (EEC) made the Japanese feel they were at the risk of being left in the cold
by other developed countries, which would endanger Japan's economic development. 63
But the idea was put fonvard at a rather inappropriate time. In 1965, international
relations in the Asia-Pacific region were still in the shadow of the conflict between the
two ideological camps. The policy of containment was sinking the US deeper into the
quagmire of the Vietnam War. Economically the idea was also found, as Kojima
himself admitted, too premature to win instant support from academics of the targeted
countries. They were not sure if their countries were going to receive as much benefit
from it as Japan would do. 64 Nevertheless, the discussions indicated that people once
again started thinking that special relations existed between the Pacific rim countries.
But these countries were to witness two significant events that were to have strong
impact on the characteristics of the evolution of the relations between them. One such
development since 1965 was the emergence of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). The other major event, which helped change the direction of the
development of the international relations in the Asia-Pacific region, was the
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rapprochement between the People's Republic of China and the United States. These
events turned out to have had far-reaching impact on the intra-regional relations.
The Significance of ASEAN & Sino-US Rapprochement
The establishment of the Organisation of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in
196765 marked a much more concrete and substantial process for the practice of
regional collectivism was striking its roots as the discussion of economic co-operation
among the developed Pacific countries continued. The founding ASEAN members,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, realised while
consolidating their independence that common difficulties of economic backwardness
and internal instability required them to work together. ASEAN, therefore, was meant
to promote economic prosperity and to strengthen internal stability through
cooperation. 66
 The significance of ASEAN as an attempt at cooperation did not lie in the
amount of achievement made in promoting social, economic and cultural progress in its
member countries. What makes it significant is that it served as an important reference
point for future development of regional collective structures.° As for ASEAN itself,
its set-up put regional collectivism into practice.
The impact of Sino-US rapprochement on the emergence of an Asia-Pacific focus
in the affairs of this region was much quicker to manifest than that of the ASEAN. The
impact was mainly reflected in a big reduction of tension. As the Sino-US relations
improved, Cold War confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region was turned into US-Soviet
confrontation plus Sino-Soviet confrontation. The Asia-Pacific region entered into a
period of tripolarity. 68 Though changes in Sino-US relations only helped to prevent the
fundamental power balance between the two super powers from collapsing, they
enabled China to be seen in a different light by countries in this region. The political and
economic relations between China and a large number of Asia-Pacific countries began to
improve. Due to China's position and influence in this region, this was highly
significant.
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Before contacts were resumed between these two countries, tension in this region
stemmed mainly from two sources. The first was the ideological struggle in the Asia-
Pacific Region. Countries were roughly divided up into two groups, the Communist
countries and the capitalist ones. The second was disputes outside the ideological
sphere, i.e. disputes over territorial and ethnic issues. As obstacles to the development
of intra-regional political relations, they were watered down once the 1972 Shanghai
Communiqué was signed. This was born out by significant changes in the intra-regional
relations.
The first major change was that diplomatic relations between the PRC and most of
the Asia-Pacific countries began to normalise. 69 Diplomatic relations between all of the
Asia-Pacific developed countries other than the United States and the PRC were
normalised as the Taiwan issue did not feature so prominently, albeit Japan had to wait
a little longer for a new government to put aside the Taiwan issue. The development of
political relations between the PRC and the ASEAN countries was more difficult as it
was hampered by both ideological and non-ideological issues.7°
The relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Parties in
the ASEAN countries was a highly sensitive issue in the relations between China and
these countries. Some of these parties were engaged in armed rebellion against the
authorities. Like the Vietnamese Communist Party in the 1960s and early 1970s, these
Communist Parties were important to the PRC for both ideological and strategic
reasons. When state-to-state relations began to improve, the importance of the Southeast
Asian Communist Parties declined. Although Chinese moral support continued to be
broadcasted to their comrades in Southeast Asia, expressions of revolutionary solidarity
and the actual provision of aid in the form of arms and training were cut down71
One of the most thorny non-ideological issues that had plagued the relations
between the PRC and some ASEAN countries was the 13 to 14 million Chinese in these
countries. Their presence and control of the local economies made them the envy of the
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local population. Incidentally, these overseas Chinese had strong influence over the
Communist Parties in these countries, with some of their top leaders being Chinese.72
The overseas Chinese therefore were a thorn in these countries' relations with China.
With the improvement in the political relations, however, the efforts by some of the
Southeast Asian countries to integrate the Chinese into their societies were assisted by
China, who signed treaties with countries like Malaysia and Thailand encouraging the
Chinese to become part of the local community. 73
 In addition, the PRC also became one
of the strongest supporters of the idea of ASEAN and neutralisation of the Malacca
Straits. 74 Although there were also other important reasons for the relations between the
PRC and some of the ASEAN countries to improve, yet Sino-US thaw provided the
basic underpinnings for these relationships to move forward.75
Improved Sino-US relations also had positive effects on the reduction of tensions
in the wider intra-regional relations. In Northeast Asia, the signing of the Shanghai
Communiqué in 1972 introduced the initial signs of relaxation in the tense relations
between the two Koreas. Both these countries took important foreign policy initiatives
to reduce tension and to co-exist in peace both on the peninsula and in the wider
international community.76 Significant changes also took place in the relations between
North Korea and Japan. "Though they are not yet normalised, the impact of détente
(between China and the United States) has been great enough to raise hopes of eventual
normalisation." 77 Though such positive initial signs did not lead to concrete results at
this stage, they indicated that the Sino-US thaw did have some positive impact on the
Korean issue.78
Sino-American normalisation also had indirect, albeit significant, impact on the
pattern of political and strategic relations among the countries of ASEAN. 79 The United
States was able to pull out of Indochina without disrupting fundamentally the strategic
balance in the whole region. But the success of communism woke the ASEAN
countries to the fact that they needed to close ranks. "These dramatic events, particularly
the successive fall of Phnom Penh and then Saigon, in April 1975, concentrated
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governmental minds. It reinforced a sense of share predicament;..." 80 Although the
ASEAN countries were more concerned with their own internal security, yet communist
success in Indochina made these countries . identify in the Declaration of ASEAN
Concord the Association as a collective security organisation.81
The reason that the ASEAN countries put the emphasis on the consolidation of
internal security was that they were concerned that a unified Vietnam, strengthened by
huge amount of captured US arms, would widen its sphere of influence through
support for the Communist Parties in their countries. Vietnam's declaration of support
for the "revolutionary struggles of the Southeast Asian peoples" convinced the
governments of ASEAN countries that Communist Movements in their countries were
"aided by outside powers ]a locution meaning the Socialist Republic of Vietnam] whose
aims are to change the political development of several countries". 82 Such perception by
the ASEAN countries spurred them "to develop rapidly plans to increase the substance
of the Association's cooperation, with major emphasis being placed on promoting
economic development"... to prevent internal insurgence.
Generally speaking, the removal of enmity between the PRC and the United States
not only put confrontation behind the two former opponents, it seemed also to have two
more positive effects on relations within the Asia-Pacific region as well. Tension was
reduced in this region as a whole and attention was more focused on Vietnam and the
Soviet Union. Relations between the two Koreas and between North Korea and Japan
became less tense. The sensitivity of the Korean issue therefore became somewhat
dulled. Secondly, state-to-state relations between China and the Southeast Asian nations
were improved. This helped reduce their suspicion of China, and also focused their
attention on Vietnam as the immediate threat. This focus led to greater unity among them
as well. The significance of these developments was that they allowed the Asia-Pacific
countries to develop an agenda of relations quite exclusive to this region against the
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background of continued confrontation between the super powers. They made the
regional focus of relations between the Asia-Pacific countries stronger.
(2). The Demise of the Soviet Union and the Asia-Pacific Region
If the Sino-US normalisation was instrumental in improving the political situation
in this region in the 1970s, the end of the Cold War after the demise of the Soviet Union
highlighted the need for the Asia-Pacific countries to develop collectively a clear-cut
regional agenda to deal with issues that have been in existence all along. This was, of
course, closely linked to the intra-regional political relations in the 1980s. The tripolarity
appeared in the early 1970s grew further as China adopted a more independent approach
to its relations with the super powers in this period. The Cambodian issue kept the
ASEAN countries united diplomatically, yet some of them still saw China as a main
threat. But China's reform and open policies made possible further improvement in its
relations with the Asia-Pacific countries. 84 But it was the demise of the Soviet Union
that gave the final push for these countries to adopt regional cooperative measure to deal
with issues affecting them.
The end of the Cold War led to "a phenomena in which one is hard-pressed to find
a distinctively defined area of imminent conflict, either ideological or military" ,85 and
the successful signing of the nuclear treaty between the United States and North Korea
removed the most dangerous flashpoint. But the United States, while remaining the
most powerful country in this region, was too exhausted to single-handedly control this
region.86 Yet regional issues and bilateral issues with strong security colours remain as
the dominant issue in this region's international scene.
One of the issues is the re-militarisation of Japan. Though Japan was still under
strong US influence, yet as a world economic superpower, it already indicated its wish
to become a political power. It found irritating the fact that Japan had to take orders
from the United States while the later was becoming increasingly dependent on
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Japanese money to carry out its international actions. Japan's demands for a political
position commensurate with its economic power were getting louder and louder.
Meanwhile Japan continuously increased its defence budget. It had the fourth largest
defence budget in the world. The growing Japanese military power appeared to be
encouraged by the United States, who found Japan as useful supplement after the Cold
War.87
 This caused concerns in both East and Southeast Asian nations.
Perhaps the most worrying issue is China's position and behaviour in this region.
China's rapidly growing military power supported by a booming economy has already
caused concerns among its Asia-Pacific neighbours. One of the causes of concern was
the disputes over the ownership of the Spratley Islands between China, Taiwan,
Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia, and between China and Japan over the
Diaoyu (Senkakus) Island in the East China Sea. As far as the Spratley Islands were
concerned, although the dispute has not led to any big-scale military conflict in the
region, yet China's tough stance has made it a sour point in the intra-regional relations
in western Pacific.88
As another development since the end of the Cold War, the normalisation of the
relations between China and Vietnam after more than ten years of hostility, also caused
concern among the ASEAN countries. For instance, the Indonesian Armed Force Chief,
General Try Sutrisno, warned that both Hanoi and Beijing still maintained socialist
systems and upheld Marxist ideology that could affect a new rapprochement after the
Cambodian issue was completely resolved. A Sino-Vietnamese entente was thought to
be capable of posing new threats to Southeast Asian security. But the ASEAN countries
are more concerned with China as a possible threat. They have adopted a two-pronged
policy: to balance off such threat by incorporating Vietnam as a member while try to
engage China in a multi-lateral fashion.89
ASEAN itself also faced potential difficulties. The changes in the general situation
in the Asia-Pacific removed one of most important unifying factor for ASEAN eroding
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the Association's political unity. This was because it was thought that ASEAN countries
might turn their attention to their own economic development. This tended to localise
these countries' focus of interests. For instance, it was thought that Thailand might see
its future more as a centre for Indochinese development than in co-operation with such
insular partners as Indonesia and the Philippines. Malaysia and Indonesia could focus
on developing a new Malacca Strait regime.90
The Asia-Pacific countries recognised the potential danger of these issues. More
and more countries felt that what was needed was new measures that were capable of
dealing with these issues. They had begun contemplating collective measures. A host of
ideas were put forward by senior officials of various countries of this region. Officials
from the ASEAN countries proposed a regional forum that would include either the
ASEAN countries and the other major countries of this region, or one that would be
consisted of all the Asia-Pacific countries. Officials from the Asia-Pacific developed
countries also advanced proposals. They want to expand the scope of the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the multilateral economic forum in this region,
to cover security issues. 91
 Certain ASEAN countries also expressed similar thoughts.
These proposals indicated that political recognition of the necessity for a regional
collective structure to deal with security issues was on the rise.92
Concrete actions followed closely the growing recognition of the necessity for
regional collective security. In accordance with a decision of the 1992 ASEAN summit,
meetings between ASEAN foreign ministers and their dialogue partners devoted to
discussions on this region's security issues had followed these foreign ministers'
annual meetings. And the number of ASEAN dialogue partners also increased. These
meetings could not have been possible in the Cold War years, and undoubtedly made a
meaningful contribution to increase understanding between the partners in dialogue. In
1993, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was set up to provide the Asia-Pacific
countries with regularised occasions to discuss some of the region's security issues.
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The to devise regional mechanisms to deal with regional issues picked up
momentum after the Cold War, and the concrete actions taken by a growing number of
Asia-Pacific countries indicated that regional, collective measures would be the first
choice to be considered in efforts to deal with issues, particularly security issues in the
post-Cold War era. "The Asia-Pacific region is ready for (collective regional) forums
precisely because... countries in the region are prone to think more in terms of common
security, a common market and common interests in Pacific co-operation..." 93 This is
very much a reaction to the region's changing political situation, in which the US's
influence has declined while the influence of China and Japan needs to be
accommodated. The increasing awareness of the necessity for and convergence of
opinion on collective thinking became one of the main underlying factors for the
emergence of a regional focus among the Asia-Pacific countries.
1. 4. Economic Inter-dependence and A Regional Focus
The previous section has demonstrated that as a result of the major changes in the
intra-regional political relationship, Asia-Pacific as a region has evolved a pattern of
relations that is increasingly focused on this region's affairs. However, this is not the
only reason that a clear focus is emerging in the affairs of this region. Since the 1970s,
another dimension has been added to the evolution of the intra-regional relations. That is
the ever expanding and deepening intra-regional trade and economic relations. The
growing economic importance that these countries have for each other has further
strengthened the tendency for them to regard their relations with each other as special.
This growing economic inter-dependence is derived from a unique type of
production and trade relations that has developed over the years among these countries.
This region is home, not only for major economic powers like the United States, Japan
and "high flyers" like the NIEs, but also for such rapidly developing countries like
Malaysia, Thailand and China. This has made it the fastest growing region in the world.
A key factor for the fast development has been the region's inter-dependent pattern of
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production. This has increased the importance that these countries have for each other as
trade partners. This section will demonstrate how the economic and trade relations
between these countries have affected the emergence of an Asia-Pacific region.
1. 4. A. "Hying Geese" and Asia-Pacific Production Relations
A special type of regional production pattern has made the Asia-Pacific countries
depend more on intra-regional forces for economic growth. This pattern, often
nicknamed the "flying-geese" pattern which is especially salient among the Pacific Asian
countries, is based on the comparative advantages enjoyed by these countries. The so-
called "flying geese" pattern was first used by Japanese economists to underline the
leading position of Japan in the economies of this region. What it describes is a process
through which a production cycle starts and finishes. 94 In its original form, it studies
the changes that takes place in specific industries in specific countries. However, the
"flying geese" pattern has since been extended to study the dynamic changes in the
industrial structure, that is, the rise and fall of different industries, in specific countries,
and further to the shift of industries from more advanced countries to less advanced
countries. 95 As explained by Ippei Yamazawa, the principal determinants of a country's
comparative advantage, which determines the stage of its development, include factor
endowment and the stage of industrialisation it has reached. Foreign direct investment
(FDI), is regarded as capable of helping increase the level of industrialisation through
the transfer of more advanced technologies.96
In the Asia-Pacific region, a "flying geese" pattern in the third sense, that is the
transfer of industrial activities in the form FDI, has come into being. The different
stages of economic development in the Asia-Pacific region can best be visualised in the
following flying geese pattern: the United States and Japan are in the lead followed by
the NIEs, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. Chasing the NIEs are
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. China is roughly at the level of the NIEs. 97 Over
the years, the United States, and then Japan, have been the main sources of technology
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transfer for the NIEs and other countries. In recent years, the NIEs have also begun
transferring manufacturing activities to China and the ASEAN developing countries.
Among the ASEAN -4, 98 Malaysia and Thailand are ahead of Indonesia and the
Philippines as a result of their higher per capita income and better economic and political
infrastructures for development. That China is on the same level of the NIEs is due to
her level of economic and technological development.99
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a dominant role in the emergence of the
Asia-Pacific "flying-geese" pattern of production relations. Through FDI, both the
developed and the NIEs in this region played a significant part in its emergence by
shifting some of their uncompetitive industries to less developed countries. W° But
Japan and the NIEs have been more active, particularly sine the late 1980s. 101 The
process of shifting comparative advantages started with Japan, the first Asian
industrialised country. Rapid economic development drastically reduced Japan's
comparative advantages in first labour- and then capital- intensive industries. Plus the
shortage of raw materials, particularly fuel, Japan was forced to move away from heavy
and capital-intensive industries to high-technology and high value-added products. This
was done according to a deliberate plan of the Japanese government. 102
The transfer of Japanese investment to Asia-Pacific developing counties underwent
two main periods. First between 1970 and 1975, Japanese investment in the Asia-
Pacific region doubled as a result of capital liberalisation and yen appreciation. In 1991,
Japan was the largest investor in this region, with 43% of the region's FDI coming
from Japan. 103 By 1980, Asia-Pacific developing countries had received in total 27.2
per cent of total Japanese FDI. 1°4 Then in 1985, the yen appreciation and industrial re-
structuring resulted in greatly increased investment in the Asia-Pacific developing
countries. The total Japanese FDI expanded to $67 billion in 1989. The Asia-Pacific
developing countries received a share of 12 per cent, reaching $8.1 billion. 105 The
targets of Japanese FDI in the Asia-Pacific region have been the NIEs, the ASEAN
developing countries and China. Investment was concentrated in manufacture. The
NIEs, however, were the chief beneficiaries, whose industrial structure was raised to a
new level through the upgraded technological base, but similar effects also occurred in
the ASEAN developing countries and China. 106
Through making full utilisation of their low cost and hard-working labour forces,
the Asian NIEs carved out for themselves a special place in the world economy as
labour-intensive manufacturing centres using capital and technologies transferred from
both the United States and Japan. Later, as population growth fell and surplus labour
from the agricultural sector reduced, labour-intensive manufacturing industries began to
lose their advantages to more capital- and technology-intensive industries. As a result,
the process of industrial transfer, happened between Japan and the NIEs in the 1960s
and 1970s, started between the NIEs and the Pacific Asian developing nations in a
lower stage, with China, the developing ASEAN countries and the Indochinese
countries as the main targets of transfer.10
The increase of FDI from the NIEs to the ASEAN countries began in the mid-
1980s. South Korean FDI into ASEAN amounted to over $250 million in cumulative
stock in 1988, with flows of $177 million between 1986 and 1988 alone, three times of
the flows of 1981-5. From Taiwan, FDI into ASEAN was estimated to have reached a
cumulative total of $86 million between 1959 and 1987, yet $35 million was invested
between 1984 and 1987. The speed increased even more, as proved by the $220 million
petrochemical plant joint venture in the Philippines and a $1 billion 'electronics park'
planned for Malaysia. 108
 By 1991, the NIEs, had surpassed Japan to become
ASEAN's biggest investor. 109
Hong Kong was said to be the largest provider of FDI for the developing countries
in this region. China was thought to be the main beneficiary in the 1980s. 110 Flows
from Singapore into other ASEAN countries was also growing, though not as rapidly
as from other NIEs because, in contrast with South Korea and Taiwan, there was little
appreciation of the Singapore dollar and Singapore itself went through a recession in
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1985-6. But similar to Hong Kong, Singapore's FDI into China steadily increased since
the middle of 1980s. This was typically represented by such investment in electronic
projects in Suzhou and Tianjin. 111
 Investment from both South Korea and Taiwan into
mainland China increased sharply since political relations relaxed.112
Since the NIEs started to invest in the developing countries in this region around
the middle of the 1980s, NIE FDI tended to be concentrated in industries at the mature
end of the product cycle, that is, the labour intensive industries. They included textiles,
garments, plastics, wood--processing and labour-intensive electronics. Besides, NIE
FDI into ASEAN was especially strong in manufacturing. For instance, Taiwan's FDI
was concentrated mainly in chemical products and textiles. It was the same with Hong
Kong. Since China, and later Vietnam, began economic reform, they became main
destinations of NIE labour-intensive investment. This trend was also promoted by the
end of the Cold War, the socialist countries' economic reform and the open-door policy,
and growing complementarity in the economic structures between them and the market
economies.113
While FDI from the NIEs to the region's developing countries went up enormously
in both absolute and relative terms and importance, NIEs' FDI, especially that of
Taiwan and South Korea, in developed countries, particularly the United States, also
increased. The developed countries' share of FDI from Taiwan and South Korea
surpassed that of the developing countries. For Taiwan, up to 1979, over half of
outward FDI went to ASEAN countries, and 15 per cent went to the United States.
Between 1980 and 1987, the situation was reversed with the share for the United States
rising and that for ASEAN declining. This was also true for South Korea. Between
1968 and 1974, 82 per cent of Korean FDI went to Asia and Oceania and 10 per cent to
the United States. Yet by 1987, 34 per cent went to the former area and 45 per cent to
the latter. Although the percentage changed drastically, the increase in the absolute
amount of outward ME FDI still made them significant FDI providers for the lower tier
countries in this region.114
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The increased flow of EDT in this region led to a network of production linking the
Asia-Pacific countries closely together. This is because shifting comparative advantages
increased the importance of the investing countries for the recipient countries and vice
versa, since "relocating their industries in neighbouring countries helps reduce costs and
enhance export competitiveness. For developing countries, the incoming FDI provides
them with employment opportunities, and the funds, technology and infrastructure
needed for economic development." 115 This prompted the countries in this region to put
more stress on co-operation since intra-regional inter-dependence deepened. This trend
continues to grow since the beginning of the 1990s, though world-wide economic
slow-down saw FDI flows decrease in 1991.116
1. 3. B. Intra-regional Trade Relations
The deepening of the Asia-Pacific intra-regional trade relations is another aspect of
the ever clearer focus in intra-regional economic relations. This is characterised by the
increase in the amount of intra-regional trade. From 1988 to 1993, trade among APEC
members saw an average annual growth of 8.7% for export and 9.0% for import. More
importantly, by the fact that trade is more evenly distributed among the Asia-Pacific
countries today rather than dependent on one developed country as it used to be. Trade
has therefore become an important engine driving the Asia-Pacific economies since
more countries are involved.117
What has led to such a situation is the rise in importance of most of the Pacific
Asian countries as markets. For years after World War Two, Pacific Asian countries
relied on the United States as the market for their exports. This was true for Japan and
then for the NIEs and the next group of countries including China and the ASEAN
developing countries. This situation began to change since the mid-1980s. While the
US market remained significant, Asia-Pacific countries diversified their export markets,
especially among the Pacific Asian countries. Hence, the growth of trade among the
Pacific Asian countries accelerated. 118 The result was that trade among these countries
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grew from just under 35 per cent in 1985 to just under 45 per cent in 1992, while cross-
Pacific trade came down from 33 per cent to just below 25 per cent. In the meantime,
the Pacific Asian region became a most important export market for the United States.
The value of US exports to Japan, the Asian NIEs, ASEAN and China surpassed that to
the EC in 1986. The increase in NIE-bound exports was most impressive: by 1992, the
value of US exports to the Asian NIEs surpassed the US exports to Japan.119
As for Japan, a similar situation appeared in its trade relations both across the
Pacific and with Pacific Asia. 120 Japanese export to the NIEs, the ASEAN countries
and China grew significantly between the middle of 1980s to the early 1990s. Japanese
export to Asia reached $112.2 billion in 1992, accounting for 33 per cent of total
Japanese exports. Of this total, exports to the NIEs accounted for 21.4 per cent, exports
to the ASEAN countries 8.1 per cent, and exports to China 3.5 per cent. For Japan,
exports to Pacific Asia have now surpassed those to the United States, which amounted
to $96.7 billion in 1992, accounting for 28.5 per cent of Japan's total exports. 121 Japan
also maintained large trade surplus with these Pacific Asian countries.122
But this does not mean that the Pacific Asian countries had a rough deal. While
Japan increased its export to these countries, its importance as a market for Pacific
Asian exports also grew. The NIEs did particularly well, gaining the most from the yen
appreciation. During the first half of the 1980s, there was single-digit growth of exports
from the NIEs to Japan, but following the 1985-7 Yen appreciation, such exports
accelerated, rising from $11 billion in 1985 to $25 billion in 1988. In 1987 alone, the
total dollar value of Japan's imports from the NIEs rose by 50 per cent over the
previous year, followed by another 9 per cent growth in 1989. Moreover, the
composition of imports has also been changing from labour-intensive finished goods to
technology-intensive parts and more sophisticated consumer and even capital goods.
The proportion of manufactured goods in Japanese imports from the NIEs increased
from 58 per cent in 1980 to 66 per cent in 1987. Japan replaced the United States as
their most important market, since exports to the United States declined.123
In addition to all these changes, trade also expanded among other Pacific Asian
countries. The NIEs became markets with growing importance for the developing
countries in the region. "It is interesting to observe that the NIEs have been importing
more from the region than Japan since 1988. " 124 Pressure from the United States led to
the revaluation of the South Korean Won and the New Taiwan dollar. The US pressure
also led to Taiwan's liberalisation of its imports, while the South Koreans followed suit
to some extent. As a result, export to these countries from Pacific developing countries
increased sharply. Hong Kong was always the most important market for China.125
While increasing imports from the developing countries in the Pacific Asian region,
the shift of export destinations from the United States to the Pacific Asian region was
particularly marked for the Asian NIEs. Intra-regional trade's share of total NIEs export
rose from 31.9 per cent to 43.5 per cent, while that with the United States slipped from
37.2 per cent to 24.2 per cent between 1986 and 1992. 126 China and the ASEAN
developing countries emerged as more important trading partners for all the NIEs. Hong
Kong saw the biggest growth in trade with China among the NIEs. As a share of Hong
Kong's total exports, trade with China increased from 6 per cent in 1980 to 29 per cent
in 1988, before falling back to 26 per cent in 1989.
For South Korea, the most important regional export market is Hong Kong, in part
en route to China. The share of Hong Kong's trade with the ASEAN countries actually
decreased during the 1980s. The ASEAN five remained important for South Korea on
the import side, especially raw materials from Indonesia and Malaysia. For Singapore,
trade with both China and Thailand grew, but trade with Malaysia remained highest.
For Taiwan, the most important aspects of regional trade was imports from the other
NIEs and growing trade with China, especially exports, although mostly through Hong
Kong. Taiwan's trade with China grew by about $2 billion from $1.5 to $3.5 billion
between 1987--1989.
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As a result of the adoption of the policy of economic development and attracting
labour-intensive industries from both Japan and the NIEs, developing countries of this
region, along with Japan and NIEs, have become not only ever more important
manufacturing countries but also expanding markets for both industrial and consuming
goods. This has obviously also helped change the pattern of trade and economic
relations in the Asia-Pacific region, and has been extremely important in turning this
region into another economic centre of the world. 127
The other important development was the rise in the level of intra-industry trade,
which also made significant contribution to the deepening of the intra-regional trade
relations. As intra-industry trade refers to the exchange of products belonging to the
same industry, the rise in such trade demonstrates that there exist complementary levels
of development and income between countries maintaining close trade relations.128
Intra-industry trade between Japan and the Pacific Asian developing countries grew in
importance since the mid-1980s with rapid industrialisation in the latter. An orderly
structure seemed to exist in this area. As income level of the Asian NIEs were close to
both Japan and the Asia-Pacific developing countries, the level of intra-industry trade
exhibited high levels between Japan and NIEs on one hand, and between the NIE,s and
other developing countries, especially China and the ASEAN countries on the other. 129
The initial trend was the development of intra-industry trade between the Asian
NIEs and Japan in metals, notably iron and steel, miscellaneous manufactured goods
and textiles. This was followed by trade in machinery. Later, intra-industry trade also
started between Japan and the developing countries in this region. For instance, the
degree of trade in electrical machinery and precision instruments between Japan and the
ASEAN countries surpassed that between Japan and the NIEs. A similar situation was
found in the trade between mainland China and Taiwan, which increasingly consisted of
industrial materials for manufacturing, machinery and transport equipment, and
miscellaneous manufactures. 130 The surplus that more advanced countries in the Pacific
region maintained against the less advanced ones was also due to the increase in intra-
industry trade. As domestic conditions got increasingly difficult for some of the
production activities, multinationals would choose to relocate such activities to their off-
shore production bases in countries on a lower level of development. This had increased
the export from countries on the higher level to those on the lower level.
A further outcome of the changes in the relative economic strength of the Asia-
Pacific countries is the talk of a bloc based on the Japanese yen. The yen bloc was first
of all underlined by the sharp increase in Japanese investment in other Pacific Asian
countries. This enabled Japan to replace the United States as the key partner for Pacific
Asian countries in aid, trade and direct investment. This to some extent gave rise to a
situation in which the Pacific Asian countries would feel strongly the impact if there was
a drastic economic change in Japan. For instance, following a global reduction in
Japanese FDI which powered much of the economic growth in the ASEAN countries
during the 1980s, some of them would see moderate economic growth. 131
Yen's appreciation in 1985 had another important impact on trade relations across
the Pacific. This is largely reflected in the movements in the trade between the triangle
of the United States, Japan and the NIEs. As the NIEs were on a lower development
level, they depended to some extent on the import of Japanese intermediate and capital
goods and the export of finished products to the United States, and increasingly to the
other Pacific Asian countries. The changes in yen's exchange rates affected the
performance of such trade. The rise of the Japanese yen tended to raise the price of both
Japanese export to the NIEs and NIEs' export to the United States and other areas.132
This obviously affected the NIEs" competitiveness.
As far as intra-regional trade relations are concerned, the most important factor that
links the countries in the Asia-Pacific together is the substantial expansion of the intra-
regional trade as new markets emerged in Pacific Asia. These markets are important for
the whole region. The increase in importance of these markets has not come at the
expenses of the developed countries whose importance as markets declined only
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relatively. Trade expansion has been mainly due to the economic growth of the Pacific
Asian countries. Meanwhile, growth in intra-industry trade and the influence of the
Japanese yen have further strengthened yet complicated the economic links across the
region as a whole.
As the above has indicated, production and economic relations in the Asia-Pacific
region have also experienced significant development over the last decade. Despite a
prolonged recession in the world economy since 1990, the Pacific Asian economies
have maintained steady growth as a result of such development. The Asian NIEs and
the ASEAN countries as a group grew 5.3 per cent in 1992, while China achieved
double-digit growth. This reflects not only Pacific Asian countries' higher potential
growth rates compared with the world's average, but also the growing ability of these
countries to generate demand from within the region. Such ability has affected these
countries' position vis a vis the United States. While the US remains an important
market, its importance has increasingly matched by the Pacific Asian countries. These
countries have also become more important for the US as markets. "Reflecting the
changing pattern of trade and investment, the traditional economic relations in the Asia-
Pacific region characterised by unilateral dependence of (Pacific) Asian countries on the
United States is giving way to relations characterised by Pan-Pacific
interdependence." 133
Conclusion
What this chapter has shown is that the concept of an Asia-Pacific region is a
product of the significant changes that have taken place in the political and economic
relations between those countries ringing the Pacific ocean in the second half of the 20th
century. The Asia-Pacific region does not carry with it the usual geographical and
cultural meanings. It is underlined by the convergence of the political and economic
interests of these countries. But it has its roots deep in the history of the international
relations between these countries spanning several centuries. The contact between the
East Asian nations and the imperialist powers and the further intensification of such
contacts laid the foundation for the emergence of the Asia-Pacific region.
From the Washington Naval Treaty to the end of the Cold War, the countries in this
region were involved in a pattern of international relations which were increasingly
centred on issues particular to this region. However, until the end of the Cold War
towards the end of the 20th century, intra-regional relations were overshadowed by
global rivalry from the World Wars to the Cold War. Yet the development in the
relations between these countries, particularly following the Sino-US normalisation,
further blurred the divide between these countries. The end of the Cold War sharply
increased the awareness of the countries in this region that they needed to deal with the
issues among them through cooperation and collective actions.
The pattern of trade and economic relations and exchanges have changed from one
of heavy reliance on the developed countries of the west, the United States in particular,
to one of growing dependence on economic growth generated by all Asia-Pacific
countries. With East Asian economies and other developing economies gaining more
importance in this region, intra-regional trade and economic exchanges will bring
further development to all the countries of this Asia-Pacific region. Such development in
the intra-regional relationship in the Asia-Pacific region has greatly aided the emergence
of a sense of community among the countries of this region. "Both cooperation and
conflict are forms of interaction,.., both in recent decades have thrust (Asia-Pacific)
leaders toward unprecedented contact and interdependence with each other". 134 Hence,
despite being huge and fragmented in geographical, political and cultural terms, the
convergence of interests among the Asia-Pacific countries has grown strong enough to
push them towards region-thinking.
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Chapter Two. Construction of Economic Co-operation and APEC
The purpose of this chapter is to find out what form of economic cooperation the
Asia-Pacific countries want to undertake. This is going to be done by looking at how an
inter-governmental forum, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Ministerial Meeting
(APEC), was set up for conducting regional economic co-operation. APEC was the
culmination of a process searching for a structure for cooperation which lasted for
nearly thirty years. 1 This chapter will focus on those factors that had crucial impact on
that process. These factors included academic discussions, political actions and
interactions between the Asia-Pacific countries and the various forums organised for
this end before APEC. It is argued here that the attributes of APEC indicate that the
Asia-Pacific countries want economic cooperation to be effective enough for them to
preserve the region's favourable environment for economic development but weak
enough for them to avoid being restricted by it.
APEC epitomised Asia-Pacific countries' desire for collective actions to achieve this
target. Ostensibly, its origin can be traced to a proposal made by the former Australian
Prime Minister Bob Hawke in 1989. As a result of this proposal, an international
conference attended by the foreign and economic ministers of twelve Asia-Pacific
countries was held in Australia in November that year. The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
operation Ministerial Meeting (APEC) was christened at that conference. It was also
decided at this conference that an annual ministerial meeting would be held in future to
continue the discussion.2
At the conference, the twelve countries' ministers agreed that the new forum's
purpose would be multi-dimensional. In addition to the promotion of global free trade,
it was also going to unite these countries in the then GATT Uruguay-Round talk,
promote intra-regional trade, and facilitate communication on trade policy and economic
data. The establishment of the inter-governmental APEC in 1989 turned out to be a
forward step with profound significance in the process of constructing economic co-
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operation in this region. APEC has since pushed forward the process of building co-
operation. After five meetings at the ministerial level and two meetings of economic
leaders, APEC brought this discussion into a new era. It was decided at the second
APEC economic leaders' meeting held in Indonesia in 1994 that an "open free trade
area" would be set up among the APEC member countries respectively in 2010 and
2020.3
2. 1. Key Academic Contributions
One of the main factors behind APEC was the promotive roles of academics. It was
among economists that the search for a suitable co-operation framework first started.
Among them, Japanese and Australian researchers played highly significant parts. Back
in the 1960s, Japanese academics started the discourse on bringing about regional
economic cooperation among the Asia-Pacific countries against the background of ever
more intensively inward-looking development of the EEC and the development of
regional economic integration in other parts of the world. Among them, Kiyoshi
Kojima, an economist, made the contribution of a pioneer. Then in the 1970s, Peter
Drysdale from Australia joined the discussion. Based on Kojima's efforts, he brought
the academic discussion on to new grounds.4
 Although both Kojima and Drysdale made
important contributions to the discussion, their ideas were far from identical. This
section will find out what proposals and ideas Kojima and Drysdale advanced, and why
these proposals and ideas were significant for APEC.
2. 1. A. Kiyoshi Kojima and His PAFTA
Discussions on Asia-Pacific economic cooperation must start by referring to
Kiyoshi Kojima's ground-breaking contribution. He was the first to make an economic
case for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. His first paper on this was published in
the 1960s, when he was a lecturer at Hitotsubashi University in Japan. According to
Peklca Korhonen, Kojima conducted his study on this idea from an economic point of
view. He did not know much about the works of those political scientists, such as
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Mitrany or Haas who explored integration, particularly European integration as an area
of political science. Kojima was inspired by "economic theoreticians, above all by the
German Wilhelm Ropke and the Swede Gunnar Myrdal". 5
 Kojima was also an
enthusiast for global free trade. His idea has been influential on later development.
Kojima presented his idea and argument for Asia-Pacific economic cooperation in a
paper which "was originally presented at 'The International Conference on Measures for
Trade Expansion of Developing Countries' held in Tokyo in November 1965 by Japan
Economic Research Centre (JERC). Kojima was a member of JERC. 6 It was written
with the assistance of Hiroshi Kurimoto, an official of Japan Association of the UN
Economic Commission for Asia and Far East (ECAFE). The paper was published in the
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics in June 1966. The English version of the paper was
later distributed widely in many Asia-Pacific countries.7 He went on to refine his ideas,
which culminated in a book entitled Japan and a Pacific Free Trade Area.. "It must be
emphasised, however, that the difference between the versions was not great, but rather
a matter of emphasis."8
Kojima argued in his paper that economic integration in the Pacific was both
necessary and important. He was inspired by the European Economic Community.
Throughout the paper, Kojima dwelled on the free trade area's logic, scale, character
and benefits for the intended members, and how member countries could help the Asian
developing countries develop their economies. The title that Kojima gave to this paper,
A Pacific Economic Community and Asian Developing Countries meant that he wanted
to set up a "Pacific Free Trade Area... among the United States of America, Canada,
Japan, Australia and New Zealand in the foreseeable future", 9 a structure which would
maintain special relations with the Southeast Asian developing countries. It clearly
indicates his concept of an Asia-Pacific region. He did not touch upon deeper forms of
integration. 10 The reason that he used the term "community" was because it was
fashionable after the EEC was established. But, he did base some of his important
arguments on the EEC's attributes.11
58
Kojima argued, first of all, that the Pacific developed countries, i.e. the United
States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, enjoyed those basic conditions that
made the EEC possible. Some of them were even better. He showed, for instance, that
the Asia-Pacific region enjoyed better conditions for cooperation in terms of both
population and the region's gross produce. As for the weight of the "Pacific
community" in world trade and the level of intra-regional trade, he argued, these
countries were in similar or even better positions to the EEC countries. Moreover, "(the
level of intra-community trade) could increase if PAFTA was established." 12 Kojima
did regard the difference in the size of these economies as a problem because. But he
held that, in spite of the much larger US economy, the economies of Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and Japan were similarly small. Japan's much larger population made it
equal to the other three. 13 However, Kojima was quite frank about the difference in the
degree of importance that these countries had for each other. Nevertheless, he argued
that this importance was substantial and growing. 14
Kojima's next argument concerned the industrial structures of the participating
countries, and the effects of tariff elimination. Kojima used the concept of trade
intensity, that is the level of two countries' trade compared to their trade with other
countries. 15 He found that trade intensity was above normal among the Pacific
developed countries. As for trade with other Pacific countries, their export would
surpass their import. He explained that trade intensity came from industrial
complementarity. "The greater the intensity of both Japan's export and import trade with
a particular country, the more complementary their industrial structures are likely to
be,... Five Pacific countries trade with each other intensively.,,16
While Kojima presented the intra-regional trade relations as favourable for the
establishment of a free trade area among the Pacific five, he also argued that it would be
in these developed countries' interests to include the Asian developing countries as
associated members of the community. He was referring to the developing members of
ECAFE in Asia, His analysis also started with the trade relations between these two
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groups of countries, which he argued was close. According to Kojima, 11 per cent of
the five Pacific community countries' total export went to the Asian developing
countries. This region was most important for Japan, one third of whose export went to
this region, but it was also important for the United States and Australia.
Meanwhile, according to Kojima, the importance of the Pacific five as export
markets for the Asian developing countries was even more obvious. 34 per cent of the
exports from these countries went to the "Pacific Community" countries. 17 "These close
trade relations between the Pacific Economic Community and Asian developing
countries require special measures for trade growth and mutual economic development,
and may suggest the possibility of associated membership for the latter in the Pacific
Free Trade Area." He even suggested in a footnote that such associated membership
could also be extended to Latin American countries. 18
Kojima also argued that to open markets to the Asian developing countries through
tariff reduction and shift of production would be far more efficient and beneficial for the
Pacific Community countries. He based his argument on an ECAFE forecast.
According to this forecast, the Asian developing countries would suffer a trade deficit of
$5,000 million in 1970. Such a trade deficit would eventually become the five
countries' responsibility. "It should be remembered that the trade gap of some $5,000
million forecasted by ECAFE is a burden for the advanced countries, mainly in the
Pacific Economic Community, which should be filled up anyhow through economic
assistance and other measures." 19 Yet market opening would substantially reduce this
burden.
There were also extra-regional reasons for Kojima to make the above proposal.
What concerned him most seemed to be the effect of the EEC'S inward looking
development. First, further development within the EEC was quite important as far as
the change in his thinking was concerned. Kojima believed in global free trade, and
strongly supported the post-war world trading system based on GATT. He was initially
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quite excited about the establishment of the EEC. When Britain started negotiating its
entry into the EEC, he thought that the EEC system was going to be substantially
extended as a result of the inclusion of the Commonwealth countries.20 However, his
mind was changed by the ever stronger discriminatory nature of the EEC when it
refused to admit Britain on the ground that the British Commonwealth would be too big
a burden for the EEC, and the prospect of the members of the European Free Trade
Area joining the EEC. Should this happen, the increasingly discriminatory EEC would
cover almost all of Western Europe. This, Kojima argued, should be dealt with in the
same way, with PAFTA being his solution.21
The other reason was the direction of Japan's trade, That is to say, the concern
about Japan's position in world trade against a background of emerging regional
communities around the world. Within the Asia-Pacific region, Japan was thought to be
the only odd one among the five developed countries. According to Kojima, the United
States and Canada on the one hand, and Australia and New Zealand on the other,
formed specially close trading relations. In 1965 the latter two countries had already
signed an agreement to create a free trade area between themselves, which was coming
into effect on 1 January 1966. Japan traded extensively with the United States and
Australia. Should trade relations in North America and the South Pacific develop
further, Japan would suffer by being left out of either arrangements.22
Further, were the European Economic Community to become a discriminatory trade
bloc covering the whole of the Western Europe, Japan would have to further strengthen
its trade relations with both the Pacific Community countries and the Asian developing
countries. In the 1960s, Japan's export could be divided into three parts of roughly
equal size, with 33 per cent to the Pacific five with the United States taking 27 per cent,
and 32 per cent to Southeast Asia, and the rest (35 per cent) to the rest of the world. For
this reason, the Asia-Pacific countries, both the developed and the developing, carried
most and equal importance for Japan. It meant that Japan could not afford to treat lightly
the region as a whole, or either groups of countries. He emphasised that, in terms of
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trade, Japan depended on both Asia and the Pacific, and warned that Japan should not
be too preoccupied with one region at the expense of the other. Therefore, if the
tendency to form economic blocs continued, Japan would have to stabilise its trade
relations with both groups of countries through some kind of organisational structure.23
In addition to Kojima's own observation and judgement of the intra-regional trade
and economic relations and the changes taking place in Western Europe, the widespread
discussion on regional economic integration going on inside Japan at that time must also
have influenced his perceptions. Perhaps these discussions further convinced him that a
free trade area among the Pacific developed countries, with the Asian developing
countries included as associated members, would be the best way out for Japan to avoid
being left on it own.
Beginning in 1963, discussion about regional integration picked up momentum in
Japan. It shifted from the question of whether Japan should engage in regional
integration to the question of whom should Japan integrate with. This was because the
further development of the EEC and the widespread copying of it in other parts of the
world created "feelings of loneliness" for the Japanese. The 'feelings of loneliness' led
to a search for suitable partners in case they were needed. Only two groups of countries
appeared practical, one being the Pacific countries, the other the Asian countries.24
Japanese discussion could be crystallised into three types of opinion. The first type
was advocated by the semi official Japan Economic Investigating Committee in a report
published in 1963. The report, dividing the world excluding the socialist countries into
developed and developing countries, claimed that Japan was a developed country. As
far as the Asia-Pacific region was concerned, Japan should integrate with the other four
developed countries, because Japan's interests could be better served by being part of
this group according to the GATT principles. The second and third views were that the
target of Japan's external integration was Asia. Their difference was in Japan's position
in such integration. The former held that Japan, the region's only developed country,
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should be the leader in promoting the establishment of the Organisation for Asian
Economic Co-operation (OAEC). The latter thought that Japan was not really so far
ahead, and the other East Asian countries were worthy co-operation partners or strong
competitors. It was vital for Japan to stabilise its market share in these countries, since,
for a long time to come, their importance as markets for Japanese exports would grow.
It can be seen from the above that Kojima's idea of a free trade area in the Asia-
Pacific region was put forward in response to the EEC's rising level of discrimination,
and concern within Japan about being left on its own. As a nation, Japan was highly
concerned with the widespread development towards regional integration in many parts
of the world. As has been shown, the widespread apprehension of "loneliness" and
prevalent views about whom Japan should co-operate with influenced Kojima's views
on the potential co-operation partners. Obviously, Kojima was also thinking as a true
patriot, keeping Japan's needs at the top of his agenda. This was fully shown by his
criteria in choosing co-operative partners.
Nevertheless, the key point of the PAFTA idea was that the Asia-Pacific constituted
a clear region, and the five Pacific countries constituted the core. Kojima did show that
economic cooperation was possible and beneficial by demonstrating that intra-regional
trade relations were becoming more important for these countries. He highlighted not
only the importance that these countries had for each other as markets, but also other
economic benefits that cooperation could bring. They included better allocation of
resources as a result of wider competition, etc. What was exceptional was his idea of
helping developing countries by opening material markets to these countries. He
believed this would enable them to develop their economies in a more dynamic way
through utilising their comparative advantages.25
Kojima made a strong case for this theory, but his proposal did not lead to any
immediate reaction from the wider Pacific academic world, or any immediate actions by
the governments of the intended five member countries. In this sense, Kojima's effort
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failed, because he did say that actions should be taken by these countries as soon as
possible before the organisational structure was in place.26 Why did the idea fail?
According to later commentators on Kojima's proposal, there were three main
reasons.27 The uneven distribution of the benefits from trade expansion as a result of
integration was quite heavy in the considerations of Australia, Canada and New
Zealand.28 People from these countries, who were involved in the discussion, believed
that a free trade area would benefit Japan, and such benefits would be achieved at the
expense of their countries.29 Inside Japan, there were also voices against the proposal.
They regarded PAFTA as analogous to the infamous Greater East Asia Co-prosperity
Sphere Scheme.30 Another reason was the United States' attitude. As the leader of the
post-war western world, the United States' attention was focused more on global free
trade rather than regional. Even if the United States would consider regional integration,
it seems that it regarded Western Europe, rather than the Asia-Pacific, as the target.31
For these reasons, Kojima's proposal did not gain an enthusiastic response from
the targeted countries. However, Kojima's effort was not made in vain. It proved to be
a good starting point. His method of study of this issue, his criteria, and his scale of co-
operation were to have deep and wide-ranging influence on later discussions carried out
in the wider Asia-Pacific region. When the discussion on Asia-Pacific regional
economic co-operation first started in Japan, "it had proceeded in vague terms, based
more on feelings than actual knowledge of the situation between the countries. With this
study, Kojima moves discussion on to the firmer ground of scientific study on the
economic strengths and weaknesses of the countries in question. The strength of
Kojima's argument is that he lays bare, from an economic point of view, the basic
relationship between the Pacific countries. This laid firm foundation on which
subsequent discussion could be based".32
The significance of Kojima's paper lies also in the fact that it provided a map for
later discussions on economic co-operation in this region. Until Kojima made his
proposal for a Pacific Economic Community, there had been no concrete proposals at
all. As will be shown later, his idea and argument were the starting and reference points
for later discussions in the process. The Kojima proposal and its failure to be turned
into action were used as the reference point for the direction and scope of proposals
made by other people. It is in this sense that Kojima's proposal was important.
2. 1. B. Peter Drysdale and A Confident and Open Trade Regime
Peter Drysdale, professorial fellow and executive director of the Australia-Japan
Research Centre in the School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University
(ANU), was the other person who put forward some basic ideas and arguments about
Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. Trained as an economist specialised in Australia-
Japan economic relations, he believed that region-wide economic cooperation was
capable of offering the Asia-Pacific countries the conditions needed to maintain the
momentum of rapid economic development in the post-war era. He drew his inspiration
from both Kojima, and his academic experiences at Oxford and Harvard.33
Drysdale represented a new thrust in the academic discussions different from that of
Kojima. The difference was mainly in their approaches to economic cooperation.34
While Kojima advocated a free trade area, Drysdale believed that it was most important
for the Asia-Pacific countries to preserve and consolidate the favourable international
environment, both global and regional, that made it possible for Japan and other East
Asian countries to achieve rapid economic development. What was most essential for
this, he held, was to maintain open, non-discriminatory and mutually beneficial
international trade relations among these countries, and to unite them in promoting
global free trade through GATT. The mechanism prescribed for this was an
organisation "which should be function-oriented, non-exclusive, non-bureaucratic." It
was supposed to be able to unite these countries through better mutual understanding.
The other main feature of Drysdale's ideas was "open regionalism". He argued that it
was highly necessary for the Asia-Pacific countries to rule out any inward looking,
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discriminatory institutions for economic cooperation. 35 This subsection will show why
Drysdale believed that Asia-Pacific economic cooperation be non-exclusive.
Deteriorating Intra-regional Trade Environment
Drysdale argued that the Asia-Pacific regional organisation must have clear-cut
functions. As far as he was concerned, one such function was to deal with issues that
started to plague the trade and economic relations in this region since the late 1970s.
According to him, the issues confronting the countries of this region were brought
about partly by their success. Such success was owed largely to the GATT based world
trade system, which enabled the Asia-Pacific region to develop close and rewarding
economic and trade relations. As a result of such relations, countries in East Asia,
beginning with Japan and then onto the others, became powerful forces in the world
economy. The rapid growth in East Asia, which outpaced that of both the United States
and Western Europe, forced those countries to consider restricting trade with East Asian
countries.
The direct consequence of this was various types of departure from the GATT
principles. As for the Asia-Pacific region, the most damaging departure was that made
by the United States. According to Drysdale, the United States played a vital role in the
rapid emergence of East Asia in the world economy. It provided the political as well as
economic support for these countries. Such support was highly instrumental in the
formation of the contemporary intra-regional trade relations, because, as a superpower,
it provided the political underpinning and a safe and favourable environment that made it
possible for the Asia-Pacific countries to develop strong economic and trade relations.36
The Untied States was also the most important market for Fast Asian exports.37
However this situation, which was favourable to the export-oriented strategy of
economic development followed by the countries in this region, began to change after
the Pacific Asian region became an important force in the world economy. The rapid
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economic growth achieved by the East Asian countries including Japan, which, to a
large extent, depended on the United States as a market, led to trade disputes between
the United States and these East Asian nations, particularly Japan, due to the trade
deficit sustained by the former. This forced the United States to resort to a series of
bilateral, anti-GATT-spirit measures to redress this.
First, a series of trade-restriction measures, such as 'voluntary export restrictions
(VERs)', 'orderly marketing agreements' (OMAs) and 'the Multi-Fibre Arrangement'
(MFA), were implemented to reduce the US deficit with Japan. These bilateral deals
were thought to be damaging not only to Japan but also to other Pacific Asian countries.
This was because they were also exposed to trade restrictions by such deals since "their
very success (would) generate United States reaction and extension of specific bilateral
import restrictions to them as well". For instance, South Korea, Hong Kong and
Taiwan were subjected to restrictions by the "orderly marketing agreement" by the
United States once they replaced Japan as the main exporters of electronic appliances.38
The second issue was the American demand for larger shares of the markets for
agricultural and mineral products in the Pacific Asian countries and the way this was
done. The United States used its huge trade deficit with Japan to pressure it to devote a
larger share of its commodity market to US products. Drysdale pointed to the disruptive
effects on the trade between Japan and other countries. For instance, under US pressure
for greater access to its beef market, Japan altered its beef import restrictions in order to
import more US beef. Also, the United States coal mining companies lobbied Japanese
utilities to buy more US coal. All this was done at the expenses other countries, but
mostly Australia. Drysdale claimed that, while the United States might be benefited in
the short-term, the long-term consequence would be distortion of the most efficient
allocation of resources and damage to the interest in non-discriminatory principles.39
Another development, which Drysdale believed was highly undesirable to most
countries in the Asia-Pacific region, was the US initiative to form so-called free trade
67
areas within this region. The most obvious example was the North American Free Trade
Area (NAFTA). The United States also considered other similar attempts, for instance a
free trade area with the ASEAN countries. These realised or attempted arrangements
were explained by Drysdale as American intentions to correct its problems of huge trade
deficits through restrictive means. He argued this could be highly damaging to those
countries that were not included in such arrangements, because narrow and exclusive
arrangements like those attempted by the Americans would restrict trade in the region as
a whole by putting those excluded countries at a disadvantageous position.40
Drysdale believed that departures by US from the GATT principles could lead to
deterioration in intra-regional trade relations. This could become an obstacle for
maintaining the momentum of rapid economic development in the Asia-Pacific region.
The rapid economic rise of the Pacific Asian countries made this region a centre of
world economic activities. A crucial reason for this was the possibility for these
countries to maintain their export momentum. The departure from GATT principles was
highly damaging for these countries since their strategy for development dictated that
they must be able to export to other countries. Should the access to these markets be cut
off, the Fast Asian countries, whose economic future had crucial importance for the rest
of the Asia-Pacific countries,41 would be deprived of a condition that was of
fundamental significance.
The most effective way out of this situation, according to Drysdale, was economic
cooperation, which would curb and eventually eradicate the restrictive arrangements.
This should enable the Asia-Pacific countries to understand better the consequence of
their policy actions for other countries so as to co-ordinate their actions for the benefit of
all countries. This was why, according to Drysdale, economic cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific region should have a broader sense and relate to international cooperation on, or
co-ordination of approaches towards, various economic policy matters. But policy co-
ordination in the Asia-Pacific region should be different from that practised among the
industrial countries, which was focused on such macroeconomic issues as monetary
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policies. Policy co-ordination in the Asia-Pacific region needed to cover a much wider
terrain to suit the co-existence of developed and developing countries. The areas
covered should include such matters as trade policy, foreign investment policy, aid
policy, structural adjustment policy and general commercial policy. It was to these areas
that priority should be given while developing common Asia-Pacific policy
approaches.42
As Drysdale indicated, cooperation as policy communication and co-ordination was
needed in this region for the following reasons. First, the developing countries could no
longer enjoy those favourable conditions for foreign trade as they used to do. Their own
success in developing their economies made those countries, particularly the United
States, who used to open their markets to them, highly reluctant to do so. Yet the ability
to continue to benefit from the US market remained crucial for their economic
development.43 In the meantime, policy communication and co-ordination could also
help curb the tendency of protectionism among the developing countries in this region,
and thereby promote trade liberalisation among these countries as well.
Second, high level of heterogeneity meant greater need for communication and
understanding. The Asia-Pacific countries were a group of countries with more
differences than similarities. A mechanism that could accommodate such differences and
enable them to adjust their policies for mutual benefits was required. "A necessary
condition for collective agreement and action on cooperative exchange is the
establishment of a common basis of understanding of the issues and options and the
pursuit of common policy goals."44
Third, policy communication was believed to be able to reduce and limit the adverse
effects of bilateral deals. They included such negative ones as those between US and
Japan as well as such innocent ones as the investment deals between Japan and China,
which could divert investment from the ASEAN countries to China. Since the countries
of this region shared a close economic link, bilateral deals tended to affect third
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countries. A mechanism for policy communication would increase the awareness of all
countries involved of the implications of these deals, and therefore reduce and limit their
adverse effects.45
Drysdale advocated policy communication and co-ordination as the main feature of
Asia-Pacific economic co-operation assuming the maintenance of free trade as a pre-
condition. He argued that easy access to foreign markets, especially the US market, was
crucial for the rapid economic development achieved by Fist Asian countries, including
Japan. Such easy access was not protected by any formal trade regimes in this region.
Therefore it was vulnerable to disruption. To maintain the momentum of rapid economic
growth, free trade must be kept as a main feature of the intra-regional trade relations.
Open Regionalism
Drysdale argued that Asia-Pacific economic co-operation should not be policy
communication and co-ordination only. It should also champion free trade. What he had
in mind, however, was not mechanical free trade through a free trade area. The free
trade that he advocated was open to all countries both in and outside this region, and
even to the socialist countries. This was necessary, as Drysdale argued, because
discriminatory arrangements would damage the economic growth performance of the
Asia-Pacific region since it was not consistent with the development policies of the
countries in this region.' 6 Globally, Asia-Pacific countries should form an alliance
through cooperation to promote global free trade. This was what he called regionalism
without discrimination or "open regionalism".47
As Drysdale saw it, open regionalism was needed in this region because the export-
oriented development strategies followed by many countries in this region gave rise to
protectionism, which was practised by both developed and developing countries in this
region. He argued that open regionalism would be practical because the Asia-Pacific
countries were interested in creating a new climate in their own approach to commercial
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policy, and because protection would damage trade partner's interests and limit the
scope for growth.48
Open regionalism was also meant to allow a certain degree of flexibility for the
member countries in opening their markets. It would be able to draw those countries
who found restrictive free trade inhibiting to participate in regional cooperation. A free
trade area, which would require uniform reduction of tariffs by all participating
countries, was not in their best interests. Both the ASEAN developing countries and
China were in a stage of development in which the total opening of their markets would
adversely affect their economic development. However, if these countries were allowed
to follow a slower track, it would invite the proliferation of commitments short of free
trade by other participants. Therefore, open regionalism would suit this region best.49
Open regionalism would also make it easy for the Asia-Pacific countries to conduct
positive and rewarding cooperation with the socialist countries and those in Latin
America.50 The way to conduct free trade following the principle of open regionalism
was for the Asia-Pacific countries to swap market access concessions basically between
the developing countries and the United States.51
On the other hand, if Asia-Pacific free trade was not intended to involve trade
discrimination within the Pacific, according to Drysdale, it might also provide a
potentially valuable starting point for accelerating movement towards the negotiation on
broader trade liberalisation on a most-favoured-nation basis. 52 The Asia-Pacific
countries should make effort to avoid any acceptance of discrimination against non-
Pacific countries implied by the term 'free trade area', and to work towards finding
areas of reciprocal concessions that could be offered on a most-favoured-nation basis.53
As Drysdale saw it, the Asia-Pacific region could use its growing economic might
to promote global free trade guided by the GATT principles. "Pacific co-operation can
be directed towards building a stronger global trade regime and binding protection to
promote regional industrialisation... The interest here is in the scope for Pacific
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collective action to strengthen the most-favoured-nation rules and the global trading
system."54 He argued that this was needed because the development interests of the
Asia-Pacific countries dictated so. Global most-favoured-nation based liberalisation was
therefore the best option for the Asia-Pacific countries. Open regionalism was also these
countries' weapon to fight protectionism practised by other regions, particularly the
EEC.55 Drysdale also held that to practise open regionalism would require the Asia-
Pacific countries to undertake co-operation in order to unite these countries in playing a
"leadership role" to promote global free trade based on GATT principles.56
It can be seen from the above that Drysdale held that Asia-Pacific economic
cooperation should be free trade, yet the focus of its effort should be on policy
communication and understanding. He advocated that the cooperation mechanism
should enable these countries to have more mutual influence so as to adopt policies that
were in favour of maintaining the momentum of rapid economic development in this
region. 57 This was due to the nature of the problems plaguing intra-regional economic
relations, which linked all these countries one way or another. "A wide, flexible and
non-bureaucratic institutional association" was believed to be able to help the Asia-
Pacific countries to tackle such problems. In the meantime, the Asia-Pacific countries
should not practise protectionism against countries both in and outside this region. In
fact, open regionalism would give these countries the opportunity to act as leaders in
promoting global free trade, which was consistent with their development interests.
An Organisation for Policy Communication & Coordination
While demonstrating that cooperation was beneficial to the sustenance of positive
intra-regional economic relations, Drysdale went to great length to explore what kind of
a cooperative institution was appropriate for the Asia-Pacific countries. His effort was
divided into two phases. The first was represented by his consideration about an inter-
governmental organisation. He proposed the establishment of an "Organisation for
Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD)" in a paper entitled: An Asian-Pacific
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Regional Economic Organisation: An Exploratory Concept Paper (Concept Paper).58
The key point made in this paper was that cooperation should be an inter-governmental
process, and the area of cooperation should be policy communication and cooperation
should be co-ordination rather than integration.59
What Drysdale was exploring in the Concept Paper was a structure suited to the
economic and trade relations within the Asia-Pacific region, instead of responding to
extra-regional changes. "By 1979 the focus was very much on the internal dynamics of
the East Asian and Pacific economies and the challenges and opportunities which East
Asian trade and industrial growth presented for the formation of foreign economic
policy."60 He argued that, as the Asia-Pacific region emerged as a centre of the world
economy, a regional organisation facilitating the pursuit of common trade and
development objectives and overcoming contradictory ones became necessary.61
He further argued that the "Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development"
should reflect the heterogeneous reality of the Asia-Pacific region and serve the interests
of all the countries. The proposed OPTAD should therefore fulfil four functions: an
organisation for effective discussions on issues facing this region; a mechanism to
stimulate investment and to improve aid flows to the developing countries, a forum for
working out long term strategies of development in the region through consultation and
discussion, and a structure which was able to accommodate the socialist countries of the
Asia-Pacific region in regional economic co-operation. 62 Such an organisation would
take into consideration interests of all, instead of just a few countries. The momentum
of rapid economic growth could be maintained as well, since regional interdependence
was much heightened following rapid economic growth in East Asian countries.
The Concept Paper also spelled out the style and working details of the OFTAD.
The organisation should be fairly loose and avoid unnecessary bureaucratic structures.
Its working style should be consultative, informal and communicative. 63 It even put
forward a detailed working plan for OFTAD. The organisation should be a process of
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high level political consultation launched by a meeting of heads of government. Its daily
functions should be handled by a small permanent secretariat made up of senior
professionals directed by a steering committee of senior government officials of the
member countries. The steering committee would meet annually or more frequently.
The areas on OFTTAD's agenda would be specific policy issues, which would be
handled by ad hoc task forces involving well-known academics. The issues should
include free and fair trade; trade restructuring, financing of regional development;
foreign direct investment; resource and energy security; and trade with the socialist
countries.64
Drysdale believed that an organisation like the OPTAD was necessary because none
of the existing regional institutions served the purposes that OPTAD was supposed to
fulfil. 65 Though there were a number of regional institutions, such as the UN Economic
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and the Asian Development
Bank, or even ASEAN, with which a new regional organisation might seem to
compete, yet "the function and target of a wide, flexible and non-bureaucratic
institutional association for East Asian and Pacific economies committed to outward
looking trade and development was considered much beyond all the above
institutions".66
What Drysdale proposed in the 1979 Concept Paper prepared for the US Senate
was an organisation that was quite unique in its kind. It should be inter-governmental
and involving high government officials, yet it was to be flexible, slim and function-
oriented. It should be capable of dealing with this region diversified issues. It should
also be an organisation in which both developed and developing countries, and the
socialist countries, could be brought together to study and deal with the trade and
economic issues existed in both bilateral relations and intra-regional relations. OPTAD,
once set up, would enable the member countries to reach agreement of understanding on
various issues, and decision that took the interests of all member countries into account.
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The importance of the Drysdale proposal is that it managed to take the discussion in
a new direction. Like Kojima's free trade area proposal, "...the OPTAD idea is
probably the most comprehensive and concrete plan proposed (so far) and has served as
a useful frame of reference in all subsequent discussion of the desirability and feasibility
of Pacific regional co-operation". 67 Deliberations on Kojima's proposal since 1968
among scholars proved that the idea was politically and economically unfeasible. There
were objections to the idea both inside and outside Japan, especially in the "smaller"
countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 68 As a result, the discussion
failed to move further. Drysdale's proposal actually restarted the discussion, in certain
sense, after a decade in 1979.
2. 1. C. Kojima and Drysdale: A Comparison
The previous two subsections indicate that there are important differences between
the thoughts of Kojima and Drysdale for conducting economic co-operation in the Asia-
Pacific region. This is obviously due to the fact that they worked against highly
different backgrounds. When Kojima published his first article on this issue, the
concept of an Asia-Pacific region was only appearing on the distant horizon. He was
writing largely in response to the initial development of the EEC, and the concern about
the EEC expressed in Japan. Drysdale, who was writing almost two decades later, drew
his inspiration from the reality that the Asia-Pacific region was already a centre in the
world economic activities. Certainly Drysdale's OPTAD proposal grew out of the
discussions on PAFTA. He did think that the focus of foreign economic policy interests
underlying the PAFTA proposal was valid and that it contained the seeds of a useful
approach to major problems that were emerging in the growing intra-regional economic
and other relations. But their proposals differed not only in their characteristics,
objective and function, scope of participation, and structures but also in the rationale for
strengthening Asia-Pacific economic co-operation,69
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The first major difference between the two is their main arguments for co-
operation. Kojima argued from the perspective of the harmful effect of the establishment
and further discriminatory development of the EEC. He maintained that the interests of
the Asia-Pacific countries would be better protected if co-operation was introduced in
their economic affairs. Yet Drysdale argued from the perspective of the consequences of
rapid economic development within the Asia-Pacific region. He wanted to have a kind
of cooperation which was able to sustain the international conditions for the Asia-Pacific
region that had helped make Japan an economic power.
The second difference lies in the format of co-operation. Kojima wanted to follow
the example of the EEC and the development of exclusive regional structures elsewhere
in the world to introduce discriminatory economic co-operation to this region. Though
he named the structure an economic community, it was actually intended to be a free
trade area, the lowest form of economic integration according to Balassa's
classification. 70 Nevertheless, this was meant, to certain extent, to separate the Asia-
Pacific region from the rest of the world. Drysdale emphasised "non-discriminatory
economic cooperation" for the Asia-Pacific countries in order to let it to expand to cover
the whole world eventually. In addition, Drysdale put his emphasis on both policy
communication and co-ordination. But he also emphasised the role that free trade could
play in the development of the economies of this region. Yet free trade was to be used in
a different sense, that is, countries should start from exchanging market access
concessions for those products that they had comparative advantages. Protection should
only be used to exchange mutual reduction of protection between the Asia-Pacific region
and other parts of the world, such as the EEC.
The third difference is in the membership scope. Kojima proposed limited
membership while Drysdale proposed open membership. Kojima believed that co-
operation was only possible among the developed countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
The developing countries, due to their undeveloped economies, should be included only
as associate members in order to offer them co-ordinated economic aid. Drysdale
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wanted to include not only all the countries with market economies of the Asia-Pacific
region, but also wanted to see that regional economic co-operation expanded to include
the socialist countries of this region, and planned a global mission for it as well.
Drysdale did not make any difference between the developed countries and the
developing countries in this region. This was because he saw that the developing
countries were rapidly becoming important economic forces in their own right. The
membership was open to both the socialist countries in this region, and the countries of
the rest of the world so long as they were prepared to exchange concessions with the
Asia-Pacific region. However, as far as ideas were concerned, the process of
constructing certain kind of economic co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region started by
Kojima in 1965 was brought forward by Drysdale's ideas of co-operation as co-
ordination and "open regionalism" and his proposal for OFTAD.
2. 2. Political Interactions
Discussion on economic co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region, started first among
academics, was under political influence right from the beginning. Kojima's proposal
got firm support from the Japanese government. Later the Australian government also
joined the Japanese government to support these discussions. Political support was also
actively sought by the academics. Drysdale's proposal for OFTAD was made to directly
involve the governments of the Asia-Pacific countries in this process. "OPTAD focused
quite properly on the need for inter-governmental organisation and activity,..." 71 This
section will illustrate why the governments of these countries would be interested in
such a venture, and what they did to influence the direction and outcome of the
discussion, which had direct impact on the emergence of APEC.
2. 2. A. The Interests of the Key Countries
It was for different reasons that the Asia-Pacific countries joined the process to
construct regional economic cooperation. Though these countries responded differently
to the idea at the beginning, the process kept growing. This can been seen in the ever
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larger number of countries represented in both the discussions in PECC and APEC, the
two forums that have involved the political circle, albeit in different forms. The most
fundamental reason for more and more countries to participate in the process was
obviously the potential economic interests involved in it. 72
 Yet my research indicates
that there were also political motives to be involved. Since the process was always
under political influence, it is worth while to examine why the Asia-Pacific countries
became interested in it.
As far as the United States was concerned, cooperation was thought to offer it the
means to exercise its leadership role in this region under changed conditions,
particularly after the Cold War. The Asia-Pacific region's economic importance for the
United States increased rapidly since the late 1970s. The American trade with the rest of
this region exceeded that with all of Europe. Yet the US did not have a regular policy-
co-ordinating or information-sharing mechanism such as the OECD with the Asian
countries. 73
 By joining this process, the United States would find it much easier to
strengthen its economic position in the area vis-a-vis Japan. Left alone or only to
bilateral arrangements, Japan's share of the Pacific Asian market was likely to grow,
and the formation of a de facto Japanese economic sphere would be inevitable.74
An organisation for economic co-operation was thought to suit the US. quite well.
A straightforward political or security-oriented regional arrangement would be neither
feasible nor desirable from the US. point of view. Most Asian countries, as well as
American domestic *opinion, would be opposed to political or security arrangements
either for fear of domination or further overseas commitments. Even if such
arrangements proved to be feasible, it would only result in creating dissension, and
complicating the security situation in the region. Thus, a multilateral organisational
framework that concentrated on economic co-operation would be the most feasible and
effective mechanism by which the US. could strengthen its presence in the region.75
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In addition, it would be in the interests of the US. if it could, through such a
mechanism, assist the region's developing countries to continue their economic
progress and to retain their market economies. Another motivating factor on the part of
the American advocates of an Asia-Pacific community appeared to be the desire to bring
into balance the traditionally Europe-centred economic policy of the US. and to respond
to the rising tide of protectionism in many sectors of their economy. The United States
found itself discriminated against by the European Community, the formation of which
it encouraged and assisted. It would not wish to repeat its experience with Europe by
being locked out of a regional grouping that might emerge in western Pacific. Closer
ties with the Asia-Pacific countries might serve as a counterweight to the exclusiveness
of the European nations.76
Japan was thought to have similar interests in the Asia-Pacific co-operation to those
of the United States. Through a co-operative organisation, Japan would be able to
secure a position in this region, or even might be able to assume a leadership role that
might not be possible on a bilateral basis or without arousing resistance from countries
with smaller economies. Japan even considered using the APEC process to bolster its
bid to become a global power. 77 There were more practical reasons for Japan to be
interested in such a structure as well. The Asia-Pacific region was not only Japan's
most important sources of raw materials, but also its most important export market. An
organisation would assist to stabilise these. Japan could also use it to co-ordinate
economic assistance for the developing countries and reduce the pressure on it to open
its market for import.78 Also, such an organisation would have the positive effect of
creating a greater and more realistic awareness within Japan of the impacts of its own
domestic economic decisions on other countries.79
For the other developed countries in this region, Australia, Canada and New
Zealand, a cooperation organisation would institutionalise their places in the fast
developing Asia-Pacific region. Both Canada and Australia were over dependent on
their largest economic partners, the United States and Japan, as markets and sources of
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investment. A regional organisation involving both Japan and the United States would
make it possible for them to balance off the dependence on just one partner. 80 The
development within the EEC was also an important incentive for these countries to be
more interested in the wider Asia-Pacific region than the United States and Japan
only.81
But Australia had much stronger interest in such cooperation than either Canada or
New Zealand. This was because the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, and the Pacific
Asian countries in particular, carried the most importance for this country. As a main
producer of raw materials and commodity products, Australia conducted the majority of
its trade with the Asia-Pacific countries. Australia came to believe that its economic
destiny was tied with East Asia. The proposed cooperative structure would bring the
benefit of expanding its markets, with the resource-poor NIEs growing rapidly as
increasingly industrialised countries. This is one of the key reasons for the successive
Australian governments to advocate the Asianisation of Australia.82
Since Britain joined the EEC in the early 1970s, Australia found its traditional
relations, particularly economic relations, with the old world gradually weakened.
Australia "loss" of Britain was more than handsomely compensated by its economic
relations with Japan and other rapidly rising East Asian countries. But the new
development in the intra-regional economic relations, particularly the American way of
dealing with Japan and other East Asian countries to cut trade imbalance, made Australia
wonder if it was going to be made friendless in this region. Hence, it would serve
Australia's interests well if economic and trade relations were stable and smooth. 83 It
was also due to Australia's desire to integrate with Asia that it played an active role in
promoting regional economic cooperation. There was also a kind of technical
convenience that only Australia enjoyed. As an industrial country, Australia was not
perceived to harbour the sort of dominating intentions that the smaller and weaker
countries suspected of both the United States and Japan.84
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The ASEAN countries, who were regarded with great importance by many, 85 had
strong interests in preserving and expanding market opportunities in the advanced
industrial countries. Yet ASEAN's slow progress as an entity made these countries have
strong reservations about the idea at first. They were concerned that ASEAN would be
submerged in a much larger structure involving some of the most powerful countries.
However, as the process picked up momentum, ASEAN was persuaded that such an
organisation would help consolidate it, since the ASEAN countries would develop a
strong voice through policy co-ordination and information sharing, and interest
representation. With both the United States and Japan in the structure, it was thought
that ASEAN would also be able to overcome the problem of dealing with one giant at a
time.86
To the Newly Industrialised Economies, the question of economic co-operation and
co-ordination in the Asia-Pacific region was of crucial importance for their continued
economic growth and viability. It would probably be in the interests of the NIEs
whether a common market, a free trade area, or a non-exclusive regional GATT were
established in the region including as many countries as possible. The NIEs would
expect that a new regional arrangement would contribute to bringing about a more stable
and open environment for trade and finance, expanded trade with the other countries in
this .region, a more favourable position in multilateral trade negotiations with the
advanced countries, and a more stable source of natural resources.87
2. 2. B. Political Actions and Interactions
In the process that led to APEC, political involvement and interactions also
influenced the process deeply. What was interesting was that interactions at the political
level over this process was not always positive. It took quite a clash for the process to
preserve its pan-Asia-Pacific characteristics. Such political activities started within the
Japanese political circle, then it gradually expanded to involve all the member countries
of APEC. Early political involvement was positive and supportive since the Japanese
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government, and then the Australian government, were in total agreement with what
was proposed. But as the momentum picked up, particularly after the ASEAN countries
joined in this process, it be increasingly complicated. Various political considerations
started to influence this process.
But it was to the support by the Japanese government that this process owed its
rapid development in the 1980s. As was shown in the first section of this chapter,
discussion on how to deal with Japan's economic relations with the nations in the Asia-
Pacific region was widespread among Japanese government officials and politicians
back in the 1960s. For instance, Japanese Diet members repeatedly raised questions
about such development soon after the establishment of the EEC and its further
development in the direction of a discriminatory bloc.88 In the mid-1960s, the concept
of an Asia-Pacific community was widely embraced by Japanese politicians, business
men and academics.89 It is therefore not surprising that the idea of a formal Pacific
association was first articulated by such people in Japan.
Out of concerns about Japan's position in this region, the idea of a formal Pacific
association received strong support from the Japanese government The first movement
at senior official level came in 1967, when Foreign Minister Takeo Mild outlined his
ideas for an "Asian Pacific policy" based on an "awareness of common principles",
regional cooperation in Asia, cooperation among the advanced nations in the Pacific
region, and more extensive aid programmes for the developing countries in this
region.90 The most important action taken was the launch of the Pacific Trade and
Development Conference (PAFTAD) series, with the support of the Japanese foreign
ministry, to consider Kiyoshi Kojima's Pacific Free Trade Area proposal. Yet the less
than enthusiastic response to Kojima's proposal by people from other countries
prevented the Japanese government from taking a more active role. 91 However, the
PAFTAD series was important in keeping the discussion going. When Masayoshi Ohira
became Prime Minister in 1978, he brought the process further through joining forces
with the Australian government. Ohira was a firm supporter of this process. He
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discussed economic co-operation in both his election campaign, and later in discussions
with both Australian and American political leaders.92
However, in the 1980s, the Japanese government became less prominent as the
chief advocate for regional economic co-operation. An important reason for this was
that Japan came to realise that its effort to be widely accepted as a member of this region
would be enhanced by maintaining a lower profile in this process. 93 But this was also
explained as the result of the consolidation of Japan's position in both the regional and
global economies. Japan's official interest in the concept during the 1970s coincided
with its desire to improve and strengthen ties with the ASEAN countries and to secure
steady supplies of natural resources, including oil. By the middle of 1980s, Japan's
relations with the various ASEAN countries stabilised and there were no serious
commodities crises on the horizon. 94 Furthermore, Japan realised the responsibility that
would come with the benefits from a multilateral structure. 95 All these reduced Japan's
incentives to play a leading role in establishing a regional co-operative mechanism.
Certainly Japan continued to exercise significant influence on this process.
As it has been shown above, economic cooperation was regarded to be of special
importance for Australia, whose government also played a highly active role in
promoting this process. Like the Japanese government, the Australian government
provided support to the academics before taking the lead itself. For instance, together
with the Japanese government, the Australian government commissioned Australian and
Japanese researchers to conduct research on the feasibility of co-operation in 1970s. A
report was produced from this research project. 96 The first widely influential action
taken by the Australian government was to sponsor a seminar in 1980 to "survey
interests in the idea of a Pacific Community". 97 This seminar turned out to be the
starting point of the Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference (PECC) series. Since
this was the first forum which involved government officials, it further underlined the
significance of the Australian role. Yet the most significant contribution made by the
Australian government was the proposal which led to APEC. Frustrated by the lack of
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progress in the PECC discussions after nearly ten years, Australian Prime Minister Bob
Hawke proposed in early 1989 the convening of a ministerial meeting between the Asia-
Pacific countries to push forward the process of constructing economic cooperation.98
The other important contribution made by the Australian government was the
consultations that its officials or representatives conducted with the various countries in
this region. Before the 1980 seminar was convened by Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser,
John Crawford, the co-author of the previously mentioned report to the Australian and
Japanese government, was sent to capitals of the ASEAN countries to for consultations
and explanation. After Hawke made his proposal, Australian officials were once again
sent on consultation missions to the various capitals in this region. Such consultations
prepared the ground for multilateral discussions by "... defining more concretely the
objectives of regional economic cooperation and the nature of a process which would
suit the needs of the extremely diverse Asia-Pacific... Moreover, the consultations gave
shape to the guiding principles of the proposed new process"29
The active promotion by the Japanese and Australian governments was highly
crucial in the early stage of this process. However, once the idea of regional economic
cooperation was widely accepted as worth exploring, countries in this region began
exerting influence on the process. While the Australian government replaced the
Japanese government as the leading force behind this process, politicians in other
countries started to make inputs to the construction of a regional cooperation structure.
What must be mentioned here is the interest shown by Senator John Glenn,
Chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific. When Ohira joined forces with Australia's Fraser in promoting the
process, Glenn's interests in it increased. The idea was not strange to him. Due to his
position in the US Senate, Glenn was involved in the exploration of solutions to the
issues in US-Japan relations. It was in this context that he came into contact with the
discussions on conducting economic co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region. Against
the background of widening interests in the process in the United States, Glenn
commissioned Drysdale and Patrick to evaluate the process of promoting economic co-
operation in this region and make suggestions as to the actions that should be taken by
American politicians.
The ASEAN countries were the first ones to inject rather negative influence into this
process. These countries were highly sceptical about the process actively promoted by
the Japanese and the Australian governments. They were not so convinced as to the
final purpose of economic cooperation in this region, when representatives from the
Australian government consulted them on the establishment of an Asia-Pacific inter-
governmental organisation. For instance, they were not so sure that security issues
should be included. They were not in favour of a formal organisation either. 101 They
made clear that they would consider participating in the discussion only if it focused on
economic issues in a less than formally official manner. 102 The ASEAN countries'
narrow interests were explained as a result of their concerns about the effect of such a
region-wide structure on the fate of ASEAN itself. As an organisation, ASEAN was
aware of its limited success in promoting social and econoniic progress in these
countries. They were also worried about the big countries' intention to dominate it. 103
But ASEAN countries' mind changed, as the momentum for economic cooperation
gathered. As these countries' economies achieved high rate of growth, they became
more confident in themselves, and also came to realised that they should not limit
themselves to ASEAN as they tried to sustain their economic growth. They also wanted
to cut down competition from other Asia-Pacific countries. Beside, they wanted to
prevent domination by big powers through directly exercising influence on it. That is
why they opposed Bob Hawke's idea of excluding the United States and Canada from
the later APEC, when he first put forward the APEC idea. Hawke was mainly
concerned with the development of NAFTA.1°4
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It was also due to the further development of NA ETA that some ASEAN leaders
took offensive by promoting pure Asian cooperation structures. Singapore's former
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yuw commented that Asia should have its own integration
structure since major trading countries were moving away from the multilateral trading
system towards more restrictive regional blocs. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammed adopted an even more radical approach. In December 1990, in a marked
departure from his previous stance of "no trade blocs", Mahathir proposed an East
Asian trade bloc in talks with the visiting Chinese Premier Li Peng. Mahathir's plan was
to form an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), which envisaged consultation among
the Asian members of APEC, with the United States, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand excluded. 1 °5 What prompted the change in the attitude of the ASEAN countries
was the EEC's Final Unification Act and connections to Eastern Europe, and the agreed
free trade area, NAFTA, between Canada and the United States and the negotiation to
include Mexico. Mahathir's proposal caused the fiercest dispute among these countries.
Though Li Peng did not respond to Mahathir's proposal enthusiastically, this
proposal caught the attention of Japan and South Korea. South Korea was interested in
the EAEC concept because it saw it as a counterweight against a Japan-led Asian
economic grouping, and as a means to balance the weakening US interests in this region
symbolised by the repeated cancellation of visits to this region by US President George
Bush. As for Japan, there was initially deliberate ambivalence in Tokyo on the issue
whether to join EAEC. Since the Mahathir plan explicitly called for the set-up of a
discriminatory East Asian bloc, which was not consistent with Japan's desire for an
Asia-Pacific structure, Tokyo's initial response was quite unsympathetic. Later,
however, Japan's attitude became more ambivalent with senior government officials
expressing flexibility. Japan therefore indicated its interests in the EAEC proposal by
deliberately adopting an open position on 4.106
With two of its most important East Asian allies showing interests in Mahathir's
proposal, the United States became concerned about the prospect of being excluded
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from this region. Secretary of State, James Baker, fiercely criticised Mahathir's
proposal. He was reported to say that any proposal for economic co-operation which
did not include the United States would be unacceptable. 107 In a letter to Japanese
Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe, Baker was reported to warn that the EAEC concept,
by excluding the non-Asian members of APEC, would divide the Asia-Pacific region in
half. Japan, as result, retreated over this. South Korea also backed down under US
pressure. According to press reports, Baker told South Korean Foreign Minister Lee
Sang Ock in a private meeting during the second APEC conference in Bangkok in
November 1990, "Malaysia didn't spill blood for this country, but we did." 108 Other
countries also voiced opposition to Mahathir's proposal.
As a result, the EAEC concept was soon left on its own. Nevertheless, such Asian
initiatives had important impact on the American attitude towards Asia-Pacific economic
co-operation, and was instrumental in stimulating a review of the United States'
relations with the rest of the Asia-Pacific region. In an article published in "Foreign
Affairs" in 1992, James Baker, the US Secretary of State, discussed comprehensively
US policy towards the Asia-Pacific. Baker recognised the ever closer intra-regional
relations in the Asia-Pacific region, and stressed the importance of this region for the
United States, and endorsed economic cooperation in this region. "...a viable
architecture for a stable and prosperous Pacific community needs to be founded (on
three pillars). First, we need a framework for economic integration that will support an
open global trading system in order to sustain the region's economic dynamism and
avoid regional economic fragmentation...." "In today's world a shared focus and the
development of an active partnership among the nations of the Pacific Rim are essential
to the success of the emerging 	 n109
As the above indicates, political support and interactions between the countries of
the Asia-Pacific region influenced the process of constructing regional economic co-
operation significantly. The direct involvement of Japanese and Australian government
officials ensured that the early discussions expanded and caught the attention of the
global system...
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politicians of other countries. These disputes focused on the scope, the membership, the
nature and the format of the economic co-operation structure. The process was not
spared of disputes though. Political disputes mainly occurred between the key countries
discussed above. The activities and concerns of the ASEAN countries further
heightened the interests of the countries involved in regional economic co-operation.
The result of such interaction was that the discussion on Asia-Pacific economic co-
operation retained its pan Asia-Pacific, forum based characteristics.
2. 3. Institutional Evolution
Another significant aspect of the process of constructing Asia-Pacific economic co-
operation was the institutional evolution. A number of forums were proposed and set
up. These forums included: the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD),
the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), Organisation for Pacific Trade and
Development (OPTAD), the Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference (PECC) and
the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Ministerial Meeting (APEC). (See Table One)
This section will show that the forums before APEC, especially the way they were
organised and conducted their businesses, influenced the way that APEC was organised
and the way it functioned. This section will also show that these forums were also the
reason that an intergovernmental APEC forum was believed to be necessary.110
The Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) was the first forum to
be set up for the discussion on undertaking regional economic cooperation. As it was
mentioned earlier, after Kojima put forward his free trade area proposal, Japan's
Foreign Minister Takeo Mild sponsored in Tokyo the first of what was to become a
series of Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD) conference to promote discussions
on regional economic cooperation. Since then around twenty further conferences have
been held in the PAFTAD series. These conferences bring together academics from the
various countries of the Asia-Pacific region. One of its early research projects was the
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above-mentioned report to the governments of Australia and Japan, which convinced
the two governments that co-operation was viable.
Table 11. One
Forum Year Established Status & Nature
Pacific Trade and	 ,
Development Conference
(PAFTAD)
1968
Academic
Operational
Pacific Basin Economic
Council (PBEC)
1967 Business
Operational
Organisation for Pacific
Trade and Development
(OFTAD)
1979 (Proposed)
Official
Never Materialised
Pacific Economic Co-
operation Conference
(PECC)
1980
Tripartite
Operational
Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
operation Ministerial
Meeting (APEC)
1989
Official
Operational
As a forum of the academics, the importance of this conference series was the role
it played in mapping out the intra-regional trade and economic relations, and in
providing ideas and arguments for cooperation. 111 It was initially limited to economists
from the major market-economy countries of this region. Later participants from almost
all APEC countries attended this conference. It continued to involve a wider and wider
group of policy-interested economists in the discussion of regional foreign economic
policy issues. The development of thinking about Asia-Pacific economic co-operation
within this forum was also a critical element in heightening official-level interest in the
idea at the end of the 1970s. The conference has since become an annual event, with
each one focusing on a particular sector of Asia-Pacific regional economic activity. It
has been held in different countries, and each conference produces a collection of
papers.
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The Asia-Pacific business community was the first group of people to feel the need
for regional economic cooperation. This was in response to the increase in intra-regional
trade after the War. In 1967, businessmen, bankers, and industrialists from Japan,
Australia and New Zealand formed the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), a
body designed to promote the study and discussion of issues related to regional trade
and investment and greater co-operation between public and private sectors. Business
groups of Canada and United States were invited to the first PBEC general meeting in
Sydney in 1968, yet they turned down the invitation. But a year later PBEC's first
steering committee meeting was held in Honolulu. PBEC grew out of the bilateral
Australia-Japan Business Cooperation Committee, and now has a membership of more
than several hundred major companies from the five industrially advanced Asia-Pacific
nations and from many developing countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region.112
PBEC was a story of success and failure. It succeeded in diluting its image of a
"rich man's club" by accommodating developing countries in special sub-regional
committees. Its national committees regularly provided advice to governments and
international agencies on economic and business matters affecting the Asia-Pacific area.
Its annual meetings made useful contributions in promoting the idea of regional co-
operation. But it never managed to set a clear aim or to chart a definitive course for
itself. The dispute between its participants on where its energy should be devoted and
its reluctance to keep up with the changes prevented it from playing an important
role. 113
Being unofficial forums, PAFTAD and PBEC provided the early opportunities for
exchange of views on regional economic co-operation between academics and business
people from the Asia-Pacific countries. The importance was also their capability of
allowing the exchange of views to happen under relatively free conditions because
participants did not represent governments, and therefore could conduct discussions in a
more relaxed atmosphere. PAFTAD's unofficial characteristics also enabled academics
from both side of the ideological divide to participate, and it also overcame the hurdle of
sovereignty, for instance in the case of China and Taiwan. Yet their strength was
paradoxically their very weakness. This was due to the fact that their concerns were
frequently in policy areas where government action was required. For this reason, it
was widely felt that the attention of governments and an official structure were needed,
though these non-official ones did have a role to play.I14
As mentioned in sub-section B of Section One, Drysdale proposed OPTAD as an
inter-governmental organisation, to involve directly the Asia-Pacific governments in the
process of promoting regional economic cooperation. 115 The idea of raising the
discussion to the official level was also endorsed by the governments of Australia and
Japan. But such efforts seemed to have been suspected and turned down by the ASEAN
governments who, as explained earlier, were highly concerned about the impact of a
much larger organisation on the future of ASEAN itself. As a result, the OFTAD idea
was not acted upon. Yet the rapid economic development in the Asia-Pacific region,
which helped shift economic power from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific, made many of
the region's political leaders increasingly aware of the necessity for government
involvement. It was against such a historical background that the first Pacific Economic
Cooperation Conferences (PECC) meeting was held in 1980 in Canberra.116
The Pacific Economic Cooperation Conferences, begun on the initiative of the
Australia government in 1980, contained significant elements required for systematic
discussions of closer regional economic ties. 117
 PECC brought the process a big step
further because, for the first time, government representatives, albeit in their private
capacities, participated in the discussions on Asia-Pacific economic co-operation. Yet
the concern about being over formal and the existence of PAFTAD and PBEC made
PECC assume the format of involving tripartite delegations representing the
government, businesses, and academics of each member country. But the stress was on
the direct involvement of the Asia-Pacific governments. In this respect, PECC should
be regarded as an ingenious success. 118 Another difference between PECC and the
previous two forums was its insistence on opening its door to all countries right from
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the beginning, and to focus on issues of trade and economic policies. Representatives
from any country, region or organisation were welcome to participate "as long as they
demonstrate a commitment to the co-operation theme".119
PECC also had more substance as it managed to make clear what it wanted to
achieve, and how it was to realise its purposes. As a forum, PECC wanted first to bring
together eventually all the Asia-Pacific countries in the discussion of regional economic
cooperation. This was made possible through its less than official posture. The second
function it set for itself was to facilitate the circulation of information between all these
countries. Its third function was to facilitate negotiations between states, something
beyond the capacity of PAFTAD or PBEC. Fourth, PECC provided a forum for
participating countries to debate trade policy issues at a more substantial level. For
instance, PECC enabled member countries to come up with an Asia-Pacific perspective
on the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT.120
PECC was also much more certain about how to go about its business. It had a
clear structure, which was modelled on that of the United Nations, with a multilateral
front and a national front. On the national front, each member country had a national
committee, made up of prominent scholars, government officials, and businessmen.
The committees' secretariat was in charge of co-ordinating activities such as fund-
raising, publications and seminars. Financial backing was sought from a variety of
private and public sources by each committee for its own domestic and international
activities. On the multilateral front, a General Meeting, attended by the national
committees, observers from other organisations such as Asian Development Bank
(ADD), PAFTAD and PBEC and guests from non-member countries, was held roughly
once every 18 months. There was also an International Standing Committee (ISC)
handling activities other than the general meeting. At the conclusion of each PECC
general meeting, the chairman of the member committee hosting the next general
meeting took over as ISC chairman. ISC consists of one representative of each national
committee and one each from PAFTAD and PBEC. 121
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The PECC ISC combined the functions of administration and discussion by being
responsible for making rules for its own operation and for all other PECC activities and
bodies; arranging international events; and deliberating new initiatives. Proposals could
be from a member committee or by the members of the Standing Committee. The ISC
would meet every several months and its activities were supported by the secretariat of
the new chairman's national committee. A Co-ordinating Group (CG) consisting of
Task-force leaders and other experts acted as advisers for the ,ISC and co-ordinated
implementation of ISC directives. The study activities of the PECC, developed through
periodically scheduled meetings and conferences, were carried out by task forces and
study groups commissioned by the isc122
With PECC, which involved for the first time governments, and had much more
clearly defined and formal organisational structure, the process itself entered a new
stage. Governments were more exposed to, and therefore, more influenced by the
thinking of both business and the academics. However, Asia-Pacific governments were
still not directly involved since government representatives acted in unofficial capacities.
This meant that the resolutions adopted by PECC could not be turned into government
policies. 123 It was felt that effective movement towards cooperation required officials to
be directly involved in such a venture to give substances to the process of developing
cooperation. The set-up of PECC and its activities and component bodies (the
international standing committee, the member co-operation committee, the international
Co-ordinating group, and the task force co-ordinators and secretariats) were therefore
only a large step forward in terms of Asia-Pacific institution-building. 124
The lack of decision-making capability and the increase in problems in the intra-
regional trade relations prompted Australia's Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, to propose in
early 1989 a scheme, less substantive than OPTAD but more formal than PECC, for
inter-governmental consultation on economic issues of common interests. 125
 The
primary purpose of the Hawke scheme was to enable the Asia-Pacific countries to
93
exchange views about trade policy issues in the hope that this would help clear the way
for further trade liberalisation; to unite these countries in wider economic forums and
discussions, and to exercise the influence of these countries in a collective manner, as
the Cairns group 126 did on agricultural issues in the GATT Uruguay Round; and to
stabilise intra-regional trade and economic relations. The Hawke proposal was endorsed
in principle by a conference attended by foreign and economic ministers from Japan,
South Korea, the six ASEAN countries, the United States, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand between 5 and 7 November 1989.127
Dubbed "a milestone in Pacific Basin Co-operation" by Richard Solomon, US
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the meeting of the 12
nations agreed "unanimously to the principle of liberalising the world trade." 128 They
also agreed that they would:
• Try to present a united voice at the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations through
consultations.
• Set up working parties' (task forces) to find ways of increasing regional trade,
investment and technology transfer between rich and poor countries. Committees would
study specific infrastructure needs, including telecommunications and transport, and
also look at conserving Pacific fishing resources.
• Set up data systems on trade, investment flows and commercial opportunities in
the region—which some officials saw eventually turning into a policy clearing-house like
the Paris-based OECD.129
With APEC, the countries of the Asia-Pacific region finally raised the discussion on
co-operation to the official level. As far as the whole process was concerned, this was a
giant step forward, since it was always difficult to involve the governments in this
process. However, APEC was also confronted with the issue in its relations with
ASEAN. ASEAN, which was always sensitive about losing its identity in the APEC
process, changed its attitude once it realised that it was not able to prevent this process
from going further. 130 It changed its tactic and attempted to dominate the process by
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having the APEC meetings centred on the annual ASEAN Post-Ministerial Council,
when the ASEAN members talked with their Asia-Pacific partners.
The Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas argued, "What we are saying is ASEAN
has had experience for several years now in developing consultative processes and
inter-governmental cooperative processes in this region... Isn't it reasonable and logical
to start from what you have. Base it on your experience, develop it from there..." The
Alatas idea was given strong support by the other ASEAN nations, but other countries
including the United States and Japan had from the outset expressed preference for a
loose process in which senior officials from all member countries could work
informally to prepare for ministerial meetings.131
Another issue was the membership of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. The early
member countries found themselves divided on this issue. Both Japan and the United
States wanted to include Hong Kong as a full member. Japan argued to leave the China-
Taiwan question until later while the United States proposed admitting China as an
official observer and Taiwan as an unofficial observer. This issue was resolved at the
third meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum in Seoul in November
1991. Under the Olympic formula, 132 both Taiwan and China were accepted as full
members at the same time. A fact that the countries of the Asia-Pacific region took the
APEC process seriously was that they had been highly active in hosting its annual
conference. This was explained as that APEC was a "supra-regional organisation." 133
As it has been shown above, the five forums set up for the purpose of promoting
economic co-operation were closely linked. Such links were found in both the
similarities of the organisational structure, modes of function, areas of main interests for
discussions, and the thrust of their efforts. This would become especially apparent if
PAFTAD, PECC and APEC are compared. APEC even took over the principles
followed by those earlier forums, especially those of PECC. For instance, APEC also
stressed that its doors were open to any regional country that wished to be part of it, and
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its ultimate goal was global free trade, etc. APEC also highlighted the contributions
made by the academics and the businesses by having the representatives of PAFTAD,
PBEC and PECC attending its conferences.
Conclusion
By studying the protracted process that led to the set-up of APEC, it can be seen
that the economic cooperation in Asia-Pacific region is rather unique. Since it has been
pursued in a heterogeneous region built on the convergence of political as well as
economic interests of the involved countries, its stress is on how to preserve the
favourable conditions for sustained economic growth. It therefore highlights multilateral
communication, persuasion and policy coordination. It will end up in a free trade area,
but it will not be a closed free trade area, as its door is not only open to new member
countries but also to other regions for exchange of mutual concessions in trade. Its
ultimate goal is to strengthen the global trade system based on the principle of most
favoured nations.
Such economic cooperation encapsulated in APEC has its roots deep in the long
process that led to APEC. This process started Kiyoshi Kojima's well-known and
frequently cited article about an economic community in the Asia-Pacific region
published in 1965. Since then, a great deal has changed. Such changes are found in the
evolution of the basic ideas with regard to the organisational structure, areas of co-
operation and scope of co-operation, and the successive forums that were set up for this
purpose. They were like road signs that led the Asia-Pacific countries to set up APEC.
It seems that the process of search, which started in a proposal for free trade among the
region's developed countries will end in a massive yet open free trade area potentially
covering the whole region. APEC, which has finally given the countries in this region
the ability to take this decision, certainly has elevated the process into a substantially
higher stage.
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The various governments' responses to this process and the interactions between
them have also left their marks on the characteristics of APEC. The most important
effect of government involvement was that the process continued to evolve until APEC
was set up. The political considerations of the various countries and their interchange
over this issue also prevented the process from either ending in fragmentation, which
would have led to more regional blocs, or in a tight, pan-regional bloc. Another crucial
factor that made APEC a consultative body was that economic dynamism and
interdependence in this region was all along business led instead of any formal
multilateral governmental pact. Countries in this region did not want to spoil this.
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Chapter Three: China Participating In the APEC Process
The People's Republic of China's (PRC) membership of APEC represents a major
modification of its foreign policy thinking because participation in multilateral economic
cooperation carries with it strong implications for a country's sovereignty. The PRC
always maintains that it is not prepared to compromise over the issue of sovereignty.1
In order to understand better why the PRC decided in 1991 to join the APEC process, it
is highly necessary to review the process that led China into APEC. This process was
long and complex, but that was for very different reasons from some early APEC
members. 2
 This chapter will show that this process was underlined by both academic
debate and leadership support, and picked up speed once the efforts to construct
regional economic cooperation were raised to the official level.
The almost two-decade long process which saw China become a member of both
PECC and APEC respectively in 1986 and 1991 broke down roughly into three stages.
The first was from 1968, when the Japanese government sponsored the first discussion
on the proposals for Asia-Pacific economic co-operation, to 1979, when the open policy
was initiated. In this stage China was first deeply engrossed in grave internal chaos and
then was busy normalising relations with major western countries for strategic
purposes. Hence little attention was paid to discussions on economic co-operation
largely by academics in some Asia-Pacific countries. Yet the Sino-US thaw, and
China's return to the international community proved significant in providing the
international environment for China to participate in the drive for constructing economic
co-operation. The second stage, between 1980 and 1989, was a key stage for China's
participation. After several long years of deliberation within the political and academic
circles, China joined PECC, the then most important forum for the discussion.
The Tian An Men incident of June 1989, and the ensuing international sanctions,
led to a short period of difficulties for China. In the meantime, the process of building
regional economic cooperation was raised to the inter-governmental level. These two
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developments seemed to have assisted the Chinese government in making up its mind
on China participation. In 1991, the PRC was accepted along with Taiwan and Hong
Kong as a full member of the inter-governmental organisation, the Ministerial Meeting
on Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). This period, between 1989 and 1991,
was the third stage. It was different from the previous two because, this time, it was the
Chinese government which actively sought to join APEC.
Following the above-mentioned three stages, this chapter will trace the landmarks
on the PRC's journey to become an APEC member by looking at how Chinese
academics and government officials adapted their views to the changing situation in the
Asia-Pacific region. This will be done through analysing academic discussions,
statements made by Chinese leaders and government officials, and comments carried in
the Chinese press, especially Renmin Ribao (People's Daily). Studies by foreign
researchers will also be referred to in the course of discussion to illustrate the actions by
other countries to involve China in the process.
3. 1. Stage I: Pre 1979: Emerging from Isolation
As far as China's participation in regional economic cooperation is concerned, the
stage between 1968 and 1979 was underlined by the absence of China. Though the
Chinese government's attitude to regional cooperation changed along with the change of
China's international position, it never attempted to join any other countries for that
purposes. However, the improvement in China's political relations with the non-
communist countries, particularly those in Asia-Pacific, enabled China to modify its
perception of multilateral economic cooperation, which facilitated China's participation
in the process of building economic cooperation. The following will show how this
happened.
When Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Mild sponsored the first academic
conference to discuss Kiyoshi Kojima's proposal for a Pacific Regional Free Trade
Area in 1968, 3
 the PRC was going through the worst years of its twenty-year history. .
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The "Cultural Revolution" started by Mao Zedong in the summer of 1966 was at its
peak. Internal turmoil and strife characterised China's politics. In foreign affairs, the
Chinese government adopted and implemented a policy of opposing both US
imperialism and Soviet revisionism. 4 In the early 1960s when China and the Soviet
Union first fell out, military threat from the American imperialists and its 'stooges' was
thought to be more dangerous than Soviet revisionism. But this belief was reversed as
border clashes broke out between the two former "socialist brothers" in 1968.
The military confrontation between the two former communist allies confirmed in
the minds of both the Chinese and the Americans that strategic alignment was possible
between them in their confrontation with the Soviets. The improvement in Sino-US
relations helped China break out of its isolation. But Asia-Pacific economic co-operation
was never included in China's efforts to expand its relations with the countries in this
region. Yet this did not mean that efforts made to organise regional economic co-
operation throughout the world were totally ignored by China. China's attitude towards
such efforts was in fact determined by its political relations with the countries involved.
3. 1. A. Pre-1972: Asia-Pacific Cooperation = Anti-China Campaigns
Around the beginning of the 1970s, China continued to view the imperialist camp
led by the United States as a main threat to its national security. The key feature of this
concern was China's support for the communist North Vietnam in the Vietnam War.
China's attention was focused on this war. Kojima's proposal for a Pacific Economic
Community among a group of enemies, and the initial academic discussions on it
sponsored by the Japanese government failed to be treated by the Chinese government
as important. But this did not mean that the Chinese government was oblivious to any
collective actions taken by Asian and Pacific countries. However, since Japan and the
United States were regarded as dangerous threats, attempts at regional collective actions
were explained as conspiracies of these two countries oppose China and to dominate
this region.
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The Asia and Pacific Council, which was set up in June 1966, was heavily attacked
by the Chinese official press. The council consisted of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, South Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand. The
Council's ministerial meeting was held annually. In February 1970, the fifth ministerial
meeting of the Asia and Pacific Council was held in New Zealand's capital, Wellington.
The meeting was attended by the foreign ministers of these countries. According to the
meeting's communiqué, it was recognised by the meeting that "at a time of swift change
and rapid development, it is necessary to cooperate on the widest possible basis.... The
purpose of such co-operation is to construct a new community. As a result of the
escalation of the Indochinese War and a few Asian countries' internal difficulties, it is
ever more urgent to take regional collective actions in the Asia-Pacific region."5
The council was viewed as part of the United States' scheme of invasion and
expansion in Asia, and Japan's attempt to restore its position as the dominant military
power in Asia. "According to the communiqué of, and the speeches delivered at the
meeting, and the activities before and after the meeting, it is an integral part of the
attempt of the United States and its 'stooges' to expand in Asia and to put down the
flames of the Asian people's revolution."6 Japan's activities at the meeting also caused
concern of the Chinese government. It was observed by the Chinese Communist Party
paper Renmin Ribao (RMRB) that the Japanese delegate stressed time and again that
Japan was to play a far more "positive" part in the Indochinese issue. It quoted that
delegate as saying that he would "convey to the United States the call by the Asian and
Pacific countries made at the meeting". "All of this indicates that the revived Japanese
.militarism is actively carrying out its duty as Asia's gendarme that Japan had committed
itself to in the Joint Japan-US Declaration.... It also indicates that Japan attempts to
become Asia's dominant power."7
China also regarded the Asia and Pacific Council as an ideologically hostile
organisation. In a brief description of this council carried in RN/MB, the council was
named as an anti-Communist and anti-China organisation set up by South Korea and
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Thailand with US support. The same report also gave as evidence that, led by Japan,
the fifth council meeting placed unrestricted slander on China and the People's Republic
of Korea, and attacked the "proletarian foreign policies" implemented by China as a
dangerous signal for the stability in Asia. "All of this fully exposes the American
intention to set up in the Asia-Pacific region a new anti-communist alliance which has
Japan as its main force and the United States as its main source of support."8
China reacted strongly not only to such political organisations as the Asia and
Pacific Council but also to the economic cooperation schemes between countries off its
coasts. Towards the end of 1970, a Liaison Committee was set up in Seoul, South
Korea. The Committee was made up of politicians and business people from Japan,
Taiwan and South Korea. The purpose of this Committee was to undertake research on
ways to jointly develop Taiwan and the off-shore oil resources in the Taiwan Strait and
the Korean Sea. The Liaison Committee included the "Special Committee of Marine
Development" and the "Special Committee of Economic Cooperation". It was decided at
the first session of the liaison committee that an equity company for marine development
would be set up, and that in December that year the "Special Committee for Marine
Development" would convene to decide the share of investment by the three members.9
RMRB again criticised the set-up of such a committee as part of the Japanese plot to
exploit other countries. It referred to this joint development scheme between Japan,
Taiwan and South Korea as a means of extortion habitually used by Japanese
militarists. The programme of joint development was but only a "dirty deal between
(Japanese) invaders and national traitors of China and Korea". RMRB also condemned
the way in which the three parties went around the issue of sovereignty. It was agreed
by them that they would go ahead with the joint development programme and the issue
of sovereignty would be set aside to be resolved afterwards. RMRB charged that this
was to make the peoples of China and Korea abandon their sovereignty and let Japanese
militarists rob them of their resources.10
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Moreover, China regarded the cooperation plan for the three countries as a part of
the American plot to perpetuate its domination of Fnst Asia. "The American imperialists
have been urging Japanese reactionaries to organise the Northeast Asian anti-
revolutionary alliance. The Liaison Committee is in fact the core body of that anti-
revolutionary alliance." Renmin Ribao claimed that it was an American plot because the
Liaison Committee was part of the changed American strategy after the Nixon Doctrine
was published. RMRB explained that, recognising that it was hard for the United States
alone to fight back the expansion of communism, the Nixon Doctrine wanted these
countries to play a much bigger role in the containment of communism. "Since the
Nixon Doctrine was put forward, the American imperialists have used many a measure
to turn Japan into the Asian gendarme, and have urged Japan to join other American
'stooges' in opposing the Chinese and Korean peoples.... (The Committee) declared
that they would oppose communism in Asia and exchange information On China. They
will also strengthen the links between them on issues like joint security in Asia. This
has exposed the naked anti-revolutionary nature of this committee...."11
Influenced by her ideological and anti-American stance, China was critical of co-
operation schemes and actions by countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Any moves taken
by these countries for cooperation were seen to be the American attempt to consolidate
its domination of East Asia. This fully shows that anti-Americanism was a dominant
feature of China's foreign policy around the beginning of the 1970s. But China attacked
only the cooperative moves and plans between the governments of the Asia-Pacific
countries. PAFTAD, the only academic conference series discussing Kojima's plan,
was not noted in the Chinese press. But it should be believed that the Chinese
government was aware of them, since Japanese politicians began to talk about regional
economic cooperation since the middle of 1960s. 12 The Chinese press was also
conspicuously quiet about PBEC and its activities. This also indicates that the reason
behind the Chinese government's hostile reaction to regional collective actions was that
they were seen as part of the US containment policy.
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3. 1. B. The 1970s: Entry into the World Community
The first half of the 1970s saw a tremendous change in China's position in the
world community and in the pattern of China's foreign relations. Up to the year 1970,
China was almost completely cut off from the world community, except for relations
with some Third World Asian and African countries. France was the only major
western country that had diplomatically recognised China, who established diplomatic
relations with China in 1964. China's relations with the Eastern European countries
were semi paralysed as those countries stood on the side of the Soviet Union. In Asia,
Indonesia and India, who were regarded as China's best Asian friends in the 1950s,
had by now drastically scaled down their relations with China. The first years of the
"Cultural Revolution", when China had no energy to take care of its foreign affairs,
witnessed further strain in China's external relations. 13
However, beginning in 1970, this picture began to change. In that year, diplomatic
relations between China and an important western country, Canada, was established.
But the most important catalyst in changing China's position in the international
community was the restoration of the People's Republic's membership in the United
Nations and the establishment of a unique kind of diplomatic relations between China
and the United States following Henry Kissinger's secret visit China in July 1971.14
The significance of the resumption of contacts and exchanges between China and
the United States went far beyond the relations between the two countries themselves.
For China, it helped remove the constraints that the United States imposed since 1949
on other countries in developing relations with China. 15 At once, RMRB carried
declarations of establishment of diplomatic relations between China and another country
almost on a monthly basis. By 1974, China was diplomatically recognised by 97
countries. 50 of these countries resumed or established diplomatic relations with China
in or after the year 1970.
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Among these 50 countries, eight were Asian countries, twenty were African, nine
were Latin American, ten were European, one was North American, and two were
Oceania. None of them were communist countries. 16
 The more important fact was that,
out of these 50 countries, most of them, except for a number of African countries, were
once condemned in the Chinese press as American "stooges". This was particularly true
for the East and Southeast Asian countries and Oceanic countries. The normalisation of
China's political relations with these countries also enhanced China's trade relations
with them, particularly with Japan and other so-called second world countries. Trade
expansion was one of the key reasons for China to strengthen its relations with these
second world countries. 17
Nevertheless, the PRC attached more strategic importance than economic
significance to the expansion of contacts with both its neighbours in Asia and other
countries further afield. This was because it was more concerned with threats from the
North, a euphemism for the Soviet Union. Into the 1970s, the Soviet Union was
perceived to be the most imminent threat The improvement in China's relations with the
above mentioned countries reversed the situation of confronting threats from both the
North and the South on one hand, and won China friends in opposition to Soviet threat
in Europe on the other. 18
 The improvement in relations with most of the Asia-Pacific
countries was seen as important in counter-balancing the Soviet threat. As a result, the
idea and discussion of economic co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region remained
outside the consideration of Chinese foreign policy.
3. 1. C. Changed Views on Multilateral Economic Co-operation
Into the 1970s, the PRC's position on international economic co-operation, be it
among Third World countries 19
 or China's former enemies, began to change, as its
international position improved. Its attitude towards such cooperation became more
positive. As a result, economic cooperation, particularly among developing countries in
Africa and Latin America, received extensive and positive coverage in China's press. In
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Asia, the PRC stopped opposing Japan's economic involvement in Southeast Asia as it
did in the 1960s when such involvement was seen as Japan's efforts to restore its
domination over this region. China became more positive about the development in the
economic relations between Japan and Southeast Asia as shown by the tone of the
Chinese press. "In the past, Japan's diplomatic failures in Asia were brought about by
the negligence of the nationalist sentiments in the Asian countries. In light of this
historical experience, the main form of economic co-operation should be that between
governments. Beside, a relationship of disbelief and dependence should be turned
through various forms of wide ranging exchanges into a relationship of mutual benefit
and mutual dependence".20
China was also highly interested in the development of the European Economic
Community and adopted an equally positive attitude towards the efforts made by its
member countries to enhance that organisation. Extensive coverage of such effcirts
appeared in the most important newspapers like RMRB, particularly between 1974 and
1975. Such coverage highlighted the actions of French and German governments to
strengthen the EEC. For instance, RMRB reported on the front page the first meeting
between French President Giscard d'Estaing and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
after they became leaders of their respective countries. The report highlighted the two
men's positive attitudes towards the EEC by quoting them saying that "talks have
proved that Federal Germany and France hold identical views on a wide range of issues
on Europe. What is extremely important is that both France and Germany maintain the
common wish to defend the European Economic Community and push it forward".21
The PRC was also strongly in favour of the economic cooperation between the
Second World and the Third World countries. This was evident in its response to the
Lome Convention between the European Economic Community and forty-six African,
Caribbean and Pacific countries signed in Togo's capital Lome on 28 February, 1975.
The Chinese press highlighted the economic benefit that this Convention would bring to
the developing countries. According to a RMRB report, following the Convention, the .
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EEC countries would not only offer duty-free and unlimited access to its market to the
developing countries, but also provide financial help and aid to these countries as well.
Words like exploitation of the developing countries by the developed countries
disappeared from such reports. Chinese officials and press also emphasised the
economic benefits for the developed countries as wel1.22
China believed that such accords between the Second World developed countries
and the Third World developing countries carried a lot of political importance as well.
She regarded such co-operation as a means for the countries involved to avoid
succumbing to the superpowers. China believed that the Second World developed
countries, particularly the Western European countries, had been subjected to pressures
from both the superpowers. To resist superpowers' pressures and to deal with their
economic crisis, the Western European countries would need urgently to strengthen
their economic links with Third World countries. On the other hand, Third World
countries also wished to expand economic relations with Western European countries
on the basis of equality and mutual benefit to fight against the two superpowers and to
develop their national economies.
Over the past four years, the Second World countries have clearly
reinforced their struggle to rid themselves of superpowers' control,
interference, sabotage and bullying. Many Second World countries want to
have dialogues with Third World countries to develop economic co-
operation. We welcome this development...Such development in the
relations between the Third World countries and the Second World
countries is in the interests of the world-wide struggle against superpowers'
hegemonism.23
The PRC gave full support to economic co-operation between third world
countries. China believed there was no fundamental conflict of interests preventing them
from conducting economic co-operation. They all suffered from imperialist and
colonialist domination, exploitation and oppression. Their economic foundation was
112
weak, and the conditions for development were poor. It was therefore a highly positive
development that these countries had realised that, while developing their national
economies by relying on their own strength, they must make joint efforts to help and
support each other. Such efforts were thought to be capable of bringing about good
progress in economic development.24
But China attached more political and strategic importance to such co-operation
while paying attention to their economic functions. That is to say, China saw such co-
operation among both the second and third world countries as important for the small
and weak countries to shake off the control of the superpowers. For instance, the EEC
was seen as a significant force in opposing both the superpowers, especially the Soviet
Union. Regional cooperation was also seen as important in efforts to remove the old
international economic order and replacing it with a new order. 25 However, China
seemed to put more emphasis on cooperation between third world countries. "In the
struggle to develop national economies and to oppose international exploitation and
domination, it is highly necessary to reinforce and develop the mutual support and
economic cooperation between developing countries. Such cooperation will help push
forward economic development and trade, increase developing countries' economic
strength, and shatter the economic dominance of the imperialists and, in particular, of
the superpowers".26
As for the Asia-Pacific region, the Chinese government's attitude towards co-
operation seemed to be consistent with its attitude towards cooperation activities in
general. That is to say, it changed from hostile to supportive. Consistent with her
opposition to the superpowers, China emphasised the significance of such cooperation
in weakening superpowers' domination. In addition to supporting Japan's actions in
enhancing its economic aid for and cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, China
was also in favour of efforts made by the member countries of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China regarded ASEAN as an important force in
fighting against the super powers and hegemonism. "By reinforcing the cooperation
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between the five ASEAN member countries, (these countries) dealt a powerful blow at
the economic hegemony of the superpowers. Such cooperation also created good
conditions for changing the backward situation in this region and developing these
nations' economies."27
China also attached a great deal of importance to the fact that the ASEAN countries
were speeding up the process of turning ASEAN into a political and economic
organisation with more substance, and the cooperative measures adopted by these
countries, particularly ASEAN's decision to form a free trade zone as the first step
towards the establishment of an ASEAN common market. ASEAN's decision to move
towards a free trade zone was thought to be a new achievement of the continuous efforts
by the ASEAN countries towards developing regional economic co-operation.28
China was also happy to see that more and more Southeast Asian nations assume
anti-hegemony and anti-superpower positions in their foreign policies. China regarded
this as "visionary and consistent with the interests of the peoples of the world". The
Chinese government praised highly the intention of these countries to strengthen their
solidarity and turn Southeast Asia into an area of neutrality and peace. Chinese Premier
Hua Guofeng spoke warmly of such developments within the ASEAN. "We believe
that, as long as the peoples of Southeast Asian countries adhere to the principles of
independence and self-reliance while strengthening their solidarity, they will continue to
win new victories in their struggles against imperialism and hegemonism".29
One other development that China viewed with great interests was the changes that
Australia and New Zealand made in their attitudes towards Asia, particularly Southeast
Asia. It welcomed those two countries to be part of, and to play active parts, in East
Asian affairs as members of that region rather than as outsiders. China was happy to see
that direct relations had been established between these two countries and Asian,
particularly Southeast Asian countries. "Both China and New Zealand are situated in the
Asia-Pacific region. It is therefore natural for both countries to be concerned with the
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development in this region's affairs.... Countries and peoples in Oceania have raised
their guard against and condemned the attempt of the "other superpower" (the Soviet
Union)30 to expand its sphere of influence in this region. We are resolute in our support
of their position of justice."31
China also took notice of the ever closer economic relations between Japan,
Australia and New Zealand and the five ASEAN nations. Reninin Ribao devoted large
amount of space to cover the exchanges between those countries, and, in particular, the
first summit meeting that the heads of government of the five ASEAN countries held
jointly with the heads of government of Japan, Australia and New Zealand in August
1977. When it Comes to such coverage, the tone of the People's Daily, in contrast to the
later 1960s, was nothing but positive and supportive.32
In contrast to her support for economic co-operation elsewhere, China remained,
throughout the 1970s, highly sensitive to any Soviet scheme for collective action either
for political and strategic purposes or economic ends. In contrast to its open support for
either the European Economic Community, Asia-Pacific countries', or other Third
World countries' cooperative activities, China was highly critical of the Soviet Union
who was painted as an exploiter and extortionist China attacked the Russians for taking
advantage of the other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) as they were either short of raw materials and fuel or capabilities for
manufacturing industrial goods. China was also strongly critical of COMECON. It was
depicted as an international trust formed to enable the "Soviet social imperialists" to
control the small and weak members. The Soviet Union was accused of using
COMECON to extort huge profits and to transplant economic difficulties to other
members.33
In Asia, the Soviet Union was depicted as the biggest threat The PRC believed that
the Russians were trying to expand its sphere of influence by gaining all the ground that
the Americans had lost after the Vietnam War. The Russians were also said to harbour
115
dangerous intentions for the whole of the Asia-Pacific region, including the South
Pacific. The main Russian thrust into Asia and the Pacific was said to be the so called
"Asian Collective Security System", put forward by Brezhnev in 1975. This system
was said to be "a conspiracy of (the Soviet Union) to realise its hegemonic ambitions. It
is a means for it to rival with the other super power (the United States) for hegemony as
well as a dangerous and biting trap laid down for the Asian and Pacific nations".34
Throughout the 1970s, China's position on multilateral economic cooperation was
dictated by its security perceptions. Determined by the policy of opposing the most
dangerous enemies while trying to befriend the less dangerous ones, this concern had
two dimensions. Since the Soviet Union was perceived to be the most imminent and the
biggest threat, all those activities that were directly or indirectly against the Soviet Union
were welcome and supported by China. Therefore, economic cooperation in Western
Europe and other parts of the world were thought to be useful and helpful not only for
the economies of the countries involved, but more for containing the Russian sphere of
influence. But the PRC did recognise that multilateral economic cooperation also had
important economic benefits. But only cooperation between those anti-Soviet countries
were seen to be beneficial. This is shown by its criticism of COMECON which was
depicted as an instrument for the Russians to exploit and extort the other members.
Though the PRC supported the efforts of economic cooperation among its friends
because it saw them as anti-Soviet moves, its positive attitude did not make it join any
multilateral economic cooperation during the 1970s. China considered itself as a Third
World country, but it was not a member of the Group of Seventy-Seven Nations within
the United Nations, nor connected with such organisations as the ASEAN, which was
geographically close to it and shared its position in regard to Vietnam and the Soviet
Union. The PRC paid hardly any attention to economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
region which remained at this point an interest of mostly Japanese and Australian
academics. This was shown by the fact that it was never mentioned by Renmin Ribao
until the end of the decade.
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3. 2. Stage II: 1979--1989: Attitude Change and Joining PECC
The first half of the 1980s was an important period for the PRC's relations with the
process of constructing Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. This was the period when
China increased its attention to this region, and to the process itself. There were two
factors in China's increased attention to the Asia-Pacific region: the academics and the
politicians. The change in the perceptions of the academics and politicians was highly
significant. As it is the case in many other countries, Chinese academics do involve
themselves in policy formulation. As far as China's foreign relations are concerned,
these academics are eyes and ears for the Chinese leadership. They have to provide the
Chinese leaders with information, analysis and evidence for certain conclusions, but
their involvement goes no further than that. They are not supposed to question or
dispute the government's views and position on an issue. Nevertheless, the academics
do have certain influence, through politicians, over the policy choices of the Chinese
government. 35 China's process of participating in the discussion on Asia-Pacific
economic co-operation is perhaps the best proof for this.
3. 2. A. Academic Discussions
(1). Initial Academic Discussions and Changes of Perception
It was towards the end of the 1970s when Chinese academics began to refer openly
to the discussion on Asia-Pacific economic co-operation. According to evidences
available, the Social Science Academy of the North-eastern coastal city Tianjin was the
first to set up a research institute to study this phenomenon.36 In 1980, Chinese
academics' interests in the idea of Asia-Pacific economic co-operation appeared to have
increased. This happened following Japanese Prime Minister Ohira's visit to Australia,
during which Asia-Pacific economic co-operation was one of the main topics on the
agenda. A plan was announced to set up within the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences a research institute devoted to studies about the intra-regional economic
relationship in the Asia-Pacific. 37
 In March the following year, a conference on the
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world economy was held in Hangzhou, in Southeast China. A paper titled: "Some
Thoughts Concerning the Proposal to Establish A Pacific Community" discussed the
on-going discussion abroad. The author Wu Jixian, a fellow of the Academy of Social
Science, argued that China, being an Asia-Pacific country, ought to treat seriously
proposals for regional economic cooperation, because that could speed up the coming of
the Pacific era. Wu also argued that regional economic cooperation should be mutually
beneficial, respectful, unrestrictive and consistent with the heterogeneous state of this
region.38
But there were also those who retained the old way of looking at such cooperation.
They continued to suspect that cooperation was only a disguise for American or
Japanese intention to dominate and exploit the weaker and smaller countries in this
region. This can be seen in the way that the motivation for establishing a regional
economic community was analysed. In this analysis, Mao's "three worlds theory" was
still used. The basic relationship in the Asia-Pacific region was stated to be that of
exploitation and oppression. As a result, the Asia-Pacific cooperation schemes were
explained to be nothing more than a euphemism for US or Japanese domination. Luo
Yuansheng, also a fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences, was quite representative
of such views. He held that, while the United States strove to protect its vested
economic interests in the region, Japan aspired to reduce its vulnerability resulting from
the scarcity of domestic natural resources, and that this had led to rivalry between the
two nations. Jin Fuyao observed that there were Japanese 'monopoly capitalists' behind
the scene. "In conformity with the rule of uneven development of capitalist state
economies, the Japanese monopoly capitalists, as latecomers, pursued the establishment
of a Pacific economic sphere with Japan at its centre. "39
Yet such analysis soon began to disappear as changes took place in the academic
perception of world affairs. This was the result of the so-called "campaign to
emancipate people's thinking" started by Communist Party General Secretary Hu
Yaobang in the same period. The most important slogan was "to seek truth from
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practice".40 The immediate effect of this campaign was a sharp reduction of Mao's
influence on people, especially the intellectuals' thinking. They began to look at the
outside world from a more pragmatic angle. The changes in the Chinese perception of
economic co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region followed a change in Chinese
perception of the global situation and of China's position.
Huan Xiang, a diplomat turned academic, who was later appointed head of the
foreign affairs section of the State Council's think-tank, was one of the first people to
call for changes to China's perception of the world, and his views were quite unusual at
the time. He wrote an article and published it on 9 July 1984 in Shijie Jingji Daobao
(World Economic Herald). In this article, he argued that it was necessary for China to
form a new outlook on world affairs taking into accounts of developments that had
taken place in the capitalist economies. He maintained that the world should not be
divided into two unconnected parts. He criticised the traditional theory of two world
markets (the socialist market and the capitalist market) and held this theory responsible
for China's isolation. Huan further stated that in reality there was only one world
market, which was dominated by the capitalist countries. This was going to remain so
for at least another fifty years. China had not choice but become part of it.41
Though Huan Xiang's article was the first to discuss the need for China to integrate
into the world market, his opinion reflected the prevalent mood in China's political
situation. First, Deng's official visit and endorsement of the Special Economic Zones
(SEZs) further reduced restriction on economic cooperation between socialist China and
the capitalist world. Second, in spite of the endorsement, the actual economic
performance of the SF7s was not as good as it had been expected, and foreign reserves
were dwindling fast. Third, the United States and ASEAN countries changed their
attitude towards Pacific co-operation. Such realities forced the Chinese to speak more
positively about Asia-Pacific co-operation.42
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The situation also affected the thinking of other economists and researchers on
international affairs who cautiously joined the debate. They also began to look at the
positive side of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. For instance, in an interview with
the Liao Wang (Outlook) magazine, Qian Junrui, President of the Chinese Society of
World Economy (Zhongguo Shijie Jingji Xuehui) said that the Asia-Pacific region
might rise to become a new centre of the world economy in the twenty-first century. He
believed that the situation of the Asia-Pacific was both an opportunity and a challenge
for China. According to Qian, it was an opportunity because, by participating in co-
operation with the other Asia-Pacific countries, economic reform could enjoy much
better international conditions, so that China would be able to benefit from the rise of
the Asia-Pacific economy. Though economic cooperation might be a challenge, it was
needed to maintain peace, security and stability in this region.43
There were also those who argued along Huan's line. They believed that the
countries of this region were parts of the same unity. Ye Qixiang argued in his article in
Guoji Maoyi (International Trade) that there were three parties to the intra-regional
relationship of the Asia-Pacific region: "the developing countries, the socialist countries,
and the 'developed capitalist nations such as the United States".' 4 This was a departure
from the rigid Maoist formula of three worlds. Ye also used the argument that there was
only one world market as put forward by Huan Xiang to explain the intra-regional
economic relations in the Asia-Pacific region. He also pointed out that China belonged
to this region because China and the rest of the Asia-Pacific nations existed in the same
geographical area.
As indicated above, Deng Xiaoping's open policy and Hu Yaobang's campaign of
ideological emancipation provided the political background for Chinese academics to
argue for stronger external economic relations, particularly with the Asia-Pacific
countries. They began to see that the rapidly rising Asia-Pacific region could offer
China the badly needed opportunity to develop its economy by taking advantage of the
favourable international factors.
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(2). Government Endorsement
In addition to such personal views, some important academic meetings were held
on Asia-Pacific economic cooperation and China's position in it around the middle of
the 1980s. In December 1984, a four-day academic symposium on the relations
between the economic development of the Asia-Pacific region and China's four
modernisation was held in Shanghai. This was the first conference ever held on the
implications of Asia-Pacific economic development and cooperation for China's
modernisation.45 Huan Xiang, who had by now become the main voice for China's
participation in Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, delivered the key-note speech. In his
speech, he stressed the importance for China to participate in the discussion on
economic cooperation between countries ringing the Pacific ocean. He said, "Today, as
we implement the open door policy, we must actively make our points and participate in
this gigantic debate which is in progress. If we don't take part in it, we might eventually
lose our voice in it".'6
At the end of conference, the participants came to the conclusion that China must
earnestly study, from the standpoint of South-South and North-South dialogue, the
question of economic cooperation among the Asia-Pacific nations. Possibilities of
intense competition in the international market were noted, but at the same time it was
hoped that the vigorous economic activities in the region would provide a favourable
international environment to quicken China's modernisation. Some participants went
even further and argued that China must by no means lose another good opportunity,
mentioning the experience of intervention from the 'left' that held back economic
development for twenty years. 47 Nearly a year after this in 1985, another academic
symposium on the trend of development in the Asia-Pacific region was convened in
Beijing, where dozens of scholars expressed optimism about the future of the region .48
In December that year, the China International Economic Cooperation Society with
a membership of over a hundred was founded and held its first meeting in Wuhan, an
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industrial city in central China. To this meeting, State Councillor Chen Muhua 49 sent a
congratulatory telegraph. Chen's telegraph represented the government's first public
endorsement of the discussions on international economic cooperation. The meeting's
agenda was to decide the trends of development of economic co-operation in the Asia-
Pacific region and China's appropriate response. The participants suggested that China
should study and implement a long-term strategy concerning participation in Asia-
Pacific economic cooperation. They made certain proposals concerning the way that
China should conduct its open-door economic policies. These proposals envisaged that
China should integrate with this region through introducing those technologies that
would enable it to capitalise on her comparative advantages. 50 This was the first
seminar that had a clear mission to make suggestions to the government.
Early into the winter of 1986, the 'Beijing Conference on the Asia-Pacific Economy
towards the year 2000' was convened with strong support from the government. The
conference was sponsored by the Research Centre for Asia-Pacific Development, the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and the State Council's Research Centre for the
Development of Economy, Technology and Society. Premier Zhao Ziyang made the
opening speech at the conference. This conference was an important milestone in the
process of China's participation in the discussion on regional economic cooperation.
Zhao's attendance and speech at the conference symbolised the acceptance, at the
highest level of the Chinese government, of the argument that China should regard itself
as a member of the Asia-Pacific region and develop an Asia-Pacific dimension in its
external policies. 51
It can be clearly seen that the Chinese academic perception of the process of
constructing economic co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region during this stage
underwent some fundamental changes along with the changes in their perception of
global affairs. At first, they were still not sure how to judge the nature and purpose of
regional economic cooperation that was discussed in many other Asia-Pacific countries.
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With political restrictions on people's thinking relaxed, these academics began to
express their views according to the realities of the region as well as that of the world.
Undoubtedly, Hum Xiang's call to look at the world as an economic whole was highly
important for the change in people's views. Obviously the common perception among
the academics that it was necessary for China to be part of the process exploring
regional economic co-operation was also influential on the shift of the government's
view on this process.
(3). Divergent Views
Once the Chinese government accepted the academic argument that an Asia-Pacific
dimension was needed in its foreign policy with regard to economic cooperation in this
region, the Chinese academics pushed their discussion to a new height. This can be
seen from the multitude of ideas which appeared from the mid-1980s. Unlike the
cautious attitude at government level to movements towards undertaking cooperation
among the Asia-Pacific countries, Chinese academics treated the idea with much more
enthusiasm, and their views also became highly diversified, sometimes even
conflicting. The differences in opinions appeared to be more in the geographical scope
of economic co-operation than in the values of cooperation.
Since the academics were also searching for ways which would lead to better
economic results for China's enterprises, it seemed that they argued, in terms of the
values of cooperation, along the lines of such western writers on international co-
operation as R. Lipsey and K. Lancaster, who argued that economic cooperation could
lead to better economic results. They tended to explain that trans-national economic co-
operation would have positive effects, such as trade creation, better allocation of
resources and the attainment of economies of scale through removal of trade barriers
and other economic exchanges between nations within a region. They also emphasised
the positive effect of competition among the enterprises in countries in cooperation,
which would lead to increase in capital investment and faster steps in readjusting the
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structures of manufacturing. The survival of the fittest in heightened competition would
further rationalise the systems of production, which would raise productivity and reduce
production costs and therefore prices. In addition, economic cooperation would help
improve relations between member countries by watering down disputes and
differences and co-ordinating policies between them.
The Chinese academics also argued that regional economic cooperation would make
the economies of the member countries grow faster. In the meantime, faster economic
growth in the member countries would create the effect of market expansion for non-
member countries as a result of the increase in demands for products and materials from
outside the region. This would benefit growth in the world economy and strengthen
global stability. This was possible because they maintained that regional cooperation
was to achieve faster development rather than for protection. Countries participating in
cooperation had no reason to put up tariff barriers against goods from outside the
region. As economies grew, trade with other regions was actually set to increase as
demand for products and materials from outside the region was bound to grow.52
However, the Chinese academics differed over the geographic scale of economic
cooperation. In other words, they held different views about whom China should
integrate its economy with. One type of argument was to maintain that economic co-
operation was going to be conducted at the global level. A second was that international
economic cooperation would develop along a dual track: regional and global. A third
group held that China should work hard to bring about cooperation among the Western
Pacific countries. The fourth saw cooperation based on all the countries ringing the
Pacific ocean as the only appropriate arena. Despite these differences, all of them
believed that China should quicken its steps to link its economy with the outside world.
The Global View
Those who believed that economic integration should be at the global level argued
that this was one of the dominant trends in the world economy and international
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economic relations. "In today's world, national economies are ever more deeply
involved in the integrated world market. Mutual dependence is on the rise not only
among the developed countries, the developing countries, and between the developed
and the developing countries, but also between countries with different social
systems."53
 Those who held this view claimed that such a trend of mutual penetration
and dependence and therefore globalisation could be found not only in trade, but also in
manufacturing and financial activities.
Specifically, these people pointed, first of all, to the faster growth in the volume of
international trade than manufacturing. They claimed that the proportion of international
trade in goods and services in GNP rose continuously. The exchanges in services,
including finance, insurance, tourism, transport and technical services grew even faster
than the exchanges in goods. They were increasingly important sources of foreign
exchange revenue for many countries. Secondly, they argued that western trans-national
corporations adopted "global strategies" in order to reduce competition. This expanded
the internationalisation of manufacturing and investment. Thirdly, financial activities
were ever more global, and financial markets were increasingly integrated at the global
level. Fourthly, scientific research and development of new technologies were jointly
undertaken by many countries. This was because they involved high risks which no
country could afford to bear on its own. Such international collaboration in developing
new technologies were popular among most of the developed countries, including the
EEC countries, Japan and the United States. Fifthly, socialist and third world countries
were also increasingly involved in the process of economic globalisation. The argument
was, therefore, that globalisation of economic activities would be the dominant feature
of the world economy.54
The Mixed View
Those holding the mixed view argued that regionalisation and globalisation were
happening at the same time, and were part and parcel of the same ultimate process of
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integration. However, there were differences within this school of views. They were
focused on which would be the dominant feature of international economic integration.
Some maintained that regional integration would enhance and eventually end up in
global integration. Others placed emphasis on regional integration by saying that global
integration would be overshadowed by regionalisation for quite some time into the
future. These differences were best represented by He Fang, Deputy Chief Executive of
the China Centre of International Studies, who held the first view, and Li Cong,
Director of the Research Institute of World Economy and Politics, who put
regionalisation ahead of globalisation.55
According to the first group, the world economy was increasingly integrated and
unified. In spite of the protectionist tendencies in different parts of the world, all of the
regional blocs, as a matter of fact, continuously extended economic links with other
blocs instead of reducing them. Trans-bloc trade and investment were on the rise.
Beside, member countries of these blocs were not prepared to limit their activities to
their blocs. They would rather push into other blocs to take up and consolidate
favourable positions. Transnational corporations were even more so. Their activities
were not only trans-national but also trans-regional. This was deepening the mutual
penetration between these blocs. "Though regionalisation will hinder globalisation on
one hand, it will, in the long run, consolidate global integration and become a stage in
the process leading to global integration on the other."55
Disputing such perceptions, Li Cong pointed to the new developments in regional
integration throughout the world. Li used as his evidence the expansion of the North
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) to include Mexico, and the expansion and
consolidation of the EEC after the EEC and the European Free Trade Area agreed to
bring their relations into a new stage. Li Cong also discussed the development in the
Asia-Pacific region, particularly China's participation in the Ministerial Meeting of Asia-
Pacific Economic Co-operation. He argued that this signified that economic cooperation
in this region would expand further. "The emergence of three major economic blocs
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centred on the developed countries is becoming inevitable." Yet he did not rule out the
possibility that these regional blocs would eventually become stages in the process of
global integration.57
Co-operation without North America
Another group of academics held the view that regionalisation was quietly taking
place among countries situated on the western side of the Pacific. It seemed that they
had no definitive concept of the region under discussion. Some called it the East Asian
bloc, which appeared similar to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir's proposal for an
East Asian Economic Caucus.58 But few referred to Mahathir's idea. Some called it the
Western Pacific bloc, including Russia, Australia and New Zealand. Both groups
agreed that economic links and cooperation in "their regions" were highly influenced by
Japan from within the region and the EEC and NAFTA from without.
Their arguments ran like this: though no formal agreements between, nor specific
actions were made by, the governments of this region on forming an economic bloc, the
regional economic relations indicated clearly that a bloc, in which Japan played the key
role, was emerging. The evidence they gave for this argument included the increasing
mutual dependence among these countries, the reduction of reliance on the American
market, the growth in Japanese investment in this region, the new pattern of mutual
investment between Japan and other countries, and the strengthening the position of the
Japanese Yen. Some also stressed the opening of the Japanese market to products
manufactured in this region. They also argued that the strength for co-operation in this
region was found right in the heterogeneous nature of the region's economies, which
was seen as complementary to each other.59
The Asia-Pacific View
The view, that regional economic co-operation should include both North American
and South American countries facing the Pacific ocean, was the most popular one
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among Chinese academics. Those holding this view tended to base their arguments on
either extra-regional or intra-regional developments. Those holding the former view
pointed to the regionalisation of the world economy as the reason for Asia-Pacific co-
operation. They argued that the EEC's further development towards economic union
and the emergence and expansion of NAFTA, 60 two discriminatory economic blocs,
would inevitably push the Asia-Pacific countries towards forming cooperative structures
of their own. But they argued that the American countries, particularly the United
States, would find it too much to give up their trade and economic relations with the rest
of the Asia-Pacific countries, simply because of the amount of trans-Pacific trade and
investments.61
The later group tended to judge by the attempts of the Asia-Pacific countries at
undertaking cooperation, and believed that these schemes and actions would prepare the
ground for region-wide cooperation. They pointed to the favourable conditions for
cooperation in this region. First, they argued that the economies of these countries had a
long history of exchanges and link. Second, the region was thought to be full of
economic dynamism as reflected in the rise of Japan, the rapid economic growth of the
NIEs, the ASEAN countries and China. Third, Asia-Pacific had all the significant
elements for economic cooperation, such as the natural resources for economic growth,
capital, labour and market. "Today, Pacific countries are increasingly aware of their
common economic interests and the importance of developing regional economic co-
operation..., which indicates that economic cooperation in the Pacific region is moving
ahead continuously.”62
The set-up of APEC was treated with great importance by Chinese academics as
well. The official colour of this organisation "indicates that economic cooperation has
entered the stage of inter-governmental co-ordination". 63 These academics also
recognised the diversity and the competitive nature in the Asia-Pacific relationship. They
therefore proposed that economic cooperation should not follow the EEC model, but
stress consultation and policy co-ordination, and should be selective in cooperation
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areas. Countries participating in cooperation should be free to develop economic
relations, either bilateral or multilateral, with other countries and regions. Beside, co-
operation should start from the bilateral level, and gradually expand to include more
countries.64
As the Chinese government increased its attention to the developments in the
process of constructing economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, Chinese
academics began to conduct their research on this topic in a much wider and deeper
fashion. They put forward different views with regard to the centre of the international
economic integration and the form and emphasis of such cooperation. Some of their
thinking was obviously influenced by studies and views of foreign academics. But they
also put forward Chinese ideas. For example, Chinese scholars stressed that the
developed countries should not neglect the interests of the developing countries in
economic cooperation. "The developing countries can only strengthen their cooperation
with the developed countries on the basis of rapid economic growth and dynamism."65
As China became more deeply involved in the discussion on Asia-Pacific economic co-
operation, the Chinese academics also focused their attentions on this region.
3. 2. B. Early Official Involvement
Although the Chinese academics made quick yet diverse responses to the process of
constructing regional economic cooperation in the early 1980s, the Chinese government
did not seem to have any clear policy on this development. No clear official statement
concerning this issue appeared in the official press in this period. It seems that the
Chinese government still looked at China's relations with the Asia-Pacific countries in
bilateral terms. For instance, when a New Zealand parliamentary delegation visited
Beijing in 1981, the head of the delegation gave a banquet speech stressing the
importance of the Asia-Pacific region, while his host, Vice President Ulanfu, talked
only about bilateral relations.66
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It was only after more exchanges between Chinese leaders and the leaders of other
countries, particularly the Asia-Pacific countries, that the Chinese government began to
present a clearer position. However, the emphasis was placed on economic cooperation
between developing countries, rather than between developed and developing countries.
At a meeting with a delegation of the UN Economic and Social Council of Asia and
Pacific (ESCAP) in January 1982, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang said that economic
cooperation could play a significant role in promoting world trade negotiations. But
China's attention was focused on cooperation between developing countries.67
Chinese leaders also continued to view cooperation between developed countries
and developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region as important for the international
effort to oppose hegemonism. During the visit of Australian Prime Minister Malcolm
Fraser to China in December 1982 and Zhao Ziyang's return visit in April 1983, the two
leaders did talk about the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. But according to Renmin
Ribao, their talks were centred on the security situation. Zhao only expressed support
for the economic cooperation between Australia and the ASEAN countries, although
Bob Hawke, who succeeded Fraser as prime 'minister, discussed with him the
importance of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation for the world economy. Even until
November 1983, Zhao Ziyang was still emphasising the importance of South-South
economic co-operation.68 Neither did other leaders, not even Deng Xiaoping himself,
were reported to have made any remarks about Asia-Pacific economic co-operation.
However, such lack of enthusiasm among the Chinese leaders was soon to
disappear. In January 1984, Premier Zhao Ziyang visited the United States. During this
visit, Zhao talked about Asia-Pacific economic cooperation when he answered a
question raised at a banquet in San Francisco. While expressing his general recognition
of the importance of this region, he stated that given the huge amount of trade and
technology transfer in the region, there were good opportunities and tremendous
potential for cooperation. He further stated that cooperation could be enlarged if "we
seek various methods and ways". 69 This seemed to be the first public statement
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endorsing the idea of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation made by a Chinese leader. This
statement also indicated that the Chinese government had begun to consider its position
on this issue.
In the following month, during talks in Beijing with Bob Hawke, the Australian
Prime Minister, Zhao showed much more enthusiasm than a year ago, and endorsed
Asia-Pacific economic cooperation in the context of the North-South dialogue. 70 A
series of articles followed in the Renmin Ribao, stressing the importance of the region
by way of introducing foreign press coverage. Other Chinese leaders also joined Zhao.
When US President, Ronald Reagan, visited China in April 1984, Chinese President Li
Xiannian told Reagan that he noticed Reagan's remarks about the political and economic
importance of the Asia-Pacific region, and said he supported Reagan's opinion.71
The Chinese government officials also began to stress that China was an Asia-
Pacific country, indicating increased interests in Asia-Pacific economic co-operation. At
the 41st General Assembly of the UN Economic and Social Council of Asia and Pacific
(ESCAP), deputy Foreign Minister Qian Qichen gave a speech that pledged China as a
member of the Asia-Pacific region, and that China would make sincere efforts to
support actively and participate in economic co-operation in the region.72
It is rather curious that neither Deng Xiaoping nor General Secretary Hu Yaobang
ever mentioned the rise of Asia-Pacific co-operation. When Bob Hawke visited China in
1985 and delivered a speech on Asia-Pacific cooperation, Hu simply made some
remarks on bilateral issues in reply.73
 He was no more responsive to the visiting New
Zealand Prime Minister, David Lange, who at a banquet heralded the spirit of Pacific
unity:74
 It does seem that not all top Chinese leaders openly endorsed the idea of co-
operation, yet they did not openly criticise it either. It could be seen that the Chinese
government had by now incorporated it on its foreign policy agenda. The proof of this
was the public support given by both Li Xiannian and Zhao Ziyang, the two top
Chinese leaders in charge of China's foreign relations. The busy academic discussions
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were also evidence that the Chinese government had accepted by now that it was
necessary to treat this issue as an important one.
In 1986, China's relations with the Asia-Pacific region moved one big step further.
In March that year, China regained its membership of the Asian Development Bank.
The identity of Taiwan was the biggest issue of all, and the format of Chinese Taipei, a
clever invention by the International Olympic Committee, enabled both Taiwan and the
PRC to become members of the Bank simultaneously. Chen Muhua, State Councillor
and Director of China's central bank, the People's Bank, expressed China's intention to
strive for the economic, financial and social development of the Asia-Pacific region.75
The ambiguity that Chinese leaders, including Zhao Ziyang, displayed in the first
half of the 1980s should be explained as China's lack of certainty about the process and
about the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) discussions, and its
difficulty in accepting that Taiwan was to participate alongside China. According to
Lawrence T. Wood, the countries that attended the first four PECC meetings agreed that
both Taiwan and China should be included in the discussions. After the first meeting in
Canberra in 1980, Australian officials briefed Chinese embassy officials in Canberra
about the meeting:76
 Into 1986, the effort to involve China seemed to be stepped up by
the Canadian PECC Committee. Several meetings were held between Chinese
Ambassador to Canada Yu Zhan and representatives of the Canadian PECC Committee.
The Chinese ambassador seemed at first having difficulties in accepting the tripartite
nature of PECC, and particularly the position of government officials in it. The biggest
issue was however still Taiwan. After repeated explanations about the nature and
purpose of PECC, the Chinese were eventually convinced and accepted the invitation to
attend the fifth meeting of PECC.7
In retrospect, it appeared that the above mentioned Beijing Conference, at which
Premier Zhao gave a speech, was held to prepare China for joining the multi-lateral
discussion about Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. Shortly after that conference,
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China joined the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) as a full member in
July 1986. The issue of Taiwan was once again resolved in the Olympic formula, which
enabled Taiwan to gain full membership as well. Huan Xiang, the strongest voice
behind China's movement towards this process, headed the Chinese delegation to the
fifth PECC meeting in Vancouver, Canada. In his speech, Huan Xiang demonstrated
his considerable inclination towards Asia-Pacific co-operation. He stated that China's
global open door policy was oriented to the Asia-Pacific region more than anywhere
else. He also emphasised that the Chinese economy could not do without the Asia-
Pacific region.78
3. 2. C. Personal Contributions
Up to the time when China became a PECC member, personal perceptions and
advocation seemed to have been significant as well. Two political figures played highly
important roles in shifting China's attention to the Asia-Pacific region. One was Premier
Zhao Ziyang, who later lost his job due to his sympathy towards the pro-democracy
students in 1989. As Premier, Zhao was directly in change of China's economic
development. His experiences as the governor of Sichuan Province in Central China,
where he first started the agricultural reform, prepared him for new and pragmatic ideas.
Zhao seemed to be the first top leader to state clearly that China should link up with the
Asia-Pacific region. At the 1985 Beijing Conference, he made a powerful speech,
stating clearly that China's opening to the outside world determined that China must
develop strong relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. He said:
How to preserve the fine force of economic development in the Asian and
Pacific nations, how to turn the glamorous prospects of economic
development of the Asia-Pacific region in the year 2000 into reality: these
are challenges that the Asian and Pacific nations face. The Chinese
government's basic position on Asia-Pacific economic cooperation is:
mutual respect, intensification of interaction, equality and mutual benefit,
and joint development. Our fourteen Economic Development Zones, four
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Special Economic Zones and three Open Areas are all located in the Pacific
coastal area. This location is favourable for intensifying our relationship
with the Pacific states.79
Being the top Chinese leader in charge of China's economic development, Zhao's
attitude was certainly a boost to the opinion that China should be part of the Asia-Pacific
region. 80
Huan Xiang was the other key figure in this process. Huan was a bit different. He
was at the same time a senior official and an academic. He was an intellectual and
started his career as a simple government employee. But he worked his way up. At one
time, he was said to have nearly been made China's Foreign Minister. As the head of
the State Council's Centre of International Studies, he played a key role in shifting
China's attention towards the Asia-Pacific region and the discussion on economic
cooperation. He was always in the picture whenever China showed interests in Asia-
Pacific co-operation.
Huan Xiang was by no means a one-area man. He was one of the most influential
international economists in China. His speciality included world economy, diplomatic
theory, and international affairs in general. Huan Xiang was educated in China and later
in Waseda University in Japan. He also spent a short period of time at LSE in London.
He started his career as a customs officer, but soon switched to the foreign service, with
which he stayed for a quarter of century. After attending the 1954 Geneva Conference
as Zhou Enlai's aide, he was posted to the UK as China's first charge d'affairs. His
career was highlighted by his ambassadorship to Belgium in 1976. 81 As a theoretician,
he was known to employ a macro-approach, focusing on global, rather than regional,
issues. Considering his influence in China, his active advocation of participation in
Asia-Pacific economic co-operation should be regarded as crucial in increasing the
importance of China's diplomatic and economic policies towards this region.82
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After China joined PECC, Huan continued to devote his energy to Asia-Pacific co-
operation. He seemed to be more focused on this region. In March 1987, the Research
Centre for Pacific Economy was set up at the Chinese People's University. Huan Xiang
was invited to deliver a speech at the opening ceremony. He said, "From now on, when
our country considers external trade strategies, introduction of foreign capital, and
industrial policies, we must carry out study in the context of the vast Pacific region".83
In June 1987, the Chinese National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation
was set up in accordance with the rules of PECC. Huan Xiang was appointed its
Chairman. In August, another symposium on Asia-Pacific regional economic co-
operation and China was held in Shanghai. Huan Xiang delivered a speech entitled:
'The Pacific towards the 21st Century'. He said in this speech that intra-regional
economic cooperation would benefit the entire region. he stressed that China could play
an important part in maintaining peace and rapid development through closer
cooperation with other countries in this region. 84 Huan's arguments provided most of
the basic reasons for the necessity for China to participate in the discussions on Asia-
Pacific economic cooperation. Due to his position in the Chinese government and
Chinese policy making process, Huan Xiang's arguments for Asia-Pacific economic co-
operation should be regarded as the basis of Chinese government's attitude and position
on the whole issue of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
It can be seen from the above that China's participation in the discussion on Asia-
Pacific economic cooperation in PECC was the result of several influences. The
personal support and advocation by people like Zhao Ziyang and Huan Xiang were
obviously important. The academics' perception of the changes in world politics and
economy, and the rise of the importance of the Asia-Pacific region provided the
rationale for the Chinese leadership to participate in the discussions, even though they
had to accept the fact that they had to sit at the same table with their opponents from
Taiwan. The change in the general political atmosphere, particularly the campaign to
emancipate people's minds, and China's urgent need to develop stronger external trade
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relations provided the favourable background. The non-governmental nature of PECC
was also important, because it enabled China to get around the issue of sovereignty.85
3. 3. Stage Three-Post 1986: Emergence of An Asia-Pacific Dimension
In terms of both the development of an Asia-Pacific dimension in China's external
policy, and the participation in the discussion on economic cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific region, the year 1986 went down in history as a milestone. On the basis of
changing perceptions of the regional and global situations, and the confidence that
participation in the discussion would not have any implications for China's sovereignty
over Taiwan, China joined the Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference (PECC) as a
full member, the then most influential and most widely represented forum. China's
membership indicated that more importance was attached to this region in its foreign
policy considerations. But it was only the beginning of the development of an Asia-
Pacific dimension in China's foreign policy. The following section will demonstrate,
through examining government policy statements, officials' talks and comments and
press articles, how the development of this dimension was finally completed when
China became a member of APEC.
3. 3. A. Treating PECC Lightly
It was almost like an anti-climax that PECC did not feature prominently in China's
foreign policy after China became its member. PECC was treated by the Chinese
government as just another organisation which deserved some of its attention. Hence,
China's membership did not entail any major and immediate re-orientation in its
diplomatic and economic policies towards the building-up of a working structure for
economic cooperation. It seemed that the attempt to bring into being such a structure did
not even become a key feature in China's general policies towards the Asia-Pacific
region. China went on to emphasise the importance of peace and the halting of the
armament race in this region. As far as economic cooperation was concerned, China
maintained its usual position, which was to bring about such cooperation among third
136
world countries, who were thought to share many similarities, such as common
experiences under colonialism and identical level of economic development.
The Chinese government's initial cool attitude towards the efforts to turn economic
cooperation into a reality in the Asia-Pacific region was first highlighted by the
organisation of the PECC China Committee and the appointment of its leaders. On 4
June, 1987, PECC China Committee held its first session in Beijing. China's most
important newspaper, Renmin Ribao, reported the meeting in a brief piece on the fourth
page the following day. Renmin Ribao explained the nature of PECC and said, "The
organisation requires its member countries to set up national committees as its
counterparts in these countries." 87 The way it was treated by RMRB indicated that it
was not of the top importance. 88 The report itself only mentioned customarily that
PECC was important for China's modernisation drive.
The appointment of Rong Yiren as the committee's honorary president and Huan
Xiang its president seemed to be consistent with the choice of leaders of such
committees in other PECC member countries. These choices were also an indication of
the importance that it had. Rong, who later became China's vice president, was China's
most acclaimed businessman. Coming from the largest nationalist capitalist family, he
was a long-standing collaborator with the Chinese Communist Party after 1949. His
friendship with them made him a successful survivor of a series of political movements.
After the "cultural revolution", he became the president of China's first private
international trust, China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC)
founded with the support of Deng Xiaoping after the introduction of the new policies.
Though he was respected and consulted on certain policy issues, he was not a
Communist Party member and was never a member of the decision-making circle.89
The choice of Huan Xiang as President of PECC China was a convenient one since
he was able to fulfil two requirements of PECC: a government official in their private
capacities and prominent academic. But like Rong, Huan was not a member of the inner
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circle of the process of Chinese foreign policy making. Though Huan Xiang was a key
adviser to the Chinese leadership on foreign policy issues, his position as the head of
the State Council's Centre of International Studies was not high enough either in the
government or the party apparatus to enable him to have a say in the government's final
decisions on foreign policies.90
A year and half later, the second session of the PECC China National Committee
was held in Beijing. Honorary President Rong Yiren addressed the meeting, which was
attended by over 60 academics, business people and government officials. Like the first
session, the second session again was treated lightly. This time Renmin Ribao only said
that the delegates discussed procedural matters and other related issues concerning
economic cooperation in the Pacific region.91
The fact that Asia-Pacific economic cooperation failed in the first two to three years
of China joining PECC to register as an important foreign policy feature was also
underlined by the absence of this topic in the policy statements made by Chinese leaders
in their talks on issues of foreign affairs. At the end of each year, Chinese leaders,
normally either the Vice Premier responsible for foreign relations or the Chinese
Foreign Minister, would write or talk about China's diplomatic achievements and
forecast developments in the international situation in the new year. This would be a
highly important foreign policy statement, which would mention China's achievements
in foreign affairs and spell out China's views on the global situation and problems as
well as the direction and emphasis of its foreign policy in the coming year.
On New Year's day 1987, Renmin Ribao published State Councillor and Foreign
Minster Wu Xueqian's answers to questions on the international situation and China's
foreign policy by journalists of the Xinhua News Agency. Wu's answers covered all
major areas of Chinese foreign policy and China's diplomatic achievements of 1986,
highlighting the expansion of China's economic and trade relations with the rest of the
world. Yet Wu did not say anything about Asia-Pacific economic cooperation and
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China's participation and role in PECC. He only vaguely mentioned that international
cooperation among small and weak nations was strengthened. Such cooperation was
becoming a significant trend in the global situation.92
In March 1988, China's Seventh National People's Congress, China's supreme
legislature, was held in Beijing. During the course of the congress, State Councillor and
Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian and his successor as foreign minister Qian Qichen told
journalists at a press conference that China's foreign policy had experienced changes
and adjustments along with its domestic policies. Wu said that a key starting point of
Chinese foreign policies was to strengthen China's unity and cooperation with the Third
World countries. He and Qian also talked in great details about the changes in China's
relations with the Soviet Union, disputes with Vietnam over the Spratleys, and even a
train accident in which 26 Japanese students and a teacher were killed. Qian said that
China was considering how to compensate the dead. When it came to external economic
relations, they only repeated past policy statements. Once again Asia-Pacific economic
cooperation failed to be a topic on the agenda.93
There could be two explanations for the low position of PECC in Chinese
government's foreign policy considerations. First of all, the Chinese government's
interests were concentrated on those proper inter-governmental organisations. This is
shown by the fact that the relations with every UN body and all other intergovernmental
financial and economic bodies, such as ADB, IMF and World Bank, are handled by a
department with either the Foreign Ministry or the Ministry of Finance, or some other
ministries. PECC was only an unofficial body which involved official representation.
Beside, its future was still not very clear. Secondly, the stress of Chinese foreign policy
was still on China's relations with the super powers, particularly that with the Soviet
Union since China started to follow an independent foreign policy.94 PECC by nature
did not qualify to be put high on the Chinese government's foreign policy agenda.
3. 3. B. Increased Government Attention
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However, the Asia-Pacific region was to feature increasingly bigger in China's
external relations, both politically and economically. While the Chinese government
kept PECC at arm's length, China's media and academics were full of enthusiasm for
economic cooperation with other Pacific countries. After China's new premier Li Peng
_ .
visited Thailand, Australia and New Zealand in April 1988, a Renmin Ribao editorial
said that Li's visit was the first by a top Chinese leader after the significant Third
Plenum of the 13th Party Congress, which decided that China's economy was to enter a
period of readjustment. "It shows once again that China attaches a great deal of
importance to the improvements in its relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific
region... In future, the world will be a multi-polar one. The international organisations
which have appeared in recent years will play important roles in the changing
international situations."95
The same editorial also said that economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region
should observe the principle of "mutual respect, mutual benefit, wide-ranging
exchanges and common prosperity". 96 On the basis on this principle, the editorial
argued, economic cooperation among the Asia-Pacific countries was set to grow
further. China was ready to join these countries in making efforts to turn the Pacific
ocean into an ocean of peace, friendship and co-operation, because China realised that
she could draw on the experiences of many Asia-Pacific countries in developing their
economies. This editorial seemed to signal that China had accepted the concept of
regional economic cooperation in this region.
The government was also catching up. The most clear-cut statement on _China's
policy towards the Asia-Pacific as a region and its economic cooperation was made by
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in a year-end article reviewing international situations
published on 16 December, 1988. Qian wrote:
The Asia-Pacific region is of great importance in world affairs and has
attracted more and more of the attention of the international community.
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Situated in the Asia-Pacific region, China is naturally concerned with the
region's peace and development. Asia-Pacific countries are highly
diversified, which should become the sources of dynamism for mutually
beneficial cooperation rather than causes of troubles. China does not seek
hegemony in this region and oppose any country to do so...
The five principles of peaceful co-existence was the product of mankind's
wisdom... We hope that these principles can be applied to the Asia-Pacific
region, which will set an example for peaceful co-existence, South-South
cooperation and North-South Cooperation.97
Another quiet change took place in the mentality of the Chinese leaders, which also
indicated increased attention to the Asia-Pacific region. This was best demonstrated by
the terms used by Chinese leaders in their talks with foreign visitors. In the past,
Chinese leaders would normally use Asia when discussing issues concerning Asian
countries. By now, "Asia-Pacific" had become the standard term, which referred by and
large to the same number of countries as when it was used by other countries. This was
the same in all the main leaders' talks with foreign visitors.
The increased interest of Chinese leaders in the development in the Asia-Pacific
region gradually turned Beijing into one of the busiest venues for conferences on Asia-
Pacific issues. These conferences discussed a wide range of issues including regional
security and disputes, scientific exchanges and cooperation and the halting of the arms
race in this region, investment and technologies transfer. Such conferences included
those held by international academic institutions, international organisations and
Chinese government's departments. Some senior Chinese leaders addressed them.
One interesting fact during this period was that, although China had become a
PECC member, it still seemed to treat with more importance economic cooperation in
the Asia-Pacific region under the concept of the UN Asia and Pacific Council of
Economic and Social Affairs. "The UN's Asia and Pacific Council of Economic and
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Social Affairs is the region's most important inter-governmental organisation. It has for
a long time played a positive role in promoting Asia-Pacific cooperation. We hope that
the UN's Asia and Pacific Council of Economic and Social Affairs will face up to the
challenges of the 90s and fulfil a bigger role in advancing regional cooperation in Asia
and the Pacific."98
At the Bangkok conference celebrating the 40th anniversary of the UN ESCAP in
April 1987, State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, further underlined
China's position on economic cooperation within this framework. He said that "the
Chinese government is concerned with and firmly supports economic cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific region". Wu also emphasised the principles for cooperation as had been put
forward for Asia-Pacific regional economic cooperation. These principles, which were:
mutual respect, mutual benefit, extensive exchanges and common prosperity, stressed
that cooperation should be beneficial for all members. Wu also discussed in great details
what these principles meant.99
As far as China's participation in discussions on Asia-Pacific economic cooperation
was concerned, the 1989 Tian An Men incident, and the subsequent economic sanctions
imposed on China by western countries, did not have much effect on the Chinese
government's enthusiasm for regional economic cooperation. In fact, the Chinese
government showed more interest in the discussions, including the PECC discussion.
Chinese officials used such occasions as opportunities to recover China's international
position, which was seriously damaged by the Tian An Men incident. On 28 October
1989, a conference on Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, the Symposium on China &
Asia-Pacific Economic and Trade Cooperation, was held in Beijing. Vice Premier Tian
Jiyun made a speech. Tian's presence at the symposium indicated that the Chinese
government treated seriously the value of economic cooperation, because such a
conference would normally have the foreign or trade minister as its guest of honour.
142 •
In his speech, Vice Premier Tian repeated the Chinese government's position on the
purpose of economic cooperation in Asia-Pacific region, which should be the common
prosperity and development of the region's countries. The main force of the
organisation of economic cooperation should be the developing countries of this region,
where most of the region's population lived. Economic cooperation should be founded
on the basis of equality, mutual benefit as well as peaceful co-existence, which meant
that countries should not interfere with others' sovereignty and internal affairs. "Co-
operation should be characterised by being open to all countries both in and outside the
region, who are committed to international cooperation... China will continue to make
contributions towards the development of economic cooperation in this region."100
Premier Li Peng also called on Chinese diplomats to step up their efforts in
promoting China's economic and trade cooperation with other countries when meeting
China's science and technology councillors to different countries. 101 Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen expressed similar purpose of China's participation in multilateral economic
cooperation from a more general perspective. In an article reviewing China's
diplomacy, Qian wrote that, for decades, the Chinese government and its leaders had
emphasised the importance for developing stronger external economic and trade
relations. Against the background of economic sanctions by western countries, Qian
stressed that China was already a part of the global community. He wrote, in today's
world, China needed the world and the world needed China. "It is necessary to point
out that the expansion of international economic cooperation is not only in the interests
of China, but also in the interests of its partners. Should such economic exchanges be
harmed in any way, both China and those countries who have imposed sanctions upon
China will suffer too." 102 All such remarks indicated that, while Chinese leaders were
worried about the effect of sanctions and wanted to break out of it, they also accepted
the fact that China must be part of the world community and cooperate with other .
countries in economic matters.
3. 3. C. Participation in APEC
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Unlike PECC and the other forums on Asia-Pacific economic co-operation, the
Chinese government reacted immediately to the first APEC Ministerial Meeting. The
establishment of this forum made the headlines in China's main newspapers. Renmin
Ribao stressed in its report that the meeting, attended by foreign and trade ministers
from twelve Pacific rim countries, hoped that China could take part in the conference in
the near future. Renmin Ribao even quoted Bob Hawke as saying at the banquet in
honour of the attending ministers that he believed that China should be invited to join
this organisation. 'The maintenance of a trade environment in which the People's
Republic of China is effectively involved is to the benefit of all of us.' The US delegate
also supported China's membership in the new Asia-Pacific economic organisation
under consideration."1°3
The reason that China regarded the APEC Ministerial Meeting seriously seemed to
be that it was an inter-governmental organisation. The set-up of APEC further reduced
the importance of PECC. For the first time, Renmin Ribao did not report at length the
speech made by the Chinese delegation attending the seventh PECC conference. The
set-up of APEC was also treated as a positive development in the intra-regional
relations. An article by Xi Shuguang carried in Renmin Ribao a month later regarded the
ministerial meeting as the important prelude to the establishment of an Asia-Pacific
economic cooperation organisation. But Xi assured his readers that the new
organisation under consideration would take time to be set up. He wrote that it was
going to be a difficult process because there existed sharply different views. He pointed
to the fact that the ASEAN countries expressed caution about it while Australia, Japan,
South Korea and the United States wanted to set up the organisation soon. Large
amount of work needed to be done too before the principles and specific rules could be
established. He therefore concluded that many difficulties still existed in the process of
turning the idea of economic cooperation into reality. 104 This seemed to mean that
China still had time to catch up with this new development.
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But Chinese leaders did not seem to be as relaxed as Xi was, though they also
stressed that APEC was only the beginning of a long process. In answer to questions
put to him by a journalist of Liao Wang, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said, "Although
Asia-Pacific economic cooperation enjoys good prospect, yet there is still a long way
ahead". But Qian also emphasised, "It is generally held that any form of economic co-
operation or any organisation for such cooperation in Asia-Pacific region will be open-
ended. It is hardly possible to form an organisation like the European Economic
Community. Nevertheless, we regard any regional political or economic organisation
without China as a member as incomplete, because China's importance for this region
has already been recognised by the countries of this region". Qian's remarks were also
carried in Renmin Ribao, highlighting their importance.105
Into the year 1990, Chinese leaders continued to use every opportunity to highlight
the necessity of China's participation in the Asia-Pacific economic co-operatidn process.
Meanwhile, China also started the diplomatic process of joining the Ministerial
Conference. By this time China's political situation was not the main hurdle. China was
actually invited to attend the second APEC Ministerial Meeting hosted by Singapore in
1990. But China did not accept the invitation. What stood in the way was the issue of
simultaneous admission of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. This time, however, it was
not only China that was held up by this issue. Disagreement also existed between the
first twelve member countries. At the second APEC Ministerial Conference held on 29
July 1990 in Singapore, the membership of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan was high
on the agenda. The United States and Japan insisted that Hong Kong must be admitted
as a member, while the US. curiously proposed that China be admitted as an official
observer and Taiwan as an unofficial observer. The ASEAN members, three of which,
Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei, did not have diplomatic relations with China at that
time, were initially opposed to membership for any of the three Chinese economies.106
The Chinese also made an active response. Renmin Ribao of 3 August 1990 said
that the second ministerial meeting also indicated that China's participation in future
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ministerial conferences on Asia-Pacific economic cooperation was what people were
looking forward to. Another report on the same day's Renmin Ribao said that the
second ministerial conference believed that China's participation was only a matter of
time. Renmin Ribao also highlighted that the conference also indicated that a decision on
this issue would be made at the third conference or even before. For the first time,
Foreign Minister Qian expressed in clear terms that China was ready to join APEC.
Qian even volunteered to suggest in clear terms how the membership issue should be
revolved. He told journalists that China was willing to participate in the ministerial
conference as a sovereign state. Taiwan and Hong Kong could participate as long as
they were not treated as sovereign states. He said that there should be other solutions,
hinting China's flexible stand on this issue. 107
When addressing the US Asia Society in New York in October 1990, Qian further
clarified China's position on the membership issue. Qian said, "Under the precondition
of 'one China', China as a sovereign state should become the official (Chinese) party to
attend the conference while Hong Kong and Taiwan should attend in appropriate
identities as economic regions". 108 While China's APEC membership hung in the
balance, the eighth PECC meeting was prominently covered in Chinese press
highlighting that Singapore's premier and US Vice President Dan Quayle attended and
addressed that year's PECC conference to imply its importance. This was in sharp
contrast to the coverage of the previous two meetings. The Chinese delegates were also
said to be active and popular during the meeting.1°9
Eventually, the issue of membership was resolved in the Olympic manner before
the third APEC Ministerial Meeting held on 13 November 1991 in Seoul, that is,
Taiwan was to join as "Chinese Taipei" alongside mainland China and Hong Kong. No
Taiwanese flag was to be displayed or anthem be played at the conference. 110 Hong
Kong was going to take part in the meeting only as an economic region. As a result, the
foreign ministry spokesman declared on 4 November in Beijing that the People's
Republic of China was to send a delegation headed by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
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and Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Li Lanqing to attend the third
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Ministerial Meeting. He also said that China Taipei
and Hong Kong were also going to attend this meeting following the principles of 'one
China' and 'distinction between sovereign state and economic regions'.111
China's participation in APEC indicates that an Asia-Pacific dimension was finally
added to its foreign policy. This is underlined by the speed with which China became an
APEC member. Clearly the process for China to join APEC was very much shorter than
that for China's participation in PECC. It took China only two years to join APEC
while it took six years for it to become a PECC member. As it has been indicated above,
this was the result of changes in China's attitudes given rise to by APEC'S inter-
governmental nature, which led to China's more rapid participation. The changed
attitude of the APEC members were also important. That China ignored Taiwan's
membership in such an inter-governmental forum was even more indicative of the
amount of importance China attached to APEC.
The other important reason for China to join APEC quickly was the connection the
Chinese leaders made between APEC and GATT. China regarded its membership as a
great achievement in its diplomacy and as an important step towards the restoration of
its membership in the General Agreement of Trade and Tariff (GATT). Li Lanqing said
at the third ministerial meeting that regional free trade was in consistence with the GATT
principles. Since the principle of most-favoured-nation (MFN) was a fundamental
GATT principle, it should be universally observed, suggesting that China would be able
to enjoy within the future cooperation structure MFN status in its trade with the rest of
the APEC member countries since APEC was meant to abide by GATT rules.112
An equally important condition for China joined APEC much more quickly was the
intention of those early members of APEC to see China involved in the process of
constructing economic cooperation. This tendency became further entrenched in the
post-Cold War era. As it was shown in the previous chapter, Drysdale developed his
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idea of cooperation as communication and coordination partly with his mind on the
position of the socialist countries in this region. China is not only a socialist country,
but also one of the most important Asia-Pacific countries. The policy of economic
reform and opening to the outside world, which led to rapid economic development,
indicated to the other Asia-Pacific countries that it would be highly significant to include
China in the cooperation process. This was determined by China's potential as a market
and production base in this region. 113 However, China's reform was also seen to have
potentially negative effect on the intra-regional economic relations. China's economic
development could cause disruption as well. It was thought therefore that it was highly
necessary to include China in economic cooperation to maintain stability in the intra-
regional economic relations.114
The wish of the Asia-Pacific countries wish to engage China should also be
examined against the new developments in the post-Cold War era. As it was shown in
Chapter One, the strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region experienced significant
changes after the Soviet Union collapsed. Against such a background, China's rapid
economic development made it an important factor in the strategic and political
considerations of the Asia-Pacific countries. However, the common wisdom was not to
isolate China but to engage China. This was so even after the bloody Tian An Men
incident in 1989. 115 This was because isolating China would not serve the interests of
these countries in preserving stability and rapid economic development. 116 Into the 90s,
China's drive for military modernisation supported by rapidly growing economic
strength and its harsh attitudes towards the territorial issues in its relations with its
neighbours have propelled the Asia-Pacific countries to speed up the process to bring
China into the international community as a responsible member governed by existing
rules. 117
 Though APEC is only concerned with economic issues, yet China's
membership is thought to be useful in changing China's attitude towards cooperation in
genera1.118
Conclusion
What does the above description of the process which led to China's participation
in APEC tell us? It tells us the following four things: first: the Chinese government's
attitude towards regional cooperation was very much affected by its relations with the
outside world, particularly the capitalist countries; second: academics played a crucial
role in changing the government's attitude; third: changes in the domestic political
environment and senior officials' support were essential; fourth: China treated the inter-
governmental APEC with most importance All these factors combined prepared the
ground for China to become a member of the inter-governmental process of
constructing economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
China's participation in the process to bring about economic cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific region was clearly the result of a process which combined the efforts of
academics and politicians. Under the much relaxed political and academic situation after
the "cultural revolution", Chinese academics were able to look at the world economic
and political situations with less restraints. Led by Huan Xiang, they argued that China
could only link its economy with those of the capitalist countries because they were the
dominant forces in the world economy. They also made strong cases for China's
participation in such discussions as APEC. Since those who made their views known
were members of either government think tanks or the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, their views were undoubtedly significant in raising the importance of the
Asia-Pacific region in the thinking of the top leaders.
Beside, individuals were also highly instrumental to push China to participate in
this process. Though China did not have people like Kojima or Drysdale who produced
original ideas for cooperation, there were people like Huan Xiang, who was a senior
official and an academic, and politicians like Zhao Ziyang and Li Xiannian, who were
ready to accept new ideas. These individuals made their contribution from different
angles, yet they were highly effective. The most important contribution of the academics
was to produce the arguments from the perspectives of international relations and
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international economic relations for China to join this process. As for the politicians,
their favourable attitudes obviously guaranteed that new ideas were included in
government thinking.
Like most of the Pacific Asian countries involved in the APEC process, the Chinese
government was very serious about the governmental content of PECC and APEC.119
This can be seen from the way that Chinese diplomats responded to invitations for
China to participate. When the Canadian PECC National Committee tried to include
China in the fifth PECC meeting, it took much time and effort to convince the Chinese
ambassador that PECC was not an inter-governmental organisation. By getting around
the issue of sovereignty, conditions were made for China to participate in PECC. Once
China joined PECC, it was duly treated as a non-governmental body.
Paradoxically, it seems that it *was, to a very large extent, precisely because of the
inter-governmental nature of APEC that the pace of China's participation had
quickened. This could been seen from the speed and level of response that China made
to both PECC and APEC. When PECC was first launched in 1980, the PRC ignored it,
as shown by the lack of coverage of it in the press. This lack of enthusiasm was totally
reversed when APEC was set up. The Chinese press not only gave quite extensive
coverage, but also highlighted the wishes of other countries, such as Australia and the
United States, to see China become an APEC member soon. The way Chinese officials
commented on the absence of China in this forum was also interesting. Chinese Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen used every appropriate occasion to underline China's wish to join
by saying that APEC would not be complete without China. The emergence of the inter-
governmental APEC even made the Chinese government willing to overlook the fact
that Taiwan and Hong Kong were included in APEC. The effort of the APEC member
countries to engage with China and to include it in the process was also highly
important. Their efforts ensured that the door was kept open to China.
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Chapter Four: APEC and China's Modernisation and Reunification
As shown in the previous chapter, China joined the process of developing Asia-
Pacific economic cooperation following significant modifications in the perception of
the academics and policy-makers of the world, and the elevation of the process itself to
the official level. In the meantime, China's APEC membership also reflected significant
modifications in its foreign policy.' It clearly shows that the Asia-Pacific region will
feature more prominently in its foreign policy. Another major development was the de
facto acceptance of the expansion of Taiwan's contact with the international community.
China has always maintained that no inter-governmental organisations should accept at
the same time both China and Taiwan. Although Taiwan takes part in the name of
Chinese Taipei, the implication of Taiwan's membership was not lost on the Chinese
government. Neither was the implication of the other member countries' insistence to
include Taiwan.2 Why did the Chinese government decide to become part of it despite
of all such odds?
This chapter will answer this question by looking at the PRC's motive to join
APEC. It will seek the answer by analysing the following areas: the economic and trade
significance of the Asia-Pacific region as perceived by Chinese leaders and their foreign
policy advisors; the impact of China's desire for a long-lasting favourable international
environment and the evaluation of its international position; Taiwan's membership as a
motive for China to depart from its usual policy stand to join APEC. Since the purpose
is to illustrate China's motive, this study will be based on Chinese materials including
comments by Chinese officials, and articles by Chinese researchers. Such comments
and articles are carried in both Chinese and foreign newspapers and journals. It will also
refer to discussions by foreign analysts where necessary.
These three areas have been the key concerns of Chinese foreign policy since Deng
Xiaoping started his programme of reform and opening to the outside world. Back in
1982, Deng Xiaoping laid down three major tasks for China's diplomacy: the
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obtainment of a long-lasting peaceful international environment, stronger and wider link
with the world economy and the reunification of the country. 3 These tasks became the
top priorities on the agenda of, and led to significant changes in, Chinese foreign
policy. The obtainment of a long-lasting peaceful international environment, in which
stronger external economic and trade relations figured prominently, was the priority of
priorities. Hence, my argument is that participation in the process of constructing
economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region was a key part of the PRC's
consideration to create a long-lasting peaceful international environment.
4. 1. APEC and Faster Economic Development
Chinese President Jiang Zemin stressed in his speech at the first informal APEC
summit that the PRC's policy of opening to the outside world meant that China was
oriented to the Asia-Pacific region more than any other region. 4 The occasion at which
this statement was made showed the amount of importance the PRC attached to the
Asia-Pacific region as well as APEC itself. Why should China attach so much
importance to a forum which had yet acquired the power to make bounding decisions?
This section will illustrate the reasons why China found it important to be part of this
process by looking at the importance of the member countries of APEC for China's
strategy of faster economic development
As it has been shown by different writers on China's reform and opening to the
outside world, the Chinese government under Deng Xiaoping went through a twisted
process in working out a strategy for China's economic development which highlighted
the function of China's foreign economic relations and trade. Participation in the co-
operation process was believed to be able to help ensure success of such a strategy.
This was because, in addition to geographic reasons, this strategy dictated that China
must link its economy with countries that were able and ready to meet its needs.
Chinese researchers on the development and trend of the global as well as the Asia-
Pacific regional economic relations conducted extensive research on China's position in
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the Asia-Pacific and world economic pattern, particularly since 1986, when China was
accepted as a full member by the Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference (PECC).
The results of such research pointed to the Asia-Pacific region with which China should
consider to link its economy.5
4. 1. A. Evolution of China's Open Economic Policy
Chinese leaders and foreign policy makers of the Deng era inherited from the Mao
era the desire to turn China into a strong country capable of avoiding being controlled or
bullied by the super powers. What makes the Deng era's leadership different from that
of the Mao era was the approach to turn this desire into reality. Back in the Mao era, the
stress was put on development of certain areas such as heavy industry and the military
capability. In the Deng era, the emphasis has been shifted to the rapid increase in
China's comprehensive national strength. 6 This has carried the Most weight in the
policy considerations of the Chinese leadership, with Deng Xiaoping himself calling for
rapid increase in China's comprehensive national strength.
Back in the early 1980s, Deng and other Chinese leaders, who visited developed
countries including Japan and the United States, were deeply impressed with the
economic achievements and material wealth that these countries enjoyed. They also
realised soon after they launched the economic reform programme that China would run
into daunting difficulties to achieve the economic targets laid down if China was to keep
its door shut to extensive economic contacts with the outside world.7 Meanwhile, the
successful experiences of Japan and the Four Tigers (Asian NIEs) in utilising external
economic elements to speed up their economic development also inspired the Chinese
leadership that China's economic development could be greatly benefited if it were open
to exchanges with other countries. "(The) economic success elsewhere in East Asia
showed China that if it opened up to foreign economic relations, it could prosper". 8 As
a result, the Chinese government decided to "establish special economic zones and open
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areas to open up to the outside world on a wide scale to attract foreign investment,
technology and modern management".9
The nature of China's economy also experienced drastic changes since the reform
programme was started. The most obvious difference caused by the new policies was
the gradual reduction of the function that state planning played in China's economy,
which had subjected the economy to tight control by the central government, and the
advocation of building a "socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics". The
increased emphasis on the function of the market also had impact on China's external
economic relations. This impact extended from the guiding principles to actual
international economic exchanges. The origin for such changes was the recognition by
the Chinese leaders that foreign trade only was not enough. What China needed was
deeper and more extensive economic link with the outside world.
However, when China started off again on its so called "Long March" to
modernisation back in late 1970s, Chinese leaders had different ideas about the way to
modernisation. For instance, the vice premier in charge of China's economy at that
time, Li Xiannian, who later became China's President until 1989, wished to repeat
what Mao Zedong did at the beginning of the 1950s. Mao went to Moscow and secured
from Stalin loans for 500 major projects, which were regarded as crucial in building up
China's industrial foundation. 10
 Li Xiannian adopted a similar policy approach, that
was to bring about modernisation through overhauling China's obsolete means of
production with advanced equipment and technology purchased from developed
countries. The foreign exchange needed for this would be obtained through exporting
China's mineral resources, especially oil and coal. "In keeping with the changed world
political and economic pattern at the end of 1970s, (the Chinese leaders) planned to
export natural resources in exchange for western technology and capital so that, within
the unified planning system, they could lay a foundation in one step for modernisation
by the end of century."11
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Once the decision was made to rely on China's resources for foreign exchange,
export of such resources, with oil and oil products in particular, grew dramatically in
both volume and value tenns. 12 This occurred despite significant domestic challenges to
its economic rationality, and the fact that domestic oil production grew less rapidly than
originally anticipated, with the search for off-shore deposits by multinational oil
companies falling far short of the initial "optimistic expectations of an oil bonanza which
would finance China's foreign purchases". I3
 Moreover, despite evidence that a
growing shortage of energy was crippling the pace of domestic economic growth,
exports of crude oil and oil products continued to absorb a very large share of these
products. Between 1977 and 1985, incremental exports of crude oil absorbed 98 per
cent of all additional output. 14 China's exports of crude oil and refined oil products
grew from 12 to 36 million metric tons and the value of petroleum export rose by almost
$6 billion. Thus a single product category accounted for one-third of China's
incremental export earnings. 15 And in the first half of the 1980s, primary products,
which were essentially commodity exports (including agricultural products and
minerals) regularly accounted from 45 to 50 per cent of China's exports. This was little
changed from the period from the mid-1960s to 1980 when they accounted for just over
half. 16
Yet this policy was quickly reversed once Deng Xiaoping assumed the de facto
paramount leadership in China. The argument put forward by Deng and his supporters
was that, despite of the fact that China was a resource-rich country, China's endowment
of natural resources could not sustain a policy of massive export of such resources.
This was mainly due to two reasons. First of all, China had a population of well over 1
billion. The average per capita resource endowment was dwarfed by that enjoyed by the
developing ASEAN countries, and was a far cry from that of the United States,
Australia and the Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries.
The second reason was the sharp increase in demand for such resources caused by
China's own programme of economic modernisation. In fact, the shortage of both basic
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raw materials and energy was deemed as the major obstacle for China's economic
growth. The over-heated economic growth that China achieved during the first years of
the reform forced a huge reduction in the export of such natural resources, which were
shifted from export to meeting domestic demands. 17 The rapid growth of China's
economy resulted in continuous decrease in the export of natural resources. It was after
1985 when the export pattern of relying heavily on resources began to change. Oil and a
small number of other resource-based products under tight control of the central state
planning and trade apparatus ceased to be significant sources of export growth. The
commodity composition of China's exports began to change in ways that suggested that
the composition of exports entered a period of transition. For instance, the export of
fossil fuels dropped from 26% of China's total export to 11.5% between 1985 and
1987. 18 By 1992, the export of oil and related products dropped to 21.51 million tons
from the all time high of 36.24 million tons in 1985.19
Though the strategy to exchange advanced foreign technologies and badly needed
foreign exchange with natural resources was abandoned, Deng Xiaoping and his
supporters did not stop pursuing an export-oriented strategy for China's economic
development. They gradually came to realise that China's huge population could be
turned from a burden into an asset. The abundant cheap labour resource and China's
industrial foundation could help increase the level of economic cooperation between
China and both the advanced nations and the NIEs in the Asia-Pacific region. This was
because, as the Chinese leadership believed, there existed a high level of
complementarity between China and its Asia-Pacific neighbours.20
The Chinese leadership's policy advisors and other scholars argued that, as a new
industrial revolution characterised by a new round of technological revolution unfolded,
developed countries would shift at least some of their productive activities, particularly
labour-intensive manufacture, to developing countries. They further argued that there
existed in the Asia-Pacific region such an economic relation of cross-nation transfer of
manufacturing activities between not only developed and developing countries, but also
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between the NIEs and countries like China and the ASEAN developing countries. This
could be highly useful to China.2I
China's cheap labour and level of industrialisation were believed by the Chinese
leadership to be capable of making China an attractive destination of manufacturing
activities shifted from both the developed and the NIE countries, and also turning China
into a competitive exporter of labour-intensive manufactures with low technology
content, in which neither the Asia-Pacific developed countries nor the NIE,s enjoyed
much comparative advantage any longer. To develop closer economic relations with its
Asia-Pacific neighbours was therefore the natural development of the above perception
of the Chinese leadership about China's economic position in the Asia-Pacific region
and about the direction of China's opening to the outside world. Due to the above
changes in the policy perception of Chinese leaders, the strategy to bring about
economic modernisation in China shifted from simply transplanting advanced foreign
means of production to China through selling resources to ever wider economic
cooperation with the outside world.
Beginning in the middle of 1980s, Chinese leaders repeatedly and highly
emphasised the importance to expand China's external economic relations. The then
Communist Party General Secretary, Hu Yaobang, urged party and government
officials to take advantage of the existing domestic and external resources as well as of
the two markets, domestic and external. Hu also told these officials to learn to master
two abilities, the ability to administrate the domestic economic work and the ability to
administrate the external economic work. 22 At the same time, Premier Zhao Ziyang also
made his contribution towards the process of linking the Chinese economy with the
world economy. Back in 1985, Zhao made the statement that "the only rational choice
of our times is to maintain lasting peace, to develop international cooperation and
promote co-prosperity."23 Zhao further elaborated his idea of co-prosperity in his
Government Work Report to the Fourth Plenary Session of the National People's
Congress in 1986.
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There were two reasons for Zhao's statement of co-prosperity. First of all, China
was forced to accept the fact that no socialist country around the world had managed to
surpass the capitalist countries in the development of productive forces. This made them
realise that socialist countries should not and could not cut themselves off from the rest
of the world economy, which happened to be dominated by the developed capitalist
countries. "This fact made people consider and accept the necessity to develop mutually
relying economic relations between countries of different social systems, in order to
explore better methods to develop each others' economies." 24 Second, the Chinese
government realised that the success of its modernisation programme would be severely
delayed if China remained an isolated country, with the outside world kept at an arm's
length. China needed to start urgently cultivating better economic relations with many
countries in order to turn the international market into one of the key driving forces for
the development of China's economy.
The significance of such statements made by top Chinese leaders lay in the fact that
they not only removed political obstacles on China's way to open up to the outside
world, concepts and values were also modified, and restrictions on methods of
exchange with foreign countries, especially developed capitalist countries, were cut
down. For instance, the purpose and value of foreign trade and foreign economic
relations changed. During the thirty years between 1949 and 1979, the emphasis of
foreign trade was placed on the satisfaction of the trading countries' shortage or needs,
that is, China would only sell to a country what it did not have or did not have enough
of. At the same time, China would only import what it did not have or did not have
enough of. Such a principle not only restricted the scope of China's foreign trade but
also shielded Chinese industries from foreign competition. This was gradually replaced
by the principles of importing what China could not produce, or could not produce most
efficiently and the realisation of better and bigger values for products exported.
International trade became the means to increase the value of Chinese manufactures. "As
a result, foreign trade and economic relations have been turned into methods to take full
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advantage of China's abundant labour resources and to improve the positive function of
the economy."2-5
Similar changes occurred also in other aspects of China's foreign economic
relations. The most significant area was the various approaches of introduction of
foreign capital, technologies and management. Loans were obtained from foreign
governments, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and Asian
Development Bank (ADB), UN, and foreign commercial banks and other financial
institutions. Compensatory trade and processing industries were developed to diversify
the ways that foreign capital and technologies were brought into China. The changed
attitudes towards the outside world knocked down the barriers that the Chinese had put
up themselves in the development of its external economic relations. The emphasis of
the value and function of foreign trade and other forms of exchange with other countries
increased the importance and significance of those countries which were able and
willing to cooperate with China through either making investments in China or
transferring technologies to China.
Clearly China received benefits from the expansion of trade and other economic
exchanges with its main economic partners. Foreign trade had indeed become one of the
most important forces driving forward China's economy. According to figures given in
the 1991-1992 Chinese Economic White Paper edited by Ma Hong and Sun Shangqing,
external demands generated through export accounted for around 15.9% of the total
social demand26 of that year.27
 The growth in export took up an even larger share of the
growth in the gross social demand. "The significant changes in the position of both
import and export in the national economy indicates that the operation of our country's
economy has undergone historic transformations. Our economic system is rapidly
becoming an open system. External factors are playing roles of fundamental importance
in the economic development... The function of foreign trade is strengthening in the
balance of gross value of the economy and in the balance of the economic structure.
Furthermore, it now constitutes one of the highly important variables in macro
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economic decisions."28 Table One illustrates the importance of export for the growth of
the production of China's key industrial manufactures. It shows that those products
with higher technological contents enjoys a higher export percentage.
Table One Key Industrial Products' Rate of Dependence on Export =$
million
Products	 Export Value	 Export Per Centage in Gross Production
Cotton Yarn
	
460	 4.16
Cotton Cloth	 1739	 13.55
Cement	 443	 4.33
Rolled Steel	 875	 4.68
Television
	
560	 24.30
Coloured Television	 415	 21.80
Bicycles	 358	 20.11
Washing Machine	 4.80
Refrigerator	 6.64
Sodium Carbonate	 3.51
Motor Vehicle	 1.63
Source: Ma Hong and Sun Shangqing, ed. Jingji Baipi Shu (Economic White Paper),
Beijing, China Development Press, June 1992. Figures for washing machine and
refrigerator are those of January to November 1991. The rest are for the whole year of
1991.
Changes in the Chinese government's approach to economic modernisation
indicates that Chinese leaders and their policy advisors accepted the fact that the level of
China's comprehensive national strength could not be rapidly raised by simply
transplanting advanced foreign technology and equipment from developed countries
"bartered" with China's natural resources. Only more extensive economic cooperation
with other countries, particularly with those that could provide China with investments
and technologies that would help increase China's export of industrial manufactures
with ever higher technology content, could put China on the right track to
modernisation. Such changes in the perceptions of the Chinese leadership increased the
importance of those countries that fitted into this category.
4. 1. B. China's Trade Relations with Its Main Asia-Pacific Neighbours
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Since China's export-oriented strategy for economic development shifted its
emphasis onto export of manufactured products produced with technologies and capital
introduced from other countries, two types of countries became, naturally, highly
important in the development of China's external economic relations. One group were
those that could transfer the much needed capital and those technologies that would be
helpful in utilising China's abundant, relatively low-skilled labour force and China's
own industrial capacity. The other group were those in which Chinese industrial
manufactures would find a ready market, from which China would be able to obtain
foreign exchange to finance further industrialisation. The following will analyse, in
accordance with the above two criteria, China's motive to join the other Asia-Pacific -
countries in the process of building economic cooperation by looking at the
development of China's economic relations with the Asia-Pacific region and the Chinese
analysis of its position in the infra-regional pattern of labour division.
First of all, the importance of the Asia-Pacific region as China's trade partner and
source of investment and technology transfer will be examined. Tables two, three and
four compare in terms of trade percentage the importance of China's ten most important
trade partners over a period of ten years. As these tables show, the Asia-Pacific region
and EU were China's most important trade destinations ever since the beginning of
1980s. But it was the former that had been the most important. This is shown by both
the number of key trade partners and the volume and quality of trade.
These tables also show that Asia-Pacific region's importance grew even further
after China adopted a strategy based on the export of manufactures to drive its economic
growth. Back in 1970s, Asia-Pacific region was already China's most important trading
region. Japan was in the dominant position. The volume of China's trade with Japan
alone was higher than that with the EEC.29 Into the 1990s, the economic importance of
the Asia-Pacific region increased steadily. In 1992 when China became the world's 11th
largest trading nation, its volume of foreign trade reached $165,600 million. China's
trade with the Asia-Pacific countries accounted for over 70% of the tota1. 30
 While Japan
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retained its importance, China's foreign trade was no longer dominated by that with
Japan. The importance of such countries as the United States, Hong Kong and the other
NIEs grew further. What these tables also show is that China's trade with the western
European countries remained at roughly the same level. The only difference is that
different countries were among China's top ten trade partners at different times.
China' Key Exports and Their Destinations between 1981--1989
Table Two: China's Top Ten Trade Partners in 1981
Countries Position Share of Total
Im. & Ex. (%)
Share of Import
(%)
Share of Export
(%)
Japan 1 25.4 22.1 28.6
I-1K & Macao 2 15.8 25.8 5.8
US 3 14.3 7.0 21.6
F. Germany 4	 • 5.0 3.9 6.2
Canada 5 3.1 0.8 5.4
Australia 6 2.3 1.1 3.4
Romania 7 2.0 1.7 2.3
Singapore 8 1.8 3.1 0.5
France 9 1.6 1.3 1.8
G Britain 10 1.5 1.9 1.1
Table Three: China's Top Ten Trade Partners in 1985
Countries Position Share of Total
Im. & Ex. (%)
Share of Import
(%)
Share of Export
(%)
Japan 1 30.4 22.3 35.6
HK & Macao 2 17.2 26.3 11.4
US 3 10.7 8.6 12.0
F. Germany 4 4•5 2.7 5.7
Singapore 5 3.3 7.6 0.6
Soviet Union 6 2.8 3.6 2.3
Brazil 7 2.0 1.6 2.3
Canada 8 2.0 0.9 2.7
Australia 9 1.9 0.7 2.7
G Britain 10 1.6 1.3 1.8
Table Four: China's Top Ten Trade Partners in 1989
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Countries Position Share of Total Share of Import Share of Export
Im. & Ex. (%) (%) (%)
HK & Macao 1 30.8 41.7 21.2
Japan 2 16.9 15.9 17.8
US 3 11.0 8.4 13.3
F. Germany 4 4.5 3.1 5.7
Soviet Union 5 3.6 3.5 3.6
Singapore 6 2.9 3.2 2.5
Italy 7 2.3 1.4 3.1
France 8 1.7 1.0 2.4
Australia 9 1.7 0.8 2.5
G Britain 10 1.5 1.2 1.8
Sources: Yang Deming etc., ed. Guoji Jingji yu Zhongguo Duiwai Jingji Guanxi
1991---1992 (International Economy and China's External Economic Relations 1991-
--1992)
The Asia-Pacific's importance was also growing along with the general trend of
economic development in this region. In addition to such developed countries as Japan
and the United States, the rest of East Asian was in fact also looked upon as important
export markets by China. In Chinese terms, East Asia included both the NIEs and
ASEAN developing countries, which are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Thailand. These countries were regarded as trading partners with historical and
traditional importance. "Judging from the present trend of development, the position of
the four East Asian 'small tigers' in China's external economic relations are rising
continuously. The importance of the four ASEAN developing countries for China's
foreign trade is also on the increase. Economic cooperation between these countries and
regions and China is set to grow further."31
What is also made clear by Tables Two, Three and Four is that it was the member
countries of APEC that were China's most important trade partners, if a closer look is
taken at the significance of the individual countries as China's trade partners. First, let
us have a look at the NIEs. Hong Kong was traditionally the most important trade
window for China. "Among the Asian Tigers, Hong Kong's position in China's
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external economic and trade relations is extremely important."32 During the first ten
years of China's opening to the outside world between 1979 and 1989, the volume of
trade between China and Hong Kong grew uninterruptedly from 17,050 million Hong
Kong dollars to HK$ 343,440 million. 33 The annual rate of increase was continuously
as high as 35%. By 1990, China and Hong Kong were the largest trading partners for
each other. Trade between them were by and large balanced.
Hong Kong was an important trade partner not only in quantity terms. The content
of trade also changed rapidly. Among China's exports to Hong Kong, processed
products, industrial products and machinery became the main exports replacing food
and primary products. By 1989, the export of such products from China to Hong Kong
accounted for around 80% of the total export from China to Hong Kong. Such a trade
pattern between China and Hong Kong was obviously in line with China's intention to
increase value-added exports, as explained earlier in this section.34
Hong Kong was also an extremely important entroport for China's external trade,
especially with Taiwan. This reduced the gap in trade across the Taiwan Strait. And
such reduction accelerated beginning in 1979, when both sides took steps to facilitate
contacts.35 This pushed forward the economic and trade relations between the Mainland
and Taiwan. As it is indicated by Table Five, trade volume went up by almost 50 times
between 1979 and 1989 from $70 million to $3,483 million. The Mainland became
Taiwan's fifth largest trade partner while Taiwan was the Mainland's sixth. In 1992,
trade between Mainland China and Taiwan grew further to reach $6,570 million. Trade
between China and both South Korea and Singapore also witnessed strong growth. The
volume of trade had reached $3,000 million even before diplomatic relations were set
up. The normalisation of the political relations between China and South Korea greatly
aided trade between these two countries. Sino-South Korean trade reached $5,070
million in 1992. With Singapore, China maintained a favourable balance of trade. In
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1989, trade between the two countries reached $3,200 million. China's export to
Singapore was $1,700 million while import was $1,500 million.36
The developing ASEAN countries were another significant group of trade partners
for China. Beginning in the second half of the 1980s, trade between China and these
countries increased by large volumes year by year. Between 1986 and 1987, trade
increased by 30.3%, followed by 26.7% in 1988 and 11.5% in 1989. The three years'
total trade reached $6,450 million. China sustained an unfavourable balance of trade
with the ASEAN developing countries. During the three years between 1986 and 1989,
China exported $2,910 million worth of goods to these countries and imported $3,540
million worth of goods from them. 37 China found in these countries an important
market for its industrial goods. Demands for China's electronic and machinery products
and light industrial products .had grown dramatically. China's imports from these
countries were composed mainly of raw materials such as rubber, timber, plywood,
coconut oil and palm oil.
Table Five: Entrepot Trade With Taiwan Through Hong Kong =$100 m
Year	 Total	 Export	 Import
1979 0.77 0.56 0.21
1980 3.11 0.76 2.35
1981 4.59 0.75 3.84
1982 2.78 0.84 1.94
1983 2.48 0.90 1.58
1984 5.53 1.28 4.25
1985 11.01 1.16 8.11
1986 9.35 1.44 8.11
1987 15.16 2.89 12.27
1988 27.21 4.79 22.42
1989 34.84 5.87 28.87
1990 40.43 7.65 32.78
Sources: Yang Deming etc., ed. Guoji Jingji yu Zhongguo Duiwai Jingji Guanxi
1991---1992
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Among the developed countries both in and outside the Asia-Pacific region, China
found in Japan and the United States, two of the most important members of APEC, its
most important trade partners. According to figures published in China's Foreign Trade
Yearbook 1992, Japan and the United States ranked as China's second and third largest
trade partners. In 1989, China's total volume of trade with Japan was $19,660 million.
Trade between China and the United States reached $11,770 million in 1990. The
volumes of China's trade with these two countries reached $25,380 million and
$17,490 million respectively in 1992. Should the volume of indirect trade between
China and these two countries through Hong Kong be taken into consideration, the
respective volumes should be much bigger.38
Trade between China and Japan was of great significance in China's relations with
Japan. The improvement in the two countries' political relationship since 1980 greatly
eased trade and other economic exchanges. It was back in 1981 when the volume of
trade between the two countries exceeded $10,000 million. In 1984, China became
Japan's fourth largest trade partner, and in the following year China rose to the second
place. Japan was one of the important sources for China's import. It can be seen from
Table Eight that, since 1979, Japan's export to China consistently accounted for over
20% of China's import, some times even as high as over 30%.
Table Six China's Import Dependence on Japan	 = $/m
Year	 China's Total Import	 Import from Japan	 Dependence Rate %
1979 15,675	 3,699 24
1989 19,550	 5,078 26
1981 19,482	 5,095 26
1982 17,478	 3.511 20
1983 18,530	 4,912 27
1984 25,356	 7,374 29
1985 34,331	 10,830 32
1986 33,083	 9,400 29
1987 33,399	 7,244 22
1988 39,850	 7,339 18
1989 39,134	 6,516 17
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Source: Yang Deming etc., ed. Guoji Jingji yu Zhongguo Duiwai Jingji Guanxi 1991-
--1992.
Similar to the pattern of trade between Japan and other developing countries, trade
between China and Japan was composed by and large with export of raw materials and
low value-added products from China to Japan and high value-added industrial products
from Japan to China.39 China exported roughly 2,000 items to Japan with 11 items'
valued at over $100 million, which included oil, oil products, marine products,
garments, non-ferrous metals, cotton, cloth, coal, corn, vegetables and villus. In some
years between 1988 and 1992, China enjoyed a favourable balance of trade. But this
happened largely due to reduction of imports from Japan and Japanese restriction of
export of certain high-tech equipment.40
China's trade with the United States carried far more significance and importance
for China than that with Japan. Though the United States was only China's third largest
trade partner after Hong Kong and Japan, yet China had managed to maintain a
substantially favourable balance of trade with the US for a long time. According to
China's Foreign Trade Yearbook 1992, China came to enjoy the second largest surplus
in trade with the United States after Japan in 1991. Such favourable balance of trade
helped maintain and increase China's foreign currency reserve, which was considered
to be of fundamental importance by the Chinese government. Trade between China and
US was relatively small before the establishment of diplomatic relations between the
two countries. In 1978, one year before the establishment of diplomatic relations, Sino-
US trade was only $1,000 million. The establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979
helped increase the volume of trade over two times to $2,450 million. According to
figures released by China's Customs, Sino-American trade reached $11,770 m in 1990.
But according to US Customs' statistics which took into account re-export from Hong
Kong, Sino-American trade in 1990 was $20,031 million, seven times higher than that
in 1979.41
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As shown by the following figures, China's share of the US market for certain
labour-intensive products was also quite substantial. China supplied half of the toys and
1/4 of the cloth sold on the US market. About 14% of US garment import came from
China. The content of China's export to the US had also been shifting towards high
value-added products. The percentage of coloured television and machinery had been
increasing. China's import from the US had been mainly agricultural products and
chemical raw materials.42
In addition to trade, the Asia-Pacific region was equally important for China as a
significant source of technology and capital. Foreign direct investment (FDI) occupied
one of the most significant places in China's export-oriented strategy for economic
development. The year 1992 was also important in terms of the amount of foreign
investment that China contracted in that year. Until the end of June 1992, the total
contracted foreign direct investment that China had obtained during the 14 year period
between 1979 and 1992 was $169,216 million. Yet for six months until the end of June
1992 alone, the total amount of contracted foreign investment stood at $58,100 million,
out of which $54,200 million, 93%, was invested or committed by APEC member
countries.43
Similar to the order of China's trade partners, Hong Kong, Japan and the United
States had been the most important sources of foreign investment in China. Direct
investment from Hong Kong accounted for over 60% of the total foreign investment
that China had introduced by the end of the 1980s. Between 1984 and 1990, in only
one year did Hong Kong's share in China's total realised FDI fall below 50 per cent,
and during 1987 - 89, the figure was close to two-thirds. More remarkable still,
virtually all the open economic zones shared in the pre-eminent role of Hong Kong.
Second in importance was Japan. Its share of China's overall FDI intake had, however,
never been as substantial as that from Hong Kong (in 1989 and 1990, it reached 11 and
13 per cent); nor had that of the United States, which ranked third, closely behind
Japan. However, large amount of Japanese and US capital had come into China through
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Hong Kong. And such capital was calculated as investment made by Hong Kong.
Despite of this, Hong Kong was undoubtedly China's largest FIN source. Investment
from Hong Kong were concentrated in labour-intensive processing industries.44
This pattern goes for investment from Taiwan as well. Taiwan perhaps learnt the
most important lesson from Hong Kong's involvement in making investments inside
the Chinese mainland. Admittedly, Taiwan does not enjoy Hong Kong's benefit of a
direct rail link with China. But the distance across the Taiwan Strait to Fujian, China's
province directly cross from Taiwan, is hardly any longer than that between Hong
Kong and Guangzhou, Guangdong provincial capital. Investment from Taiwan
experienced rapid expansion since 1987, the year when the Taiwan authorities removed
the restriction for Taiwan people to visit the Mainland. The year 1988 saw the amount
of investment increase by over $3,300 million. It increased again in . the following year
by another $600 million, although because of strict bans on direct commercial,
navigational and postal links with the Mainland, such progress had only been possible
through cumbersome connections in third countries (above all, Hong Kong). Though
the Chinese Statistical Yearbook did not contain a separate entry for investment from
Taiwan, but quasi-official accounting in 1992 showed that Taiwan was the fourth
largest investor in China. 45
 In the 1990s, South Korea and Singapore also became
significant countries making investment in China.46
Japan and the United States were also important sources of foreign capital and
technology transfer for China. As far as Japan was concerned, the most important was
governmental loans lent to China. Among the 18 foreign governments which had lent
loans to China, Japanese governmental loans were the most important. This was in
terms of both the contracted quantity and the amount actually used. The other most
important characteristic of Japanese governmental loans favourable to China was the
lack of preconditions. For example, the Japanese government started lending another
100,000 million Yen loan to China in 1987. The use of this loan was left to be decided
by the Chinese government. Among the 18 foreign governments that had offered loans
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to China, Japan's and Kuwait's were the only governments which did not impose the
condition that loans must be used to purchase goods from the lending country.47
Compared with China's share of the US import market, American investment and
technology transfer in China were much dwarfed. But they were highly important. Back
in 1979, the United States made no investment in China. By 1990, American
investment was involved in 1,185 projects, with a contracted value of $4,315 million.
Large number of agreements for technology transfer had been singed as well. In the ten
years between 1979 and 1989, 814 contracts and agreements were signed, with a total
value of $3,250 million. Sino-US technical cooperation covered such areas as
aerospace, aviation, electronics and off-shore oil exploration. Such high-tech
cooperation was certainly significant in raising China's own level of technology. Sino-
American co-operation, in these fields was even taken by the Chinese government as
evidences of China's capability to cooperate with the NIEs in high-tech fields.'8
Obviously, the Asia-Pacific countries, especially the APEC member countries, carry
the most weight in China's foreign economic relations. Their importance is found in
them being both China's most important trade partners and largest sources of foreign
direct investment. What is more, their importance is growing. In order to secure the
success of their strategy of using foreign trade and foreign investments as one of the
engines pulling Chinese economic growth, the Chinese government will certainly
continue to attach great importance to China's economic relations with these countries.
Therefore, any form of trade and economic cooperation and integration in this region
will be taken seriously in China, as it can have serious implications for China.
4. 1. C. A Favourable Pattern of Division of Labour
It is certainly true that, as markets and sources of investment and technology,
China's Asia-Pacific neighbours figured prominently in its foreign economic relations.
But It seems that the Chinese government's intention to expand China economic
relations with these countries did not stop at trade with and the introduction of
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investments and technology from them. What the Chinese government wanted was
close link of China's economy with that of the Asia-Pacific region, and through this
region with that of the rest of the world. 49 They believed the pattern of the emerging
intra-regional division of labour in this region was favourable to their intention. The
Chinese analysis of China's position in the pattern of division of labour in the Asia-
Pacific region was even more revealing as far as China's economic motive for
participating in the APEC process is concerned.
Chinese economists argued and convinced the Chinese leadership that China's
opening to the outside world should not be limited to increased foreign trade and foreign
investment. China should turn its economy into a harmonious part of the world
economy. The so-called "Coastal Development Strategy" was the most important part of
the programme adopted under Zhao Ziyang's premiership to strengthen China's
economy with those of the Asia-Pacific region.50 The idea of this programme was to
gradually tie China's economy with that of the Asia-Pacific region so that the Chinese
economy would not only be a part of the world economy but also benefit from the
opportunities offered by the rest of the world. The way to achieve this was to let China
become a part of the production process supported by trans-national investment and
shift of productive activities. Chinese economists argued that the Asia-Pacific region
offered the best chance to do so.51
The reason that the Chinese government adopted this approach to develop China's
economy was that they were convinced by the Chinese economists that, in the Asia-
Pacific region, countries were at different stages of development. Such differences had
given rise to different advantages that these countries enjoyed in certain manufactures.
And their different advantages helped these countries settle into a pattern of intra-
regional division of labour, into which, the Chinese believed, China could easily fit.
The Chinese analysis of the existing pattern of regional division of labour was quite
similar to that made by other analysts in this region. 52
 According to their analysis which
was based on the stages of development and the export content of the Asia-Pacific
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countries, at the top of this strata were the United States and Japan, who, back in the
1980s, had entered the stage in which economic development was led by the satisfaction
of their domestic markets. Their industrial composition was mainly featured by their
high value-added and technology- and capital-intensive manufactures such as electronic
products, machinery and services. Their exports were made up mainly with both
finished high-tech products, technology and capital. Their importance was also found in
their ability to absorb exports from developing countries, while transferring capital and
technology and capital goods to these countries, including China.
The second tier economies were the NIEs, namely the four small East Asian
Tigers. These were export-oriented economies. Their industrial composition included
mainly labour- and capital-intensive industries. But they already started shifting towards
technology- and capital-intensive industries. They were also becoming sources of
investments. 53 The Asia-Pacific developing countries, with the ASEAN developing
countries in particular, formed another tier. Their economies were in the transitional
period to become export-oriented. Their comparative advantages were found in their
resources and the supply of relatively cheap labour. China regarded itself as a third tier
country between the NIEs and the ASEAN developing countries. "Its level of
development is slightly lower than the NIEs but higher than the ASEAN and other
developing countries in this region."54 Tables Seven and Eight illustrate the levels of
comparative advantage of these countries as perceived by Chinese analysts.
Table Seven: Asia-Pacific Countries' Comparative Advantages: Country-wise
Market Resources Capital Capital
Goods
Technolo
gY
Labour
US 4 3 4 3 4 1
Japan 3 1 4 4 4 1
NIEs 2 1 1 2 2 2
ASEAN 2 3 1 1 1 3
China 2 2 1 1 1 4
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Such a pattern of division of labour was, as perceived by Chinese leaders and their
policy advisers, favourable for China. It made China's opening to the outside world
easier. 55 They argued that China was in a strong position to conduct co-operation with
practically all of the Asia-Pacific countries. This was because China had the kind of
labour resources and level of technology that these countries would find attractive.
China could be the labour-intensive production base for the developed countries, whose
level of development would force them to turn their attention to countries like China for
cheap labour. The NIEs who had started shifting towards a higher technological level
would find in China the kind technologies that were useful for them. Even the ASEAN
countries were not seen as eternal competitors.56
Table Eight: Asia-Pacific Countries' Comparative Advantages: Industry-wise
agriculture Resource Textile Intermediate Goods
(Iron & Steel, etc.)
Machine Electronics Services
US 4 4 1 4 1 3 4 4
Japan 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 3
NIEs 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 2
ASEAN 2 3 4 2 1 1 1 1
China 2 3 4 1 2 1 1
Note: Degree of importance: 1 to 4 upwards, that is if the importance of a country s market is 4, then
this country's comparative advantage lies in it being an important export market for developing
countries. China's importance lies in its inexhaustible source of labour.
Source: Fang Sheng, ed. Zouxiang Katfang de Zhongguo Jingji--Lilun, Moshi, Luxian (An Opening
Chinese Economy---Theory, Model and Line)
This is because they saw the comparative advantages of the Asia-Pacific countries
as dynamic, they were all moving in the direction of higher level of comparative
advantages. "In the process of development of the international economy, a structure of
international division of labour with clearly delineated levels and strong compatibility
has gradually emerged among the countries and regions of the Asia-Pacific region.
There also is a situation in which nations in this region are transferring some of their
industries to other countries."57
 "Such a pattern of division of labour with different tiers
generates its inherent dynamics. Such dynamics will continuously raise the level of
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industrialisation of the countries which take part in this division. This will help push
forward the economic development in this region and sustain the strong momentum
long into the future."58
Chinese analysts believed that the strategy to turn at least China's coastal areas into
a huge processing plant was highly compatible with the dynamic trend of industrial
development in the Asia-Pacific region. This is because they saw that the industrial
composition in China's Asia-Pacific neighbours, especially in the NIE,s, had started and
would continue to upgrade beyond the end of this century. 59 In time, a new pattern of
division of labour would emerge. 60 By the year 2000, Chinese analysts argued, Japan
and the United States would remain as the main exporters of technology- and capital-
intensive manufactures. But over the whole decade of the 1990s, Japan would reduce
substantially the export of labour-intensive products with low technology content. The
US would continue to open its market to labour-intensive products with high
technological contents. Such a trend would benefit China's need for technologies and
investment. In the meantime, the NIEs, especially South Korea and Taiwan, would
move further in the direction of technology and capital-intensive manufactures while
phasing out their labour-intensive manufactures.61
As a result, Chinese analysts held that trade in technology- and capital-intensive
manufactures among Japan, US, South Korea and Taiwan would see rapid expansion
in the 90s. They predicted that the United States would maintain its advantageous
position as an exporter of natural resources and technology-intensive manufactures.
Japan would become a major economic power focused on manufacturing technology-
and capital-intensive products. South Korea would become an important exporter of
heavy and chemical industrial products. Taiwan would keep its emphasis on the
development of both machinery and transport equipment as well as textile and light
industries. Hong Kong and Singapore would continue to develop their traditional light
and electronic industries.62
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As for China, the overall trend of its export throughout the decade of 1990s was to
rely heavily on its low-technology, labour-intensive industries, while speeding up the
expansion of the export of labour-intensive manufactures with higher technological
contents. Following the direction of change in the pattern of world trade, the Chinese
economists argued, the market of primary products would go down further as the
market of finished industrial products would go up. Among such manufactures, the
export of miscellaneous products, such as garments, shoes, special instruments, dodo,
etc., and basic manufactures, such as yarns, textile products, rubber products and
paper, steel and other non ferrous metals would continue to grow. As its
competitiveness in these manufactures rose on the international market, China would
export more of both miscellaneous and basic industrial products to the Asian NIEs and
more basic industrial products to Japan.63
Yet China needed to introduce more investment and technologies to expand its
capability as a main exporter of such products. The Chinese believed that their needs for
investment and technologies could be satisfied by developing stronger economic
relations with the Asia-Pacific countries. 64 This is largely because they believed that the
inefficient industries in both the developed and NIB countries were in fact anxiously
looking for cheaper labour to maintain their competitive edge. The NIEs, who were
considered to be the most anxious to downgrade their old industries, were situated
strategically along China's coast-lines. They were thought to be considering China as
the natural destination for the shift of their investments in labour-intensive industries.
For instance, the South Korean government's plan to develop the western part of
South Korea attracted the attention of Chinese academics and government officials.
They held that this plan had two main purposes. One was to develop South Korea's
western region, which were neglected as a result of strategic considerations of the Cold
War Era. The other was South Korea's intention to take advantage of China's Strategy
of Coastal Development. Chinese academics claimed that "major South Korean
corporations' eyes are on China's coastal economic areas while committing themselves
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to the development of the western coastal regions of South Korea. They have all made
strategic arrangements to get into the Chinese market".65
Chinese academics also indicated that they believed South Korea's technologies
were compatible with China's level of development. South Korea was also ready to
phase out a lot of its existing technologies to other countries to make room for its own
technological upgrading. The technologies that Chinese academics regarded as useful
for China included those for garment processing, shoe making, toy making, leather
processing and other light industrial technologies. They argued that China should adopt
such a foreign economic policy towards South Korea to allow it to focus on the
introduction of these South Korean technologies.66
As Chinese discussions showed, Taiwan was also considered as a source of
investments and transfer of suitable manufacturing activities for Mainland China.
Although Taiwanese investments started only a few years ago and tend to be different
from investments by other countries, 67
 Taiwanese investments played a significant role
in promoting China's export. "As most Taiwanese firms in the PRC have very high
export ratios, they play an important part in boosting PRC export. "68 As a result of
such investments from Taiwan, China had even become a main rival for Taiwan in
international trade. For example, in 1991, Taiwan's market share in the United States
rose by only 0.1 per cent from 1990's 4.6 per cent. Mainland China, on the other hand,
closed the gap by increasing its share markedly from 3.1 to 4.0 per cent. In 1992,
China's overall export rose to an all time high of $165,600 million, outstripping
Taiwan's $153,480 million.69
Looking ahead, Chinese economists maintained that political détente between
Taiwan and the Chinese mainland was likely to be reflected soon in the establishment of
more convenient links. This would pave the way for further massive transfer of
Taiwanese capital and production activities, on a scale similar to the expansion of Hong
Kong manufacturing investment in China during the 1980s.70
 Obviously, China's high
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speed of growth in foreign trade could not be attributed to investment from Taiwan
alone or any other single country, yet it does underline the significance that foreign
investments, which looked for and found cheap labour in China, had for China's
economic development.
The above has shown that it is the Chinese government's decision to follow an
export-oriented development strategy, the only viable strategy allowed by China's
economic reality, that had focused China's attention on the Asia-Pacific region. The
most important reason was that the countries of this region were found to be the most
appropriate cooperation partners for China, Since China had to utilise its huge labour
resources to support its export-oriented strategy, it must look for and secure the
necessary capital and technologies to allow it to take advantage of its labour resources.
China also needed to find the market for its exports. This determined that China must
develop close and functional relations with those countries that were able and happy to
meet these requirement. The Asia-Pacific countries, particularly the members of APEC,
were found to be such countries, and therefore its most important partners in pursuing
the export-oriented development strategy. China therefore had every economic reason to
hope to stabilise and strengthen its economic relations with the Asia-Pacific countries
through joining APEC.
4. 2. APEC and A Peaceful International Environment
As Michael Yahuda has argued, the Chinese leadership have always been after a
peaceful international environment, which will allow China to concentrate on internal
economic construction. 71 Hostile international environment was partly blamed for
China's backwardness.72 Since the beginning of 1980s, the pragmatic Chinese
leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping began to re-evaluate China's international
environment. Such re-evaluation led to such a conclusion with regard to China's
security situation, that is, China was no longer confronted with any direct military threat
to its security from the outside world. Nevertheless, substantially reduced military threat
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from other countries did not mean that the Chinese leadership believed that China had
nothing to worry about its international environment. The international sanctions
following the Tian An Men incident convinced them that much was to be done to
consolidate China's improved international environment. To be part of the Asia-Pacific
economic cooperation process was part of that effort.
4. 2. A. Better International Environment
The second-generation Chinese leadership centred on Deng Xiaoping believed that,
after forty-odd years, China's international environment improved substantially. This
judgement was based on two analysis. The first was that on the issue of war and peace.
The second was on China's relations with its neighbours, particularly since the 1980s.
The issue of war and peace had always occupied an important place in China's foreign
policy . thinking. Ever since the founding of the PRC, Mao and other Chinese leaders
maintained that the next world war was inevitable, following Lenin's theory that
imperialism meant war. The escalating arms race between the two super powers since
the late 1960s further strengthened this belief of the Chinese leadership of the Mao era.
The then Chinese leadership's analysis was focused on the relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union. They believed that rivalry was the essence of this
relationship. Such rivalry would sooner or later lead to war. They believed that war
would come sooner rather than later. In the middle of 1970s, Chinese leaders insisted
that the Soviet Union was more likely to start the next world war, because it was on the
offensive while the United States was on the defensive. 73 Prior to the third plenary
session of 11th Party Congress held in winter 1979, all important foreign policy
statements by the party and the government emphatically pointed out that the danger of a
new world war continued to exist and the Chinese people should always maintain their
vigilance and be prepared for war.74
Influenced by such a perception, plus the hostile international environment between
50s and 70s, the PRC adopted self-reliance as the guiding principle for development.
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The government's attention and resources were concentrated on developing powerful
national defence. What was more, there were also forces in the leadership who were
opposed to developing strong economic and trade relations with the capitalist countries.
When China first opened to the outside world in the early 1980s, opposition against the
new policies from the conservatives remained strong. A series of questions were raised
about the plausibility of mixing China's economy with those of the capitalist, and even
worse, the imperialist countries.75
The pragmatic policies initiated by Deng Xiaoping focused China's attention on
internal development Economic construction was regarded as the most important aspect
of such development In his speech at the opening session of the 12th Party Congress,
Deng Xiaoping declared that the decade of 1980s would be an important one in the
history of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese nation. During this decade,
"(E)conomic construction is at the core of ... tasks; it is the basis for the solution of our
external and internal problems." 76 Yet Deng and other Chinese leaders argued that it
was not possible to accomplish rapid economic development if China were to continue
to shut its door to the outside world.
When the policy of opening to outside world began to be implemented, Deng and
his supporters were not sure if the international conditions were appropriate for such a
policy. Since the policy meant to open China's door to a world market dominated by the
capitalist countries,7
 they were concerned whether this would harm China's prospect
to achieve rapid economic development. What they were most worried about was
whether China would be involved in another world war between the super powers.78
Assessment was carried out about the prospect of a new world war. The conclusion
was that war was possible, but only remotely possible. For instance, Deng himself
argued that the possibility for the outbreak of another world war had receded. He wrote
in December 1977, "International situation is good. We are likely to be able to win more
time before the next (world) war starts". Again in March 1980, Deng said, "A calm
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observation of the international situation tells us that it is possible for the next (world)
war to be put off for longer"79 Deng also said, "Over many years, we stressed the
danger of wars. But our stand on this issue is now somewhat modified", "It now seems
that the Third World War will not start in the near future. Although the danger of
another world war still exists, a long period of peace can be obtained".80 Certainly
Deng made these statements to support his idea of opening to the outside world. But
they indicated that the assessment of China's international environment changed.
With the confirmation of Deng's view on the dim prospect of another world war,
the Chinese gave up their traditional conception of the international situation and started
to evaluate from a new angle the contemporary world and the general structure of
relations between the east and the west, particularly the correlation of forces between the
super powers, and between the super powers and the other countries. Their views
changed. The old perception was that the imperialists' armament race would eventually
lead to a war that would engulf the whole world. Their weaponry was also powerful
enough to bring disasters to the people around the world. 81 But the new perception
tended to highlight the restrictiveness of the super powers' military might. The
conclusion drawn from the reassessment was that the two super powers would remain
locked in fierce arms race. War would not break out in the near future since neither
could defeat its opponent and assume a dominant position.82
After the well-known Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Congress and
following the adoption of the new perspectives in evaluating the state of the world
situation, the Chinese leadership went on to modify their stand on the issue of war and
peace. They changed to stress more and more the continuous growth of the forces of
peace around the world. As Deng Xiaoping said in one of his rare interviews with
foreign journalists, the growth of the forces of peace throughout the world and the
weakening of the two super powers had greatly reduced the danger of another world
war. Though it was impossible to rule out completely another world war, the present
situation was more favourable for peace.83
 As the process of opening to the outside
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world progressed, the emphasis was further shifted to the possibility to avoid another
world war. This was proved by what Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said in an interview
with Liaowang [Outlook Weekly] in 1988, "after the third plenary session of the 11th
Party Central Committee, China's view of war and peace was changed according to
-
analysis of the actual state of the international situation. A world war can be prevented,
a long-standing peaceful international environment can be attained."84
The further modification of their views on the issue of war and peace was based on
the following premise. Though the super powers were the only two countries around
the world to have the capacity to wage a world war, they would not do so. This
argument was first of all built on the conclusion that nuclear power could no longer
guarantee either side the ultimate victory in a world war. Instead, nuclear weaponry
constituted a restraint on the super powers. This is because, despite of the fact that they
both had the capacity to destroy each other dozens of times, should a world war be
started, it would definitely escalate to a nuclear war, which would destroy both them.
This was why, according to the explanations of Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese
leaders, war did not break out between the super powers for over forty years.85
Another explanation given by the Chinese leaders about the avoidability of a new
world war was that the world had become more multipolorised and interdependent.
Other powers, like Western Europe, Japan and China, were playing increasingly crucial
roles in the contemporary international affairs. 86 Multipolorisation and interdependence
had forced all countries, including the super powers themselves, to adjust their policies.
The capitalist countries did not necessarily want to start a world war to attain their aims,
because the destructiveness of world wars, especially nuclear wars, would deprive the
original meaning of war, which was, the Chinese believed, to extend the economic
interests of the warring countries. "Hegemonist countries wish to use force to develop
their economy and expand their sphere of influence. Should military actions bring about
burdens too heavy for their economies to bear or damages too severe for both parties to
a war, then they would have second thoughts about world wars."87
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Yet Deng Xiaoping and his followers never ruled out completely the likelihood of
another world war. Their argument continued to be that forces for world peace had
increased substantially, and peace could be preserved for much longer, but the
eradication of the possibility of another world war had to wait until the third world
countries became strong enough to balance off the influences of the super powers. "The
further increase of the forces for world peace has made it possible to avoid the outbreak
of another world war for a long time, and it is likely that world peace can be protected."
"World Wars can be prevented if the forces for peace and the third world countries
grow much stronger." 88 Deng Xiaoping also stressed the point that the purpose to
concentrate all resources on China's economic development was to modernise more
speedily China's defence system.89 It can be seen that Deng Xiaoping and other
Chinese leaders maintained that the likelihood of another world war was much reduced,
yet their view remained that it was impossible to avoid totally another world war.
As far as China's economic development was concerned, this new view point on
the likelihood of a new world war had two meanings. Since the next world war could
be postponed as a result of the growth of the forces for peace, China did not have to
maintain its vigilance by keeping a large army, neither did it have to make sure that its
economic achievements would not be wasted in such a war. Instead, it had a much more
stable and favourable international environment to devote more attention and resources
to economic development. This was the first meaning. The second meaning was that the
possibility to avoid another world war for a long time meant a break for China. It must
take this opportunity to develop its economy much faster in order to be ready for the
next war, since it was not ultimately avoidable. History convinced the Chinese
leadership that it was China's backward and weak economy that had made it the target
of attack by foreign countries. The only way to prevent such attacks was to rapidly raise
the level of China's comprehensive national strength. Therefore, China must, and
could, seize this favourable opportunity offered by history to speed up its economic
development.90
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4. 2. B. More Room to Manoeuvre between the Super Powers
The second element, which made the Chinese leadership feel that China's
international environment had improved enough to allow it to join the APEC process,
was China's increased ability to manoeuvre between the super powers. As history
shows, China was never able to maintain working relations with both the Soviet Union
and the Untied States at the same time. This was said to have made China always over
dependent on either one of them, and restricted China's ability to enjoy more initiatives
vis-a-vis either of the them.91 In order to avoid the situation in which China had to deal
with both super powers from disadvantageous positions, China tried to extricate itself
from the super power rivalry, and assume a more independent position from which she
could reduce pressure from them.92
In his political report to the 12th Party Congress, Hu Yaobang, the then General
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, introduced for first time the concept of an
independent foreign policy. "In the 33 years since the founding of our People's
Republic, we have shown the world by actions that China never attaches itself to any
big powers or group of powers, and never yields to pressure from any big power."93
Deng Xiaoping also discussed the meaning of this policy in his opening speech at the
12th Party Congress: "Independence and self-reliance have always been and will always
be our basic stand... No foreign countries can expect China to be its vassal, nor can it
expect China to accept anything harmful to China's interests." 94 The basic
characteristics of such a policy were: (1) not to rely on any big power or any group of
big powers; never succumb to pressures from any big powers, neither to form alliance
with any of them; (2) independently form China's policies in accordance with the
Chinese government's perception of the state of the international affairs.95
Zhao Ziyang further elaborated the meaning of the independent foreign policy in his
Report on Government Work to the 2ed Plenary of the 6th National People's Congress
in 1984.
187
We adhere to certain principles in managing our relations with both the
United States and the Soviet Union. Neither should we ignore the
improvement of our relations with them because we are opposed to their
hegemonism, nor should we give up our anti-hegemonist stand just because
we want to better our relations with them, nor harm the interests of one of
them simply because we want to develop our relations with the other.96
Hu Yaobang clearly pointed out the intention of this policy in one of his speeches.
He said:
So far as we ourselves are concerned, there are two disadvantages in
developing a relation of alliance with the super powers: first, China wishes to
develop relations and friendly exchanges with all countries of the world. To
enter into alliance with the super powers would hinder, or at least affect, our
effort to make more friends; second, such a relation will prevent us to
sanction their transgressions.97
This development in China's foreign policy made it possible for China to normalise
its relations with the Soviet Union. After almost a decade's effort, China and the Soviet
Union finally normalised their relations with the symbolic meeting between Deng and
Gorbachev in Beijing in May 1989. The normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations did not
occur at the expenses of Sino-US relations. In fact, one of the reasons that Sino-US
relations were not fundamentally disrupted after the Tian An Men incident was that the
US did not want to push China to the Soviet Union.98
As a result, China could for the first time enjoy stable relations with both super
powers. This was obviously the best situation that China could wished for. Though
China's leaning to either the Soviet Union or the United States was the outcome of
perceived threat from one or the other. Yet leaning to one side did not change the fact of
being under threat. The independent foreign policy enabled China to be less threatened
since both super powers would be reluctant to push China to the other side. This
certainly increased China's ability to pursue a foreign policy with more initiative. Such
changes in China's position in the international affairs enabled it to be more relaxed in
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developing relations with both individual countries and international organisations. This
is because the Chinese government did not have to worry about being seen as over-
leaning to either of the super powers, and face more threat from the other.99
4. 2. C. The Best Ever International Conditions
If Beijing felt that its international environment in the 1980s was much less hostile
and dangerous due to the remoteness of another world war and its enhanced ability to
deal with the super powers, then the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War offered China, in the minds of Chinese leaders, "the best ever international
environment since the founding of PRC." The collapse of the Soviet Union was not
perceived as a threat by the Chinese leadership. Rather, it was taken as favourable for
China's drive for modernisation because it allowed China to open up further to take
advantage of the external opportunities for China's economic development. "For the
first time since over one hundred years ago, our country has entered into a situation in
which military confrontations with the United States, Russia and Japan have been
avoided. Relations with neighbouring countries are also at their best through out
modern history. This enables us to focus on reform and opening to the outside world
and modernisation construction. This is a good opportunity in a thousand years".100
Such enthusiasm was based on analysis of the pattern of international relations
emerging in the post-Cold War era. Chinese foreign policy makers believed that, in the
aftermath of the Cold War, a period of adjustment and realignment in the international
relations would follow. 101
 Forces would split and regroup, and new contradictions
would be interwoven with the old, leaving the world still far from stable. Meanwhile,
international economic competition, which would happen mainly among the capitalist
countries, would get ever more fierce, replacing arms race as the main form of rivalry
among the major powers. Contradiction between North and South would also become
more pronounced. Though the world would remain to be a troubled one, yet the
Chinese leadership were more confident about China's security environment than they
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were at any time since the founding of PRC. This was especially true, according to
Chinese leaders, when they looked at China's relations with its neighbours and China's
geopolitical position.
From the strategic point of view, the end of the Cold War removed the most
immediate military threat to China. Since the disappearance of the Soviet Union at the
beginning of 1990s, the likelihood of a military conflict between China and its northern
neighbour dramatically reduced and set the stage for improvements in Sind-Russian
relations. As a result, China did not face any plausible external military threat to its
heartland for the first time in its over 40 year history. In the meantime, the United States
was also scaling down its regional military presence, and the super-power military
confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region was ended. The only possible exception was the
unresolved competition in strategic nuclear weapons. Yet it did not constitute any
immediate threat. 1°2
The situation around China was also seen to be more peaceful since relations with
Vietnam normalised and the possibility of conflict on the Korean Peninsular remained
low. China's relations with the ASEAN countries also made giant steps forward.
Singapore set up diplomatic relations with China after holding up for nearly twenty
years following the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and Indonesia.
Even Japan was not considered an immediate threat since Chinese policy makers
believed that Japan was not yet ready to renounce the well-known Yoshida doctrine
emphasising economic development rather than military build-up. Even Japanese
remilitarisation was considered just one possibility, not an inevitable development.103
China's international environment was substantially improved to allow it to pursue
economic modernisation.104
One other development following the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was for
some time deemed as negative by Chinese leaders, was the uncertain situations in the
former Soviet Republics in Central Asia. Though immediate military threat to China's
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security from its northern neighbour was eliminated, concerns persisted in Beijing about
developments in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Beijing feared that
there would be escalating fighting between and within the Central Asian states that could
spill over into western China. Ultra-nationalism might also affect the Muslim dominated
Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, neighbouring the newly independent Central
Asian countries.
The relations between these former Soviet republics and other Central Asia Muslim
states was another area of concern for the Chinese government They were particularly
worried about a possible bloc of Islamic nations united by Islamic fundamentalism and
armed with nuclear weapons. Chinese specialists on Central Asia warned that the
geographical area occupied by the former Soviet republics in central Asia was the most
uncertain and potentially unstable region in the world. 105 However, this fear abated
once China established diplomatic relations with the Central Asian states.'
Further afield, the United States was no longer viewed as a direct threat either.
Some people pointed to the United States as the main threat, but more disagreed saying
that, although the US. would like to see China peacefully evolve into a capitalist country
and that time and again it showed some tendency to intervene in China's internal affairs,
the US. was too preoccupied with the issues in other parts of the world to have the
capacity or the intention to invade China or subvert its current government. Moreover,
they even argued that the United States was reluctant to see internal turmoil develop in
China, which would definitely disturb the peace and stability of the Asian-Pacific region
and harm the interests of the United States and all of China's neighbouring
countries. 107
One interesting question, discussed by many Chinese specialists in recent years,
was where the main threat to China would come from in the post-Cold War era. Their
research convinced them that none of the former sources of threats, including Russia,
the United States and Japan would pose any immediate threat to China, especially
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China's security. Some researchers put forth a new idea, that is, in the post-Cold War
era, the main threat was not necessarily from a particular country or military invasion.
They suggested that the main threat to China at present might come from multi-level
economic and scientific challenges. 10
Many Chinese specialists believed that the world's technological revolution would
reach new heights by the end of this century or early in the next, resulting in many
breakthroughs in science and technology and promoting the world economy to higher
levels. Every country must meet the challenge in order to raise its status in the twenty-
first century; if China could not meet the challenge by catching up with the new
developments, it would be in an awkward and very difficult situation, because not only
the gap with developed countries would widen, even those countries on the same
economic level would surpass China.
In the meantime, though the Chinese viewed Russia as preoccupied with its own
problems and unable to expand abroad, they did not rule out the eventual economic
reinvigoration of the former Soviet Union, which, they contended, could pose a threat
to Chinese security in several ways. 109 First, greater economic might could underwrite
efforts to realise expansionist political and even military ambitions fuelled by a desire to
restore Russia's status as a global superpower in the next century. Second, if economic
production increased and living standards rose in Russia and the other former Soviet
republics, people in China could demand to take a similar path, placing in jeopardy the
survival of the Chinese Communist regime. Third, an economically rejuvenated Russia
could become a fierce economic competitor in the long run, vying with Beijing for
markets and foreign investment. Some Chinese also pointed to the prospect of the
revival of Russia's "traditional great-nation-chauvinism" in the next century.110
Chinese leaders, officials and intellectuals shared the view that, as long as China
remained economically and technologically backward, it could not fully assume the role
of a major world power that it sought to play. Building a powerful, modern economy
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was viewed as essential to enhance China's "comprehensive national power" and thus
bolster its global and regional standing. Consequently, Beijing's foremost security
objective for the foreseeable future would be to create and sustain an international
environment conducive to the successful execution of China's economic reforms. This
was because increased "comprehensive national strength" was taken as the basis for
both the maintenance of China's long-term security and the survival of the socialist
system.111
Since China's chief foreign policy concern changed from security to rapid
economic development, the kind of international environment required also changed to
one that was "peaceful" and favourable to economic development. Chinese leaders and
academics hoped that this new environment would assist the expansion of foreign trade,
and also make it possible for China to adopt a development strategy that would enable it
to benefit from a world economy that was entering a new era of technological
revolution. Three elements became more important than others in China new
international environment: good economic relations with its main trade partners, stable
and secured access to overseas markets and a growing source of foreign investment and
technology transfer. All of these could be adversely affected by regional economic
cooperation schemes.
As it was shown in the previous chapter, both Chinese leaders and academics
believed that some kind of a regional structure was going to become the dominant
feature in the intra-regional economic and trade relations of the Asia-Pacific region. No
matter what type of structure the Asia-Pacific countries would embrace, it would
certainly carry unwelcome implications for those countries that were not included as
members. As for China, a situation like that would amount to an unfavourable
international environment. One of the purposes to construct regional economic co-
operation was to improve communication between the Asia-Pacific countries through
better information exchanges. Should China be left in the dark, it certainly find itself in
a unfavourable position.
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On the other hand, by being part of this process, China not only could have more
information about its most important trade partners, but also make its opinions and ideas
concerning co-operation known, thereby, influencing the process. This was just what
China had in mind since it joined APEC. In his speech at the 3rd APEC Ministerial
Meeting, Foreign Minster Qian Qichen said that Asia-Pacific economic cooperation
should be informal and open-ended. 112 Though Qian's words echoed the principles laid
down, they carried practical meanings for China. As a developing country, China was
obviously not in the position to enter into any form of discriminative structure, as its
economic system, level of development and market capacity would not allow it to
exchange with its partners the kind of privileges that are involved in a restrictive
arrangement. By making its views known, China could at least try to make the co-
operation process favourable to it.
An even worse scenario that could be avoided by participating in this process was
international isolation. The international sanction imposed on China after the Tian An
Men incident in 1989 brought a great deal of pressure on China. This was certainly
unfavourable for its efforts to deepen the economic and trade relations with the outside
world, particularly the developed countries. To take part in something like APEC could
help China avoid being totally cut off from its most important economic partners. This
is not to say that China believed that it could escape from such sanctions once it became
a member of an international organisation. The importance of APEC was that it allowed
Chinese leaders to have direct contacts with foreign leaders, who could not or would
not have contacts with Chinese leaders otherwise.
This was fully illustrated by the way that the Chinese government treated the
meeting between Chinese President Jiang Zemin and US President Bill Clinton. Despite
of the fact that this meeting took place as part of a multi-lateral function, the official
Chinese press sounded as if it was a bilateral event. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was
also quite explicit about the bilateral meaning of this meeting: "The meeting itself carried
a great deal of importance". 113
 The meeting did lead to normalisation and expansion of
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Sino-US contacts and exchanges. Another illustration was the establishment of
diplomatic relations between China and South Korea, which was assisted by direct
contacts between senior officials of the two countries at APEC meetings.114
As it has been shown above that China believed that its trade and economic
relations with the Asia-Pacific countries were significant elements in the long-lasting
favourable international environment that it had been pursuing. What was regarded as
highly important during the Cold War era, such as the delay of another world war and
the ability to manoeuvre between the super power, were no longer relevant so far as
China's international environment was concerned. Instead, international conditions that
would help speed up China's economic development became the top priority on the
government's foreign policy agenda. In a speech made during his last visit to Southern
China in early 1992, Deng Xiaoping urged Chinese officials to use the favourable
international situation to step up economic development in order to increase China's
comprehensive national strength. 115 In his keynote speech at the informal APEC
Summit in Seattle in November 1993, Chinese President Jiang Zemin declared that
"China is first and foremost open towards the Asia-Pacific region". 116 This is because
the region carries huge importance for China's externally oriented development strategy.
China's decision to join APEC was therefore to ensure that it continued to enjoy a
favourable international environment in a dramatically changed post-Cold War world.
4. 3. APEC and China's Reunification
As it war argued in the previous sections, the PRC's involvement in the process to
bring about economic cooperation was its natural foreign policy choice as a result of its
pursuit of faster economic growth. However, what makes things equally interesting for
students of Chinese foreign policy is also the PRC's acceptance of Taiwan's APEC
membership. 117 It is a widely known position of the Chinese government that Taiwan
is an inalienable part of China, and that all countries or inter-governmental
organisations, who recognise the People's Republic of China (PRC) as China's
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legitimate government, must cut off any official relations with Taiwan. The Chinese
government has always been steadfast on this point.118
Why, then, did the Chinese government choose to ignore the implication of the fact
that Taiwan for the first time in twenty years gained the membership of an inter-
governmental organisation along side the PRC? Did the fact the Taiwan and the PRC
join this organisation at the same time mean that China changed its mind about Taiwan?
This section will prove that it was the intention of the Chinese government to set up
close economic relations with the APEC countries while preventing Taiwan from
gaining international recognition that had prompted China to sit down with its old
enemy at the meeting table of APEC. It is a measure of active prevention of the Chinese
government to put up with Taiwan's diplomatic gains while maintaining a generally
favourable international environment.
4. 3. A. Taiwan's Campaign for International Recognition
The central issue in contention between the government in Mainland China and the
government on Taiwan since 1949, when the Guo Min Dang (Nationalists) regime was
driven to Taiwan, has been over sovereignty and international recognition, namely,
which regime represented China, and consequently, should be accorded the appropriate
legitimate and official diplomatic status. The PRC since 1949 steadfastly maintained that
it was the legal government of China, that "there is only one China," and that Taiwan
was part of China. For the Republic of China (ROC), a similar line was also followed
in its diplomatic activities. They insisted that the ROC was the sole legitimate
government of China and would cut off official relations with those countries that
recognised the Mainland. The Taiwan authority kept that line even after most of the
countries shifted their diplomatic recognition to the PRC since 1970. This led to
Taiwan's isolation in the international community.
However, the question evolved in recent years to become one of Taiwan's survival
separate international political entity. Though Taiwan was recognised as an
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important economic force internationally, the rapid development of China's economy
and its potential economic power compelled Taiwan to take active actions to avoid total
international oblivion. Split between its desire to break out of isolation and a
commitment to China's reunification, Taipei pursued "substantive" relations with other
nations rather than inflexibly insisted on official diplomatic ties. As far as multilateral
organisations were concerned, Taiwan pursued "dual recognition", that Taiwan and the
Mainland were both represented formally and officially in these organisations.119
Taiwan was engaged in a battle to maintain its position in the international
community since the early 1970s, the decade which saw the Mainland greatly enhance
its international position. The cessation of official relations between Taipei and
Washington in 1979 led to even further decrease in the number of countries that
recognised the ROC on Taiwan and maintained diplomatic relations with it. By 1992,
there were only 24 countries throughout the world maintaining diplomatic relations with
Taiwan. Meanwhile, with the Mainland implementing the policies of economic reform
and opening to the outside world, its growing economic importance led to the
establishment of official ties between the Mainland and such key former allies of Taiwan
as South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Furthermore, more and more Taiwan
businesses turned their attention to the Mainland. 120
Against such a background, Taiwan started a counter offensive. It drastically
changed some of its traditional stances. Internally, Taipei dropped its claims to be the
legitimate government of China. In recent years, no article in the ZYRB actually
challenged the legitimacy of the Beijing government to rule the Chinese mainland, nor
did they directly claim this legitimacy for the Taipei regime. 121 Taiwan also stopped
calling the communist government on the Mainland a bandits regime. Taiwan largely
shelved the question of the rightful ruler of China and instead concentrated on the
legitimacy of the reunification process. ZYRB and certain other Taiwan publications
appealed to certain international precedents and to growing global democratic norms,
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arguing in effect for a kind of procedural legitimacy based implicitly upon the principle
of democratic self-determination. 122
Externally, the Taiwan authorities took a series of initiatives to avoid further
isolation in the international community. The purpose of these initiatives was to shake
off the restrictions that the issue of sovereignty imposed on Taiwan and the limitation of
the fact that most countries with whom Taiwan wished to develop strong economic and
political relations had diplomatically recognised the Mainland authorities. The most
significant change in the Taiwan authorities' position was their acceptance of "dual
recognition", in other words, they stopped insisting that the Republic of China was the
only legitimate government of China, and that no country should have at the same time
official relations with both the Mainland and Taiwan. Taiwan's Foreign Ministry also
started implementing the so called "flexible and pragmatic" foreign policies. The key
feature of such policies was the lack of insistence on official recognition.
In bilateral relations, Taiwan focused its efforts on developing "substantive"
relations through setting up direct official contacts with other countries. Efforts were
made to expand and deepen exchanges in different areas with other countries rather than
on formal diplomatic recognition. Taiwan also expanded its economic relations with
many countries around the world by setting up an International Aid Fund. Taiwan's
senior officials, including its president, managed to visit several countries with no
diplomatic relations with Taiwan under various pretexts. The most illustrating case was
the so called "holiday diplomacy". Taiwan's President Li Tenghui visited Singapore and
Thailand, who have embassies in Beijing, in the name of having a "holiday".
But Taiwan devoted more of its energy to return to multi-lateral organisations, as
individual countries would find the pressure from the Mainland too much to bear. This
was represented by Taiwan's drive to regain its seat in the United Nations. It was back
in June 1991 when Taiwan took the first move to regain its seat in the UN. On 18 of
that month, Taiwan's Legislature, Li Fa Yuan, passed a recommendation made by some
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members of Taiwan's incumbent Guo Min Dang Party that Taiwan should rejoin at a
suitable time the United Nations under the title of Republic of Taiwan. The government
promised to consider this issue with seriousness, instead of brushing it away by
insisting that Taiwan would not try to regain its seat at UN while the PRC was on it.123
In January 1993, Taiwan's Foreign Ministry once again put on its policy agenda
Taiwan's re-entry into the UN. This time it was the Taiwan Administration, rather than
the Legislature, which took the initiative. Along with Taiwan's membership in multi-
lateral international organisations, Taiwan's return under the title of Republic of China
to the UN was declared as one the three key purposes of Taiwan's diplomacy. Li
Tenghui, Taiwan's President, also expressed the wish that Taiwan would apply for re-
entry into the UN in two to three years' time. 124
The Taiwan authorities' stepped-up effort to return to the international community
was also caused by the democratisation process which started after Jiang Ching Guo
decided to remove the ban on political parties and anti-government newspapers in 1987.
This allowed the underground anti-government forces to resurface. The Democratic
Progress Party (DPP), which is now Taiwan's main opposition party, has always
demanded that Taiwan should become independent. 12-5 With the ban on political parties
removed and the development of a genuine election system, the DPP's positions on
Taiwan's international identity subjected the incumbent Guo Min Dang to a huge
amount of pressure. In order to avoid losing touch with the voters, the Taiwan
government changed its strategy on this issue by stepping up its campaign for more
international recognition.126
Taipei certainly realised the significance of the process of setting up economic co-
operation in the Asia-Pacific region for its cause to return to the international stage as a
legitimate and independent entity. As a matter of fact, Taipei had been very active in the
process in its early days. It made an application to participate in PECC at the second
conference back in 1981. It was only the PECC member countries' wish to include both
China and Taiwan and to accept China in precedence of Taiwan that had postponed
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Taiwan's membership. This situation repeated itself when APEC came into being.127
Taiwan's media was also very frank about Taiwan's intention to participate in this
process. For instance, an article carried in the Taiwan government controlled newspaper
Zhongyang Ribao said that membership in APEC would be highly significant for
Taiwan to break the Mainland's efforts to cut it off from the international
community.
4. 3. B. China's Analysis of Taiwan's Intention and Their Reactions
As it was shown in the previous chapter, the Chinese government was actively
making suggestions with regard to the solution of the membership issue after APEC
was set up. The Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen mentioned in a highly important
foreign policy speech that the issue could be resolved by APEC admitting both Hong
Kong and Taiwan as economic regions. 129 This seemed to have laid down the bottom
line for this issue. This is to say that the Chinese government made it clear that this
issue could be resolved only within the framework of not confusing and compromising
China's sovereignty over Taiwan. The reason that China did this was that it realised that
its membership issue was not going to be helped much if it insisted that Taiwan be
excluded from APEC. Hence, China chose to realise its aim of preventing Taiwan from
gaining the international recognition that it wished for by making sure that APEC did
not become the catalyst for it.
As it has been mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the reunification of China
was the third mission that Deng Xiaoping gave the Chinese government. Taiwan's drive
for wider international recognition and participation in international organisations, in
particular the United Nations, made the Chinese government deeply concerned. The
most important reason behind the concern was its implications for the relations across
the Taiwan Strait. They believed that, despite of the fact that the Taiwan-Mainland
relations improved in recent years, the Taiwan authorities' real intention was to turn
Taiwan into an independent state. "What must be made clear is that, at a time when the
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relations across the (Taiwan) Strait is improving and people on both sides of the Strait
are expecting the early reunification of the motherland, the Taiwan authorities' intention •
to return to (the international community) is an outright movement to create 'two
Chinas, or one China, one Taiwan". 130
There were several reasons for the Mainland authorities' concern about Taiwan's
APEC membership and its other efforts to return to the world society. First of all, they
believed that this would prolong or even undermine the process of bringing about
reunification across the Taiwan Strait. They explained that Taiwan's campaign to regain
its UN seat under the title of Republic of China is an attempt to "co-exist with the
People's Republic of China in the international community on an equal footing".131
Such actions meant to lead to situations that would never be accepted by the Mainland
authorities because they would delay the arrival of the time when the Communist Party
on the Mainland and the Guo Min Dang Party in Taiwan would meet to discuss China's
reunification. The end purpose of such Taiwan activities was therefore to bring about a
situation of one country with two regions and dual recognition, which would ultimately
lead to Taiwan's independence. In his letter to the UN Secretary General, Buttros-Gali,
the Chinese UN Ambassador Li Zhaoxing wrote, "The Taiwan authorities have
implemented its "silver-bullet diplomacy" (a euphemism used by Taiwan's own press)
to service its attempt to return to the UN. The real purpose of this scheme is to split
(China), delay and undermine the great cause of the reunification (of China)." 132
The Mainland authorities also believed that it was the Taiwan authorities' deliberate
attempt to break away from China that had caused them to make such big efforts to
regain Taiwan's position in the international community. They pointed to the statements
made by Taiwan's senior officials and senior members of the Guo Min Dang as
evidence that the Taiwan authorities' real intention was to seek dual international
recognition and to create the reality of two Chinas, or one China one Taiwan. For
instance, Renmin Ribao quoted an anonymous Guo Min Dang legislator, "We do want
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to bring about international consensus on the fact that there are two Chinas. In fact, the
government's activities are those guided by a policy of two Chinas." 133
Due to this perception, the Chinese government strongly attacked Taiwan's
movements to seek independence by international recognition. They charged that the
Taiwan authorities, by arguing for dual recognition and the return to the UN, had
moved over to the side of those who openly advocated Taiwan's independence. "Once
this declaration was made, some people wanting independence for Taiwan expressed
their instant approval and their regret that this was not enough. These people want the
Taiwan authorities to make a clear-cut declaration that they will forswear their one-
China policy and adopt that of 'one China one Taiwan'. They said that such policies
will run into further difficulties on the international stage. The only way forward is to
declare one China one Taiwan and to turn Taiwan into an independent state. This
attitude of those wanting independence for Taiwan clearly indicates that the "temporary
two-China policy has taken the Taiwan authorities so far that they have not much
difference with Taiwan's Democratic Progress Party (DPP)." 134
China has also attacked those countries which sponsored Taiwan's return to the
UN. These countries were accused of seriously violating China's sovereignty and
rudely interfering in China's domestic affairs by putting forward the demand to include
the discussion of Taiwan's return on the agenda of UN General Assemblies. Their
activities were said to have violated the purpose and principles laid down in the UN
Charter on one hand, and UN resolution 2758 adopted at the 26th UN General
Assembly on the other. The Chinese argument was that the United Nations, through
Resolution 2758, recognised that the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate
government of China and Taiwan was a part of China. Any member country, who
wished to support a part of member country to join the UN would violate that country's
sovereignty and the UN Charter.
4. 3. C. Beijing's Counter Offence
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It seems that the Mainland authorities in Beijing chose to counter Taiwan's
international offensive by highlighting the PRC's unquestioned right to govern the
whole of China, including Taiwan. This could be seen from Beijing's overall emphasis
on formal statehood and absolute national sovereignty, which justified its sensitivity to
external interference in Chinese domestic affairs. The PRC's logic was that if a state
accepted it as legitimate government of China and Taiwan being part of China, then the
process of reunification was an internal Chinese matter in which no foreigners should
be involved. The principle of non-interference rendered unacceptable any external
pressures on the question of Taiwan and reunification, or any efforts by Taipei to utilise
the international environment to its political advantage vis-a-vis Beijing.135
This argument was also the underlying theme of a 1993 Beijing White Paper on
Taiwan, particularly in passages regarding the latter's status in the international system
and regarding Beijing's range of legitimate means to resolve this issue. In the White
Paper, Beijing argued that UN membership was restricted purely to sovereign nation-
states, that the world society had with near unanimity recognised the People's Republic
as the sole sovereign national government of China (including Taiwan province) and the
legitimate representative of China in all international organisations, and as a result, there
was no question whatsoever of Taipei's returning as a member of the United Nations,
which was made up by sovereign nation-state. In the same document, Beijing also
asserted that its refusal to forswear the use of military force as means of resolving the
Taiwan issue was predicated upon the legitimate right of a sovereign nation to protect
the integrity of its territorial boundaries by any means thought necessary.136
Beijing's argument that Taiwan was not a nation was based on several points.
First, they pointed to the origin of the Taiwan issue. Taiwan argued that since the two
Koreas and the two Germanys are or used to be members of the UN, Taiwan should
also be accepted alongside the Mainland. To counter the argument that the state of
separation across the Taiwan Strait was the same as those between the two Koreas or
the two Germanys before their unification, the Mainland authorities used the cause of
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China's disunification as an argument that China's sovereignty remained complete. The
Mainland's counter argument was that the circumstances in Germany, Korea, and China
were not comparable. They claimed that unlike the case of the two Koreas, who were
divided into separate sovereign states as a result of international agreement at the end of
the Korean War, the separation of China was caused by the result of the defeat of the
Guo Min Dang in China's civil war and foreign intervention in China's internal affairs.
"The confrontation between Taiwan and the Mainland was brought about by the Guo
Min Dang regime's escape to Taiwan after being defeated by the Chinese revolutionary
people and the protection offered to the Taiwan authorities by foreign powers."137
Taiwan was therefore only a temporarily separated from China while China's
sovereignty and territory remained complete. Hence it "can not be compared in nature to
the separation of either Germany or Korea. "138
The end purpose of this exercise of the Chinese government to emphasise its
legitimacy as the sole government for both the Mainland and Taiwan was to underline to
the international community that Taiwan is only a region of China's, and should be
accorded the appropriate status in international affairs. Starting from such an argument,
the Chinese government and its leaders repeatedly and steadfastly made the point that
Taiwan should not join the international community as an independent entity because
neither did the majority of nations recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state nor do the
people of Taiwan favoured independence. This was also the reason for Qian Qichen to
suggest that Taiwan could admitted into APEC as an economic region. 139
Hence, when a high level Taiwanese official declared that the Chinese nation was
"temporarily divided into two Chinas" and that Taiwan had sovereignty over the
territory actually under its control at the close of the 1993 informal APEC Summit
Meeting in Seattle in response to Beijing's public claims of sovereignty over the island,
Chinese officials immediately responded by criticising the unlawfulness of such claims.
The Chinese government also battled hard to prevent Taiwan's president and foreign
minister from attending APEC meetings, both ministerial and the informal summit. As
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they publicly demanded that China's sovereignty be respected, large amount of
diplomatic activities were carried out behind the scenes to make sure that the hosting
countries of APEC meetings only invited Taiwan's economy minister. 1'
Despite of the fact that the Chinese government or academia never openly linked
China's participation in APEC with that of Taiwan, it is not difficult to believe that one
of the reasons that China joined APEC was to prevent Taiwan from using APEC as a
stage for it to argue its case for independence. This is so because the PRC government
took Taiwan's anxious desire to participate in this forum, and to send its top political
leaders to its meetings as a part of the stepped-up campaign to return to the international
community, where it still could find certain amount of support for its cause. This is very
much part of China's scheme to preserve its favourable international environment.
Should the Mainland government felt that Taiwan's independence movement was
getting out of hand, China would certainly intervene, with military force if
necessary. 141 This kind of scenario would certainly cause problems for China in the
wider international community, which would damage the stable and beneficial
international relations that China had worked hard to establish.
Conclusion
As the analysis in this chapter has shown, China's participation in the process of
bringing about economic cooperation among the Asia-Pacific countries should be seen
as a key part of its strategy to obtain and maintain a long-lasting favourable international
environment to allow it to concentrate on domestic economic development. Since
China's export-oriented strategy shifted its emphasis onto utilising China's almost
limitless cheap labour, it became highly necessary for China to secure both the
necessary means to produce better value-added goods and the market which was
capable of absorbing such goods. The Asia-Pacific countries, particularly the APEC
countries, were found to fit well into this strategy. An equally important motive was
China's wish to benefit from the existing structure of intra-regional trade and economic
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relations, and to make sure that China would fit into the future intra-regional division of
labour. It was held by the Chinese that China's labour resources and level of technology
made it possible to conduct cooperation with almost all the APEC countries, many of
whom were believed to want to enter into such cooperation with China. Since APEC
was designed to influence the pattern of intra-regional economic relations, it is only
natural for China to join APEC as trade and economic relations with the other APEC
members are the most important.
The long-lasting favourable international environment also has a political side to it.
Before the Cold War ended, the main concern for the Chinese leadership was to assume
a position from which it could deal with threats from either of the super powers. This
endeavour was characterised by shifting alignment between the super powers to balance
off the most threatening one. In the post-Cold War era, China's biggest challenge was
believed to be the rapid increase in its comprehensive national strength, the old strategy
of balance of power lost much of its significance. Instead, stable and healthy relations
with all of its neighbouring countries became one of the most important foreign policy
target. But the PRC did not find it easy to make sure that its relations with its most
important neighbours would remain so in the post-Tian An Men period as well as in the
aftermath of the Cold War. Therefore, a forum like APEC, in which Chinese officials
could come into direct contact with all of China's Asia-Pacific neighbours, was
regarded by the PRC to be a most important means to maintain a long-lasting favourable
international environment.
China's decision to become an APEC member was also motivated by Taiwan's
admission as a full member of this forum. It was the result of the strategy of following
the second best choice, since China could not have the benefits that the process of
economic co-operation could offer it without making certain concessions over Taiwan's
membership. However, it would certainly not be in China's interests to see Taiwan use
this forum to advance its return to the international stage as an independent entity. As it
has been shown above, the PRC always insists that it is the legitimate government of
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the whole of China, including Taiwan. It is plausible to believe that the PRC saw its
APEC membership as the best way to ensure that Taiwan is treated as an economic
region by the other APEC members. This could let China kill two birds with one stone,
preventing Taiwan going too far along the road of independence while enjoying
whatever economic and political benefit that this forum could yield.
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Chapter Five. Regional Collectivism Versus Balance of Power
As was set out at the beginning, the purpose of this study is to ascertain whether
the PRC can work cooperatively with other countries, particularly its Asia-Pacific
neighbours in a multilateral framework. The answer has been sought by examining how
and why China participated in the multilateral economic cooperative forum: APEC.
However, in order to put China's participation in APEC in a wider perspective, the
study started off by looking at how a regional identity has emerged among the Asia-
Pacific countries on one hand and what kind of a cooperative structure has been set up
in this region on the other. What this study has shown is that China's A PEC
membership indicates that it has very strong reasons to enter into multilateral
cooperation with its Asia-Pacific neighbours. This is because in the post-Cold War era,
China's traditional method of securing a favourable international environment, i.e. the
balance of power between the super powers, has lost most, if not all, of its relevance.
On the other hand, it is hardly possible for China to ignore multilateral cooperation with
its Asia-Pacific neighbours.
5. 1. Rising Collectivism & Declining Balance of Power
As it has been shown, there are important internal and external reasons for China to
consider adopting regional collectivism as a key principle guiding its foreign policy.
Externally, a clear regional identity has emerged among the Asia-Pacific countries,
though the Asia-Pacific is a vast, heterogeneous region in geographical and cultural
terms. This is proved by the strong tendency of the governments in this region to
consider and adopt multilateral measures to deal with issues in their relations. This is
clearly due to the developments in the intra-regional political relations, which have
helped these countries realise that they share large amount of common interests and
common problems. If the emergence of ASEAN and the normalisation of Sino-US
relations were developments which only gave rise to some major changes in the intra-
regional relations, then the end of the Cold War proved to the Asia-Pacific countries that
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it had become necessary for them to adopt collective measures to deal with the intra-
regional issues.
A far more important factor is the fundamental economic changes occurred in this
region. The emergence of a number of countries with rapidly increasing economic
power has turned this region into another centre in the world economy. Supported by
different comparative advantages and intra-regional flow of investments and transfer of
production activities, a strong momentum of economic development has been sustained.
The region's economic dynamism is increasingly self-generated. In the meantime, the
Pacific Asian countries have emerged as significant markets as well as production
bases. Therefore the APEC countries are the most important trade partners for each
other. This type of intra-regional economic and trade relations urge the Asia-Pacific
countries to adopt multilateral means to deal with the issues in their economic relations.
Such developments in the intra-regional political and economic relations have led to a
convergence of interests among these countries, and therefore a sense of identity.
So far as the economic issues are concerned, the Asia-Pacific.countries chose to set
up APEC, a region-wide, multilateral forum; to deal with these issues. Obviously this is
due to, first and foremost, academic promotion and political support. Driven by the
need of their respective countries, Japanese and Australian academics, represented by
Kiyoshi Kojima and Peter Drysdale, have argued strongly for Asia-Pacific economic
cooperation. Their promotion have received strong support from their governments, and
later from the US congress and government, which has kept the process moving
forward. An equally important factor is that economic cooperation found increasing
support in the rest of the Asia-Pacific countries. As dictated by the direction of their
countries' foreign economic and trade relations, these countries are highly interested in
stabilising such relations through multilateral means, which are accepted to be more
efficient. These countries' interests have ensured that cooperation not only focuses on
economic issues but also is Asia-Pacific in scope. APEC's main functions at the present
are promotion of regional trade liberalisation, trans-national investment and prevention
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of protectionism by emphasising communication and co-ordination at the policy level.
The long-term target of APEC is to form an open regional free trade area to strengthen
the global liberal trade regime.
The regional identity emerged among the Asia-Pacific countries and the set-up of
APEC provided strong external incentives for China to consider regional collectivism in
the form of APEC. But the domestic considerations for China to do so are even more
significant. China joined APEC following a long process, which saw the PRC's
position and reaction to multilateral economic cooperation evolve from opposition to
support to participation. This process also saw Chinese academics and government
officials gradually realised that the PRC ought to join its Asia-Pacific neighbours to
work out collective measures to deal with issues that affect all of them. Change in
perception occurred because of the reform policy and the relaxation of the political
conditions, which removed the ideological restraint to develop close trade and economic
relations with countries which used to be Cold War enemies. The change in perception
was not reversed even after Tian An Men square followed by economic and political
sanctions by the major western countries. Instead, China became even more anxious to
join the process to construct economic cooperation once it was raised to the official
level.
This clearly indicates what the PRC was concerned about was the possibility of
being left out of a process that is set to have significant impact on the region. Another
technical consideration seems to be that the Chinese government believed that APEC by
nature was easier to accept, and would allow it to have certain amount of influence in it.
APEC remains a forum, whose decisions have only started getting more influential on
its member countries. This offers China a certain amount flexibility. The aim to turn the
Asia-Pacific region into an open free trade area by 2020 is also significant because it
gives China more time to narrow the gap with the stronger countries. It will also put
China in a stronger position in dealing with other countries over trade related issues.1
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The anxiousness of the Chinese government to join APEC was apparently caused
by its nature and characteristics. There are in fact other domestic considerations which
carried more weight than APEC's official nature. The pragmatic Chinese leadership of
the Deng Xiaoping era, who were, including Deng Xiaoping himself, deeply impressed
with the material wealth of the capitalist countries, particularly China's East Asian
neighbours, were awakened to the fact that China could become powerful only through
developing rapidly its comprehensive national strength. Earlier attempts to transplant
modern technology and equipment bartered with Chinese oil and other raw materials
soon ran into trouble as domestic demand for energy and other raw materials shot up.
Even Deng's idea of special economic zones did not work well at first.
This forced the Chinese leadership to come up with other more effective measures.
The development experiences of China's East Asian neighbours and the new round of
technology upgrading and external transfer by both Asia-Pacific developed countries
and NIEs turned the Chinese leaders' attention to the huge Chinese population. They
realised that the Chinese population could be turned from a liability into an asset. They
decided that the strategy of "transplant" must be replaced by the externally oriented
strategy of development But the PRC needed foreign investment and market to achieve
that. The Asia-Pacific countries were thought to be ready to meet China's requirement
for investment and matket. Since APEC is meant to maintain the momentum of
economic growth in this region through communication and coordination at the policy
level, being a member of it would apparently help the PRC to maintain close economic
and trade relations with the other member countries.
This was explained by Chinese academics and officials as efforts to obtain a
favourable international environment for domestic development. But Deng Xiaoping
and other Chinese leaders also realised that the favourable international environment had
a political dimension as well. The end of the Cold War not only removed the necessity
for the PRC to shift between the super powers to ensure its security, but also
strengthened the Chinese leaders' belief that China must develop its economy rapidly so
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as to keep up with the fast developing Asia-Pacific region. Domestically, the Chinese
communist party also had to produce high growth in order to ward off challenges to its
rule. But they could not turn China into a developed country quickly. They needed a
long-lasting favourable international environment to do so. They therefore would not
want Taiwan's efforts to expand its international space to spoil this. Since other APEC
members preferred strongly to include Taiwan, the PRC chose to ignore the sensitivity
of the issue of sovereignty to join APEC. The aim was to maintain and expand positive
political relations with the Asia-Pacific countries on one hand and prevent the issue of
Taiwan getting out of control on the other.2
The PRC's APEC membership should therefore be regarded as a strong indication
that it is inclined to work collectively and cooperatively with the other Asia-Pacific
countries. Any other choices would mean the eventual abandonment of the policy of
reform and opening to the outside world, whose success depend on better and stronger
economic and political relations with its Asia-Pacific countries. The post Tian An Men
policies of the Chinese government seem to stress that is not on their agenda. Another
factor, which is likely to cause the PRC to give up its intention to work with the other
Asia-Pacific countries, is for the Asia-Pacific countries to abandon the present policy of
active engagement. Though these countries are getting ready to contain a potentially
aggressive China, but the emphasis of the present policies towards China is still on
engagement.
5. 2. A Foreign Policy Adjustment with Long-term Effects
For over forty years since the founding of the PRC in 1949, major foreign policy
adjustments have by no means been rare. China's APEC membership represented
another major foreign policy adjustment in response to the new international
environment in the post-Cold War era. It indicates that the Asia-Pacific region became
the focus of the PRC's foreign relations. What is equally important is it indicates that a
significantly new concept had been incorporated into the government's foreign policy
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thinking. Collectivism had been accepted as an effective measure to achieve foreign
policy targets. This is certainly going to have long-term effects on the evolution of
Chinese foreign policy as well as on China's relations with its Asia-Pacific neighbours.
Each time when the PRC made major foreign policy adjustment, it was for some
fundamentally crucial reason. This can be proved by the major foreign policy
adjustments in the past, particularly the adjustments made vis-a-vis the super powers.
For instance, it was Mao's determination not to sacrifice China's independence that
caused the Sino-Soviet split at the beginning of the 1960s. At that time, China could not
afford to see its relations with the Soviet Union deteriorate for both internal and external
reasons. 3 A more typical case was the normalisation of Sino-US relations. It was for
the sake of national security. When China and the Soviet Union went separate ways
back in the early 1960s, the Soviet Union did not openly threat China with military
invasion. Therefore China did not face pressure from both the north and the south. 4 But
the border conflicts towards the end of the 1960s made Mao Zedong and his comrades
realise that only a strategic partnership with western capitalist countries would restrain
the Soviet Union from posing more serious dangers to China.5
The thaw in Sino-Soviet relations in the 1980s was an even better illustration of this
point. As it was shown in last chapter, it was the PRC's desire for better international
strategic environment that made it move to the middle ground between the super
powers. In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration was thought to lean towards
Taiwan. The Chinese government found that this was not in China's favour. It needed
to balance it off by improving relations with the Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping and his
followers held that it was not possible for China to concentrate its resources on
economic development if it was going to be confronted with a situation harking back to
the 1960s, when China was on the opposite side to both the United States and the
Soviet Union. The United States must be stopped from "bullying" China. Yet China
must maintain the international circumstances which were generally good for its
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economic development. Therefore, the Sino-Soviet relations were only brought back to
the level of normal state-to-state relations.6
This study has shown that this latest adjustment was motivated by the
government's overriding priority of rapid economic development. As I have
demonstrated in last chapter, what prompted the Chinese government to ensure that
China was quickly admitted as a full APEC member was their concern that China would
face the danger of being left alone by the emerging regional multilateral structure. This
would obviously affect adversely China's externally oriented strategy of economic
development. The post "cultural revolution" Chinese government was clear that self-
reliance behind closed doors was not going to turn China into a modern nation equal to
western powers. It would have to open its doors to the outside world to acquire the
means to realise modernisation. Chinese policy makers were convinced that the Asia-
Pacific region offered them the best chance to do so.
Rapid economic development was accorded even more importance after the collapse
of the East European Communism. Challenged by demands for more political freedom
and participation, the Chinese government found that the communist ideology had lost
its attraction. The only way for it to claim legitimacy to govern was to make the
economy grow even faster. However, strong economic development is an on-going
issue which can not be settled forever. This together with all the above reasons have
made the new change in the Chinese foreign policy thinking long-lasting.
5. 3. China's Future Relations with the Asia-Pacific Countries
What implications does the APEC membership have for the PRC's foreign policy
towards and behaviour in the Asia-Pacific region? It is always difficult to predict the
.future development of Chinese foreign policy. Nevertheless, certain rough ideas can be
deduced from this study. What has become clear is that China is going to devote more
attention to, and to be involved more deeply in, the affairs of the Asia-Pacific region in a
more positive manner. The kind of hostile attitude and strong attack on regional
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collective schemes back in the late 1960s will not make a come-back. Hence China will
likely adopt more conciliatory and cooperative positions on matters concerning its
interests, while making sure that its interests will not have to sustain too much damage.
As matter of fact, China has already adopted such an approach in dealing with matters
of this kind. The way that China handled the dispute over Spratleys7 has proved that
China is ready to adopt less hostile positions on issues regarded as crucial.
It can also be expected that China will begin to resort more to collective measures in
handling intra-regional political and economic issues and problems, rather than resorting
to those based on the concept of balance of power. This is determined by the fact that
the intra-regional issues and problems facing China today are no longer those that China
could deal with only by seeking the support of one power or one group of powers
against another or another group. In addition, China will face more issues and problems
that will make it vital for it to adopt collective measures. Should the APEC forum be
given more real power in the settlement of regional trade and economic issues, China
will rely more on this mechanism. For instance, China is most likely to join those
APEC member countries to mount more pressure on the United States and Japan to
increase access to their markets.
But this hardly means that China will give up other options just for APEC. How
much China is going to rely on APEC to find solutions to problems in its trade and
economic relations with other member countries, and how far it is going to accept the
influence of this forum, will largely depend on its effectiveness. If China finds that
APEC can not offer what it really wants from it, it can be expected that China will try to
find alternatives to APEC. The other factor affecting China's attitude towards APEC is
how soon China will join the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Should this come in
the very near future, APEC's importance will probably shrink, since WTO membership
is more effective in resolving China's immediate foreign problems. Nevertheless, even
China were to join the WTO soon, APEC will continue to be important for China
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simply for those reasons explained in last chapter. As a result, APEC will remain highly
important in Chinese foreign policy considerations.
Similarly, China is expected to assume a more conciliatory and co-operative attitude
to the bilateral relations with its Asia-Pacific neighbours. It is also likely to resort more
to this collective format in dealing with bilateral issues. First of all, it is most likely to
use APEC to gain more access to the markets of the developed countries, and to deal
with bilateral trade and economic issues with the rest of the APEC countries. As far as
the United States is concerned, China will likely to continue to use APEC to influence
US leaders and policy. China is most likely to resort more to APEC in dealing with
American protectionism, since it is subjected to similar pressures to those faced by
many other APEC countries. APEC is probably going to be used by China as a kind of
a shield protecting it against pressures from the United States as well. For instance,
China may use APEC to argue against the US intention to treat China as an
economically developed country.
As for Sino-Japanese relations, APEC's significance is expected to be economic.
While access to the Japanese market is highly important, China is expected to influence
through APEC Japanese policy of direct foreign investment and aid. As it was shown in
chapter two and chapter four, Japanese overseas aid and FDI are highly important for
China, who is obviously concerned with any shift in Japanese aid policy. In this
respect, China is in the same boat with the ASEAN developing countries. Should more
Japanese EDT and overseas aid be shifted to ASEAN, China will see its share shrink.
As a result, China will use APEC to influence Japan's policies in these areas. This goes
for those countries that are important sources of FDI as well. China will certainly be
more knowledgeable about these countries' policy intentions, which will allow it to
become more adept at adjusting its own policies.
As an information gathering and communicating forum, China will gain through
APEC more understanding about the ASEAN developing countries, who have been
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shown as competing with China for market and investment due to the similarity in their
development levels. This will assist China in selecting the key areas of development.
This will certainly be true for the ASEAN developing countries too. It can be expected
that there will be more communication and co-ordination between China and these
countries under the auspices of APEC.
What will be interesting to see is what will happen to trade and economic relations
and political relations between Mainland China and Taiwan. The effect appears to be
more negative than positive. It is to be expected that China will continue to do all it can
to prevent APEC from becoming the arena for Taiwan to realise its ambition to return to
the international community. This will be taken, at least by the authorities in Taiwan, as
a negative gesture by the Mainland. What is more, should APEC bring about a region-
wide free trade area, Taiwan will find that it will have even less reason to develop wide-
ranging contacts with the Mainland. For all these reasons, APEC is capable of hindering
the contacts and exchanges between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait.
Despite the fact that Taiwan has tried hard to avoid being overshadowed by the
Mainland, contact is not avoidable. This is recognised by Taiwan as wel1.8 APEC can
also become another channel of contacts between the Mainland and Taiwan. Exchanges,
particularly indirect exchanges, will increase. They will undoubtedly be quite frequent
between lower-level officials. Whether it is going to be used for reunification purposes
remains to be seen. But what is certain is more understanding of each other, although
this may be limited to policies related to international economic and trade issues.
However, a series of variables will play important parts in this respect.
Despite all these uncertainties and variables, China is expected to continue to attach
a great deal of importance to APEC in its external policies and foreign political,
economic and trade relations. China will also use the APEC forum to influence the
process of regional economic integration. China's concern is focused on the speed at
which regional integration will happen in this region. China is also anxious to see that
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no big powers will use APEC to impose their will upon the weaker countries. Chinese
President Jiang Zemin pointed out at the 1993 Seattle informal summit that economic
integration in the Asia-Pacific region should proceed in a slow and assured manner, and
that differences between the Asia-Pacific countries should be respected. 9 Nevertheless,
China is most likely to explore actively how regional economic co-operation can be
brought forward through APEC, and how China will be able to function effectively in
this framework. One can believe that collectivism, both regional and global, is likely to
feature more prominently in China's foreign policy considerations and behaviour.
224
1. See Renmin Ribao, 22 November 1991, P. 7.
2. The Chinese government' policy over Taiwan is, should Taiwan go too far along the
road to independence, China would have no other choice but to use military means to unify
China. See Yang Shangkun, "Interview with Journalists from Taiwan", Renmin Ribao, 26
March 1992, p. 1.
3. See Han Nianlong, Diplomacy of Contemporary China, 1992, pp. 131--148.
4. Ibid.
5. See Section Two, Chapter One for more on this point.
6• See Li Jingzhong, Sitio-Soviet Relations, 1989.
7. China has indicated that she is ready to join those countries claiming sovereignty over
these islands in joint development. During the recent dispute with the Philippines in which
China set up some structures and the Philippines responded by showing a group of foreign
journalists to these islands, China showed such attitudes. See Far Eastern Economic
Review, Vol. 158, No. 22, 1 June 1995, pp. 20--21.
8• See reports in Zhongyang Ribao, 16--20 November 1993, p. 1.
9. See Renmin Ribao, 20 November 1993, p. 1.
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